

Vol. X, No. 3

SUMMER 1960

CURRENTS

*A QUARTERLY REVIEW
to explore the implications
of Christianity for our times*

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CROSS CURRENTS is available (to subscribers only) on microfilm. Address inquiries, including those for back volumes, to University Microfilms, 313-1st Ave., Ann Arbor, Mich.

CROSS CURRENTS is published quarterly by Cross Currents Corporation, a non-profit membership corporation at 103 Valley View Road, West Nyack, N.Y. 2nd class mail privileges authorized at West Nyack, N. Y. Editorial communications should be addressed to Joseph E. Cunneen, Valley View Road, West Nyack, N.Y. Elmwood 8-4898. Subscriptions should be sent to Cross Currents Quarterly, 3805 Dovedale Court, Randallstown, Md. The price is \$1 per issue, \$3.50 per yearly subscription (U.S. & Canada). Foreign \$4. U.S. distributor: B. de Boer, 102 Beverly St., Bloomfield, N.J. Printed in the U.S.A. by Waldon Press, 150 Lafayette St., New York 15, N.Y. Walker 5-4744. Copyright 1960 by Cross Currents Corporation. 341

THE REALISM OF MORAL PURPOSE IN FOREIGN POLICY

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

EVENTS OF RECENT DAYS surrounding the collapse of summit negotiations have been deeply unsettling to most Americans. No one who loves peace can feel any elation at the breakdown of high-level talks in Paris. There are signs that we are in for a renewed period of threat, counter-threat and heightened tension in the cold war. The chief source of disaster lies in the crude and violent Soviet tactics, which have been explained by experts on Russian behavior as part of a relentless strategy of "advance and retreat." According to this diagnosis, Soviet leaders subordinate every moral and political judgment to the single purpose of whether or not it serves Russian expansion. When we urge one another to establish a "national purpose" as clear and unequivocal as the Soviet purpose, we ought to reflect on what the effect of this would be on an independent moral standard. Morality is a matter of both means and ends, and the summit crisis throws light on its dual nature.

Americans in the period between two World Wars were often exhorted to seek world peace through international law and novel world institutions. Many loyal and responsible persons in the aftermath of World War I felt a deep sense of shame and guilt since, although Woodrow Wilson had been the prophet of world law and order, the Senate, following his return from the Paris Peace Conference, repudiated the League of Nations. The generation which comprised

the nation's intellectual leaders and included such men as Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, and James Shotwell, President of the Carnegie Endowment, called for rededication to world organization and effective world law. Their resolve and conviction along with that of many others paved the way for American sponsorship of the United Nations and a new International Court.

Perhaps because these international goals were so largely realized, postwar leaders have concentrated increasingly on another aspect of America's responsibility in the world. Recent history makes abundantly clear that new and more orderly forms of international relationships have not altered a basic requirement in world politics. A nation that aspires to world leadership must achieve a clear image of its role in the world, the purposes for which it stands, and the policies its security and traditions require of it. A great power that calls on the world to embrace international values must first enunciate its national values and trace out their points of contact and consistency with universal and world-wide values. Nor will it do to affirm that the rest of the world should pursue our goals, worthy as they may be. The needs of men are too variegated, and there are many mansions in the present international society.

In the eyes of the rest of the world, the United States is frequently less successful in articulating narrow, working national purposes than broad international goals. Even our friendly critics abroad point to the gap between what we do and what we say. The annals of inter-state relations clearly attest that

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other world leaders from the time of the Roman Empire to the British Commonwealth share with us the dubious privilege of being objects of widespread criticism. However, their shortcomings and the apparent inevitability of attacks cannot excuse us from the task of marking out the ethical guide lines for America's conduct in the world.

Superficially, American thought has always been sensitive and alert to the ethical challenges of the day. As President Calvin Coolidge found that his clergyman was "against sin," most Americans are "for virtue." Almost every private and public national commission pays tribute to the central importance of ethical purpose. By contrast countries like Germany or Italy in the 1930's were imperiled by excessive moral cynicism. In those years whole societies and peoples were seized by a prevailing belief that "might makes right." This has seldom been an American affliction. We tend to pursue national goals, even overwhelmingly materialistic ones, in a spirit of religious fervor. A recent advertisement blandly, indeed blasphemously, described one free enterprise program as a means of promoting "the Jesus-way of life."

Over most recent statements of ethical purpose hovers the risk that they are premature or insufficient. They neglect the means by which goals are pursued or sometimes they erect means into ends. Justice in Marxist eyes is the attainment of a classless society and the total alleviation of poverty. Liberal democratic theories of the 19th century put their stress on the individual and his good to the exclusion of the interest of great collective groupings. Many statements of social and political ethics assume that clarity of ends negates the importance of a discussion of means. Statesmen are prone to fix attention on glowing national purposes heedless of the means

that either fulfill or corrupt broad purposes. The problem is one that extends to every aspect of human life. A loving but domineering father mistreats his son for "his own good." The Communist oligarchy exacts human and material sacrifices in the name of a classless society. A harsh executive demands absolute loyalty and imposes excessive burdens upon employees ostensibly for the good of the corporation, actually for his own self-aggrandizement. The ethical doctrines of men and nations are so consistently premature and insufficient because they deliberately or unconsciously ignore the truth that the taint of self-interest is almost never absent. Partial and fragmentary acts of justice are cast in the frame of universal justice partly because self-serving individual and collective aspirations are served thereby.

The problem is nowhere more acute than in western society in the second half of the 20th century. The doctrines of religious philosophers like Albert Schweitzer may have less relevance for such a society than they have for a basically primitive society. By contrast, more attuned to present-day needs may be the political writings of theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr, historians and philosophers like Herbert Butterfield and Jacques Maritain, and jurists like Prof. Charles de Visser. Chester I. Barnard, former President of the Rockefeller Foundation, has pointed out that theologians are wont to speak "of a nomadic and simple agricultural life—of sheep and lambs, of shepherds—in an industrial age in which the majority have no experience of rural life." The present day world bears almost no resemblance to the ancient world of saints and prophets. Its hallmark is human behavior in the aggregate; it suffers from the clash of great collectivities each a law and morality unto itself. Big industries, big unions and big government dominate

the national scene. The nation-state giving tolerable satisfaction to its members is the prevailing organization of the international arena. Individuals who are robbed of self-fulfillment by the fragmentary nature of rewards that most vocations provide turn to the great leviathans. The precariousness of man's existence, his limited satisfactions, and his unquenchable will to power and prestige lead him to seek recognition where he can. More often than not, he finds it vicariously as his nation or his corporation achieves greatness. Unfulfilled aspirations channeled into national ambitions generate the fierce enthusiasm and crusading zeal of today's nationalism. The more intense the self-alienation of individuals, the more extravagant their national fervor. The German *lumpen* proletariat are, of course, the classic case because of the role they played during the era of National Socialism. This disinherited element became a major carrier of Nazi dogma since it assured them admission to the middle class from which they had fallen during a period of intense economic crisis. Similarly, the marginal white worker is often most resistant to changes in exclusively white neighborhoods. Insecure and uncertain persons, because they can realize themselves only in the group, lose their identity and with it their critical faculties. They accept unquestioningly the group's moral judgments because ambition and self-respect require it; they reinforce the spirit of national self-righteousness, for in Mussolini's words, "Sixty million Italians can't be wrong." In the end, they help make great collectives like the nation morally autonomous communities.

The belief in "my nation right or wrong" illustrates but one important illusion in the quest for moral purpose. It is an illusion that gives one aspect of moral judgment supremacy; it concludes prematurely that inevitably my

state is morally righteous. But this viewpoint is not sufficient for an observer who tries to demarcate national purpose. He must face the stubborn realities inherent in the situation within which national purpose must be formulated. He must come to terms with the ethical problems raised by the nature of foreign policy. I propose to enumerate a few of these realities touching the process, problems, and the dimensions of foreign policy.

The Process of Foreign Policy

THE INCREDIBLE COMPLEXITY of the process by which present-day foreign policy is formulated is the first datum point deserving consideration. In the 18th and 19th centuries, peace required the agreement of a handful of rulers whose judgments and opinions were tantamount to decisions. As I have suggested, they shared a common moral universe and were at home with one another's political discourse. They were not more virtuous than other men but their virtue and objectives were mutually perceived and frequently accepted.

In democracies, the anatomy of a foreign policy decision is infinitely more complicated. Our allies and friends abroad are continually bewildered in their search for a point of decision within our sprawling political system or the question of where we stand on NATO or other policies. Where in the machinery of government is an issue at any given time? Who is responsible? Is it the Executive, Legislature or Judiciary? With whom ought the representative of foreign countries to consult: the President, Secretary of State or an Ambassador? How reconcile conflicting policy statements? Who coordinates and who decides? The Secretary of State historically was responsible for marshalling and ordering the business of foreign policy, but with the multiplication of non-

political agencies for economic, cultural and propaganda purposes has come a diffusion of decision and action. Policies are continually being reformulated and renegotiated and key officers like the Secretary and President must through their representatives round up support for each new program. Like sheepdogs they rally their followers and bring them into line behind a continually changing policy. Beyond external pressures, hundreds of factors leave their imprint on policy: tides of public opinion, dominant personalities, the President's or Secretary's concept of his office, and the scope of legislative bipartisanship. The relative influence of each of these forces makes firm political and moral judgments hard to come by.

The point of this full recital of the complexities of the foreign policy process is that collective morality is invariably less simple and unambiguous than personal ethics. The latter commonly involves the relations between two individuals. Each must bear moral obligations and responsibilities to the other. In democratic foreign policy, obligation is frequently diffused and obscured. Burke's dictum has relevance, for it remains essentially true that no one has found a way to indict a whole people nor can anyone point the finger in most decisions to a single individual who is accountable. Every day somewhere in the world some American official attending an international conference is expected to state United States policy. But who is responsible: the representative or those who have drawn up his instructions? And what of those conferences for which instructions are incomplete and officials on the spot are compelled to improvise a policy?

Officials representing the U.S. are in attendance daily at approximately a dozen international conferences; Secretary Dulles during the early months

of his office met with committees or subcommittees of Congress nearly twice a week. High officials particularly in recent years are asked to approve policies contained in position papers for which only a tiny fraction of the supporting evidence is put forward. Can responsibility be fixed at the level of top officials—the chiefs—or does it also rest with the so-called Indians at the working level? If so, how are we to divide responsibility in some appropriate fraction among those who recommend and those who decide, when the latter do not share all the evidence? The issue of the U-2 plane is only the latest and most dramatic example of the problem. Who in the vast network of intelligence operations made the decision regarding the overflight of Soviet territory, and who ought to be expected to carry responsibility for this unhappy and tragic course of events?

Foreign Policy Problems

THE COMPLEXITY of moral judgment is not solely the result of the diffusion of decision-making within free political systems. It also inheres in the nature and scope of the problems themselves and the pace at which they must be resolved. Outsiders often see foreign policy problems as clear-cut moral issues: peace or war, negotiations or conflict, support of the United Nations or selfish nationalism. However, the form of contemporary problems is almost never so simple. Before there can be a decision on policy, someone must frame the question. The vast majority of questions are practical, specific, even narrow in scope. Should a visa be granted? Ought trade arrangements be modified? What are the grounds for negotiating a treaty? Is now the time for a visit by the chief executive of a neutral country? Such questions are practical issues in which the moral problem is several stages removed. Hav-

ing in mind the preponderance of decisions of this kind, a State Department official observed that in thirty years of foreign service he could not recall a single case in which issues had been weighed primarily in ethical terms.

Once valid questions are formulated, some of course answer themselves. Others may not be susceptible to answers and still other problems deteriorate before any answer is possible. Some questions are resolved by obsolescence and others must be reformulated before officials can deal effectively with them. A former Assistant Secretary of State tells of keeping each year a personal list of the sixty or seventy most urgent problems that appeared on his agenda for action. Coming back to the list a year later, the Secretary was astounded at the number of problems that time had resolved or that had over time been translated into other issues. Doing nothing may be a policy no less than taking decisive action. Yet the public sees in inaction a sign of weakness or immorality or both.

In fact, the private citizen and particularly the moralist does no one a service by merely exhorting from the sidelines. He who persistently calls for a new policy for this area or that problem misunderstands the nature of foreign policy. His voice is like that of a man calling from the platform to a friend caught in the subway rush. For the friend crushed and hemmed in by surging humanity the outsider can hardly be of much help. The milieu in which the two men must act is so utterly different that insistent demands to do this or that can only be confusing. The most recurrent example of the relationship between men living in two worlds is that of the scientist and policymaker. When Bertrand Russell views foreign policy problems through the "squint" of the natural scientist, he is counselling a course of action that has

less immediate consequence for viable programs of action than he imagines. For almost all the rational and predictable patterns familiar to him as a scientist are missing from the political realm.

The New Dimensions of Foreign Policy

FURTHER, THE PACE and magnitude of international problems or their dimensions conspire to complicate moral judgment. From the days of the first Secretary for Foreign Affairs, John Jay, the office and its duties have radically changed. Some of the early Secretaries succeeded in combining part-time legal practice with diplomatic duties. During his years as Secretary Thomas Jefferson wrote he had not heard from the Ambassador in Madrid for two years. If no word were forthcoming, Jefferson proposed to write his envoy. John Jay's office numbered an assistant and two or three secretaries, barely enough to enable someone to remain in the office while colleagues were at lunch. Today the Department has over 20,000 employees and representatives in more than one hundred countries. Today the cable volume of the Department exceeds that of the Associated Press and the United Press. On every important issue, the United States is expected to have a policy—not in due course but immediately. News of the Iraqi Revolution and the overthrow of the Nuri Said regime reached Secretary John Foster Dulles in the early morning hours and before the day had passed, the United States was expected to announce its policy.

Until World War II, it was probably sufficient for the United States to have viable policies in Europe and a few scattered outposts in Asia. Today with France and Britain terminating responsibilities in the Middle East and Africa, the United States has become increasingly involved. To meet the new obligations, the President and Secretary have

become the world's most avid travelers. Most Americans know that Secretary Dulles was clocked in record travel but, less widely noted, Secretary Herter spent forty-three of his first fifty-six days outside the country. In the jet age, the time for serious reflection on all the facts has become more and more difficult. One casualty of modern technology has been the time for moral anguish in which world leaders could search their consciences as Lincoln, McKinley and Wilson did in past moments of American history. In other words, the expansion of the international system has further complicated the moral problem.

The Rediscovery of Purpose

IN THE FACE of these massive and far-reaching changes in the anatomy of foreign policy, the observer asks himself whether moral purpose is obsolete in foreign policy. Are ethics in world politics like a living organism that in a changing environment loses its earlier function? Or can we point to areas in which men and states can rediscover a sense of national purpose consistent with the goals of others?

I would point to at least four spheres in which personal ethics and religious values have a central role to play. The first is the domain of the individual, of personal ethics and of one man's attitude toward another. The second is the domain of national life and the values men share as citizens in search of the good life in a more tolerable society. The third is the domain of a national approach and attitude toward the harsh realities of international politics. Finally, the fourth is the domain of the broader international community, the kind of world in which we live, and the sense of our destiny under God.

The first domain is often obscured by the complexities and uncertainties of which I have spoken. In the same way

that personality is extinguished by the pressures bearing in on the organization man, human qualities of honesty, judgment and responsibility fall victim to demands for national conformity. "A diplomat is a man sent abroad to lie and deceive in the interests of his country," wrote an early diplomatic observer. The British historian Harold Nicolson has amended the statement by adding "but he must return to negotiate another day." The qualities by which men measure their friends are therefore not wholly irrelevant for diplomacy. A strong trustworthy and responsible diplomat is more likely to build up the intangible nexus of solid human relations from which understanding can grow. One can point to a complex of personal qualities memorialized by writers in ancient sayings. They include a set of virtues not exclusively in the realm of personal ethics but political qualities nonetheless by which the extraordinary individual is measured. One such virtue is courage: "In politics courage is the master virtue and without it there can be no others." Another is the capacity for leadership: "There is this to be said for a strong and scrupulous man; when he gives his word he can keep it." Professionalism in the broadest sense is a hallmark of responsible politics: "The worst blunders of practitioners are less dangerous than the sciolism of the amateur." Our procedures for selecting representatives abroad, particularly at the level of Ambassador, run the risk of obscuring the importance of professionalism. If the public were made more keenly aware of the prospects of morally responsible conduct by the best of professionals, the Republic would be better equipped to fulfill its purpose in the world. Summitry, open diplomacy and spectacular exposés in Congressional hearings, all stem from a lack of confidence and respect for professional public servants. A gov-

ernment with vast commitments around the world can scarcely afford this viewpoint, any more than it can accept denials of standards of excellence in its cultural life. Resourcefulness coupled with a sense of a Providence transcending all fragmentary human virtues is the quality well-exemplified by Lincoln and Washington: "Do as if everything depended on you while knowing that all depends on God." Taken together these qualities are capable in the best of men of making for firmness free of arrogance, idealism devoid of hypocrisy, and justice uncontaminated by claims of absolute justice. In this way, personal ethics, which so frequently seem alien in the clash of great collective groupings, reappear in the association of their representatives and leaders.

The second domain touches the values men cherish most as they reflect on the social and political order within which they live and move. What is the good society? What is the current state of national life and what ought it to be? Moralists need to remember that religious and ethical values are never the sole support for a more tolerable collective order. History offers too many examples of monarchical states on the "Right" which have exploited and used religion for their purposes in suppressing rights and making tyranny legitimate. American democracy is the product of a happy confluence of both Judaeo-Christian precepts and liberal humanitarian values. Both have contributed to the needs of a free society; each furnishes a vital corrective for the other's excesses. For its part, liberalism reserves to the secular order a mood of tentativeness and civilized conduct that fosters political give and take. If political issues were arbitrated solely in moral terms, political debate would soon deteriorate into internal strife and open civil war. The classic case of the breakdown of the American system came dur-

ing the "War between the States" when both sides framed their position in the absolute righteousness of Biblical texts. On the other hand, secularists need to recall that compromise on means and policies is made possible because there has first been agreement on overarching moral and political ends. The "higher law" that englobes the American Constitution provides the framework within which sharp but acceptable debates are pursued on the methods of achieving justice. In Paul H. Nitze's well-chosen words: "Over and above the values of any particular array . . . of human beings there exists an ethical framework which has objective validity, of which men can aspire to have some degree of understanding—not perfect, but approximate—and which can give a measure of insight and of guidance to those who seek it."

A third domain concerns the ethical principles that carry meaning for the harsh realities of international politics: power struggles, armaments races and self-interest in national security. Moralists and international lawyers out of genuine concern for the predicaments that confound the participants in world politics often contrive rules and standards meant to reduce international conflict. However, when external standards run athwart the natural aims and drives of men and states, they find ways of abridging or destroying them. If standards and limitations can be made to serve the purposes of states, they will be honored and observed for long periods of time. One significant example stands out in the law of treaties. Nations like individuals keep their international commitments when it is in their mutual self-interest to do so. The Rush-Bagot agreement settling the Canadian-American boundary dispute has been long-lived because the parties found it served their national interests. Other agreements, particularly in the armaments field, have

been scrapped when their terms conflicted with national interests. Disarmament negotiators today face first of all the task of discovering standards that will be self-enforcing because on balance they will serve both East and West.

Beyond this, however, the observer can point to general moral concerns that have meaning in the inter-state system. One is the concept of forgiveness and another the principle of charity. Following every international war, the victors have essentially two alternatives as guides in the drafting of the peace. The one is to approach this task in a spirit of *revanche* and vindictiveness, to wipe from the earth the evil force responsible for the conflict. Unlimited war-aims and unconditional surrender embody this approach. The trouble with such conceptions is that almost inevitably they sow the seeds of the next conflict. The destruction of one great power creates a political vacuum into which another ambitious state extends influence and control. Not only does the laying waste of a nation assure that the reestablishment of internal order will be more difficult—a situation that extremist political groups will exploit—at the same time it constitutes a standing invitation for power from the outside to flow into the vacuum—exemplified by Soviet expansionism since World War II.

Forgiveness in world politics presumes that most international struggles take the form of a tragic predicament. However much more just one nation's cause may be than another's, neither side is wholly right and neither is totally at fault. They break off diplomatic relations and take up arms when neither can afford to yield great moral points at issue. They find themselves after long contention at a point of no retreat. Once at war they abandon the tentativeness of the political process for full-scale moral and military crusades and when they approach

the peace table in the same spirit, the chances are remote they can establish conditions of lasting peace. By contrast, forgiveness has been combined with political realism in certain peace settlements. At the Congress of Vienna, France was reinstated almost immediately to the counsels of state partly on moral grounds but also because the order of Europe required it. Realists such as Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand recognized the rising threat of Tsarist Russia and the states of Germany. To stem the threat, the peace was drawn with an eye as much on the new danger as on the ancient foe now vanquished in defeat. With the possible exception of the Japanese Peace Treaty, Bismarck's settlement at the end of the Austro-German conflict may have been the last conciliatory peace. The fruits of the new approach are apparent in a succession of devastating wars.

Charity is another moral purpose that on its face seems too gentle and civilized for the brutalities of international life. Yet the rise of new nations crying out for aid and respect may well become the dominant problem of the second half of our century. In sheer self-interest but no less from moral impulses, the wealthy nations perceive their responsibility to aid impoverished states. Walter Lippmann may be stretching a point when he draws an analogy from American life where the rich through taxes and gifts now plainly bear responsibility for helping the poor. Yet his comparison is sufficiently close to the mark to point up a lesson. The "have-not" states ask and receive technical assistance from the "haves" because in this era of rising expectations the powerful must aid the weak if they would maintain any form of international peace and order. One challenge confronting a maturing democracy like our own is to learn to discriminate in word and deed between

short-run self-interest—that should be interpreted as such—and longer-run charity and magnanimity. We can no longer afford to call one the other, for while concealing self-interest is hypocrisy, we need not shrink from the proper explanation of acts of charity in relief, reconstruction and foreign aid. From case to case, we are often more selfish or generous than we are credited with being, either in our own words or in those which describe our motives.

The fourth and last domain is the international community itself. This community comprises sub-communities that hold values that deserve respect. Writing of the American Secretary of State, Paul H. Nitze observes:

The Secretary has a primary obligation . . . to the interests of the United States as a nation state. . . . The Secretary, in representing the coalition system and alliance systems of which the U.S. is a leading member, has obligations . . . to a much wider . . . group. . . . If the thesis is accepted that a principal task of U.S. foreign policy is today the construction and defense of a world system of order to replace that shattered in two world wars, then the values to be pursued by the Secretary of State include those associated with a . . . group virtually coterminous with mankind as a whole.

Mr. Nitze points to layers of responsibility which taken together make for an international order. In part, the building of an international system is a public and governmental act. Underlying these measures and often preceding them, however, private groups and individuals build up networks of common interests. Church groups, voluntary agencies, universities, and foundations may lay more solid groundwork at deeper levels of reality. The growth of a regional system like the British Commonwealth resulted from an infinite number of individual acts some of which

were sufficiently sound so that, on independence, states such as India and Ghana continued to embrace many inherited values. The growth of an international order may equally depend on a succession of small actions taken by men who sense and seek to build a more stable international system in which their own humane values have a fair chance of survival.

Through all this, the importance of the relation between initiative and moral purpose looms large. To return to the theme with which I began, both the United States and the Soviet Union failed to serve their national purpose at the summit meetings. In part the destructiveness of Soviet tactics was undoubtedly responsible, but so was the absence of clear and affirmative initiatives by the West. The Eisenhower administration failed to put forward the diplomatic equivalent of the Marshall plan. Because we had nothing to offer, Khrushchev, despite overplaying his hand, was able to make some political capital, especially through the disarmament program put forth following the conference. Moral purpose in foreign policy is realistic when cloaked in flesh and blood programs. It rises above the limits that restrict morality in foreign policy when expressed in concrete programs for action. Short of this, moral purpose is no more than pious moralism, which because it touches no one directly, plants seeds of doubt that moral purpose can ever be brought within reach. The link between morality and political realism is political initiative that gives form to concrete hopes. The less said and the more done about moral purpose in a succession of specific measures and programs, the more likely our friends abroad, who now condemn us, will praise us for the realism of our national purpose.

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
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SACRED IMAGES AND THE INVISIBLE GOD

ROMANO GUARDINI

BEFORE DISCUSSING the theological principles governing Christian art, it is well to recall those instances where Revelation itself, and, later, Church history sound a note of warning.

First of all there come to mind the formidable security-measures prescribed in the Old Testament. The First of the Ten Commandments proclaimed, "I am the Lord, thy God . . . Thou shalt not defy me by making other gods thy own. Thou shalt not carve thyself images (of the Divinity) or fashion the likeness of anything in heaven above, or on earth beneath, or in the waters at the roots of earth, or bow down and worship it" (*Deut.* 5: 6-9). It was forbidden, in short, to make an image of God; nor was one allowed to carve an image of a creature which would convey an idea of God and would be given divine honors. The commandment was obeyed. There were no images of God in the Tent of the Covenant and in the Temple. The Holy of Holies was completely

empty, apart from the Ark and its trappings.

The Second Commandment, following closely on the lines of the first, admonished: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God lightly on thy lips; if a man uses that name lightly, he will not go unpunished" (*Deut.* 5:11). This commandment was in turn obeyed and so rigidly that the name of God which had been revealed on the Mount of Horeb—Jahve, "He who is"—was never used. Circumlocutions were used in its stead.

The significance of both commandments is the same. The First erected an insurmountable barrier against the surrounding pagan cultures, against idolatry in all its forms; the Second protected the Sacred Name, lest people should try to lay hands, through his name, on God himself. In the minds of the ancients, an object and its name were identified and the person who knew the name could use it to exercise his power over the object. It was necessary therefore to impress on believers that God is the absolutely Transcendent, the Intangible Lord. The warning was rendered all the more necessary by the fact that the Old Testament mentality was impregnated with a sense of the presence of God: it was God Who had crossed the desert with His people and had taken up His abode in the Temple. This sense of God's nearness had to be safeguarded from contamination by myth or magic.

The New Testament too warns us that God cannot be captured in an image. But New Testament Christianity is completely dominated by the awareness that the Eternal Son had become man; a fact which leaves less in evidence the insistence on the Divine Transcendence.

Msgr. Guardini is one of the most prolific and incisive Catholic writers of our time. This article, his 5th appearance in CROSS CURRENTS, is being reprinted from the alert Irish monthly, THE FURROW (St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, Eire, \$4.50 a year), where it formed part of a special issue on Sacred Art (June 1957). The German copywright is held by Verlag Schnell and Steiner, Munich, who printed the essay to serve as an introduction for an exhibit of German Liturgical Art. Msgr. Guardini's recent books include JESUS CHRISTUS (Regnery), MEDITATIONS BEFORE MASS (Newman), and THE FAITH AND THE MODERN WORLD (Pantheon).

We have an example of it, however, in the lovely words of the *First Epistle to Timothy*, where the "blessed and only Lord" is referred to as "King of Kings and Lord of Lords; to him alone belongs immortality; his dwelling is in unapproachable light; no human eye has seen or can ever see him" (6:15, 16); or again, in the *Epistle to the Ephesians*, where St. Paul says that "the love of Christ surpasses all human knowledge" (3:19).

Warnings against the danger of making images of God recur with insistence throughout history. A violent attack was made on sacred images at the end of the period of Christian antiquity. Partly the tool of political aspirations, it found expression in the destruction of many works of art and the persecution of those who supported the cause of images. Iconoclastic fury was rekindled at the time of the Reformation, especially among the Puritans, and its progress too was marked by the destruction of a series of masterpieces of Christian art. In some places, the same spirit led even to the exclusion of music from places of worship. We see its ultimate consequences in the repudiation, in the 19th and 20th centuries, not only of images (whether in sculpture and painting) of Christ and the saints, but also of assertions about God or about the positive content of Christian revelation.

SUCH REACTIONS are productions of quite disparate motives. The aversion of the ancients from images had its root in a fear that if images were made objects of veneration they would become for them idols; a sequel not unforeseeable in a world still permeated by paganism. Later this outlook was reinforced by a certain Neo-Platonic spiritual philosophy, according to which a material image served but to distort rather than to represent the Divine Es-

sence. At the time of the Reformation, Christian sentiment set itself against the pagan tendency which had led Renaissance artists to give to the men and women of the story of the Redemption the characteristics and characters of the heroes of antiquity. Finally, it may be said of the present-day aversion from images that it is the logical outcome of the reformist tendency to free Christianity from all connection with the world, in such wise that the act of faith and the assertions which it implies would assume the character of blind risk, pure and simple, and of paradox.

Nobody who knows how history unfolds will hesitate to see in all this an expression of genuine concern. However, the absolute repudiation of sacred images is in contradiction to the manifest import of Revelation.

When we read the Old Testament prohibitions against images, we must never lose sight of the intrinsic connections between the prohibitions and the clearly-formulated warning against the danger of idolatrous worship of God's image—against the pagan attitude to images, in short. Religious imagery as such was not rejected. This much is evident from a circumstance the importance of which has not, in our view, been sufficiently recognized.

I allude to the revelation that it is possible for God to be present in a clearly definable spot on earth and to live in a building erected by mortal hands. God is indeed present everywhere, but the revelation means something more than that; it means that in this or that place there is realized the mystery of a personal divine presence. The Old Testament is quite explicit on the point. There is an example in the book of *Genesis*, in the account of Jacob's dream: "And he shuddered: 'What a fearsome place is this,' said he. 'This can be nothing other than the house of

God; this is the gate of Heaven' " (28:17). The book of *Exodus* speaks as follows of the Tabernacle after its completion: "When all was done, a cloud covered the tabernacle, and it was filled with the brightness of the Lord's presence; nor could Moses enter the tabernacle that bore record of the covenant, so thick the cloud that spread all about it, so radiant of the Lord's majesty; all was wrapped in cloud" (40: 32,33). Then there is the impressive account in chapter 8 of the *First Book of Kings*, of the consecration of the Temple at Jerusalem. Solomon, in the prayer he used in its consecration, exclaims in wonder: "Folly it were to think that God has a dwelling-place on earth. If the very heavens and the heavens that are above the heavens cannot contain thee, what welcome can it offer thee, this house that I have built?" And yet the fact remains: "the house I have built is to be thy dwelling, thy throne for ever immovable" (13). But this "house of God" is as decisive an affirmation about God as is an image. In fact, it is even more decisive, because the house affirms, not merely that "here is represented the dwelling place of the Lord," but that "here He really lives."

Nor should one forget that in the Old Testament—and in the most spiritual part of it, for that matter, in the prophetic books—we find accounts of Theophanies or divine apparitions, in the shape of images which, for all that their significance is a mystery, are themselves sharp and decisive. Isaiah says of the vision in which he received his vocation: "In the year of king Ozias' death, I had a vision. I saw the Lord sitting on a throne that towered high above me, the skirts of his robe filling the temple" (*Isaiah* 6:1). And the prophet exclaimed in dismay: "Alas . . . and yet these eyes have looked upon their King, the Lord of hosts" (*Isaiah* 6:5). One can well understand his dismay

when one recalls the words spoken to Moses by God on Mount Sinai: "But my face . . . thou canst not see; mortal man cannot see me and live to tell of it" (*Exod.* 33:20).

This very absence, moreover, of images in the holy Temple, this void, is it not also itself an image? It is no paradox to say that an unencumbered space, contained between walls which mark out a proper spatial proportion, is not the negation of image, but its antipode. It stands to the image as silence does to speech. No sooner does a man enter such an "empty" space than he senses a hidden presence. Such a space, in short, expresses what human forms and concept *fail* to say about God. Visitors to Santa Sophia speak of the awesome religious sense that emanates from its emptiness. It is opportune to recall in this connection that modern architecture has rediscovered how singularly efficacious for the expression of religious truth are those unencumbered, well-proportioned surfaces, those empty spaces, in proper dimensions and appropriately lighted.

However, and here we come to the heart of the matter, the Incarnation both demonstrated, once and for all, the possibility of sacred images and inaugurated their employment. It is no mere chance that John, the most spiritual of the Evangelists, should have picked his words so carefully, when he said in the prologue to his Gospel not merely that "the Word was made man," but rather that "He pitched his tent among us," which is an evident allusion to the tent of the Covenant in which the Lord lived during the journey through the desert.

In case there should be any doubt about the meaning of these words, he added: "and we had sight of his glory, glory such as belongs to the Father's only-begotten Son, full of grace and truth" (*John* 1:14). Therefore not only

have we formed an idea of Him in our minds, not only have we dared to go near Him in a paradoxical movement of our spirit, we have seen Him. It is something analogous to that "seeing" of which the apostle speaks at the beginning of the *Epistle to the Romans*: "The knowledge of God is clear to their minds. . . . From the foundations of the world men have caught sight of his invisible nature, his eternal power and his divineness, as they are known through his creatures" (1:19, 20).

The *First Epistle of St. John* opens with these words so full of feeling: "Our message concerns that Word, who is life; what he was from the first (that is, from the beginning of the Creation of the world), what we have heard about him, what our own eyes have seen of him; what it was that met our gaze and the touch of our hands. Yes, life (really) dawned; and it is as eye-witnesses that we give you news of that life, which ever abode with the Father and has dawned now on us. The message about what we (also) have seen and heard we pass on to you. . . ." (1:1-3). These phrases—they were certainly addressed to contemporary Gnosticism—are so weighty that one at once perceives that they treat of a matter of capital importance. They assert with unequivocal certainty the reality of the Incarnation, a certainty undiminished by any theory of symbolism or psychologism. Now the reality itself is also Revelation and Epiphany. In other words not only is the "Word of Life" the eternal Son of God, perceivable by the human mind, not only can He be the object of thought or theory. He is also visible: in such wise that one could say, "There He goes," that one could ask Him something and get a reply, that one could feel His hand on one's head and touch His clothes; not to mention the supreme intimacy of contact of which St. John speaks so

plainly in the sixth chapter of his Gospel (51-57). But the eyes which can see Him, the ears which can hear Him, the hands which can touch Him, are the eyes and ears and hands of the "new man," who has been reborn of faith and baptism. It is the same with the catching sight of God through His creatures of which the *Epistle to the Romans* speaks (1:19-20); this is not for the natural eye but for the eye which belongs to a pure heart, a heart inspired, that is to say, by true love (Cf. the Sermon of the Mount, *Matt.*, 5:8).

It would seem that for St. Paul, who had already anticipated the whole of St. John's thought, representation of the Divinity had begun in the very Trinitarian life of God. In his *Epistle to the Colossians* he says of Christ that He is "the true likeness of the invisible God" (1:15). Now since every image supposes an archetype, it follows that the concept of the "invisible God" implies a two-fold meaning full of mystery. On the one hand, its meaning is to be understood not in relation to the abstract intelligence but to sight, as when speaking with confidence of a "vision of God," in which our friendship with Him will one day find its fulfillment. But this vision so transcends the range of our natural powers, that God is called quite simply "The Invisible One," Whose dwelling is in unapproachable light (*1 Tim.* 6:16). On the other hand, this invisibility is changed to visibility when God becomes man, man created according to God's image. Then you have an Epiphany: "The same God who bade the light (of day) shine out of darkness has kindled a light in our hearts, whose shining is to make known his glory as he has revealed it in the features of Jesus Christ (St. Paul, *2 Cor.* 4:6).

St. John tells us that Our Lord said to Philip in his farewell discourse: "If you had learned to recognize me, you

would have learned to recognize my Father too. From now onwards you are to recognize him; you have seen him. At this Philip said to him, Lord, let us see the Father; that is all we ask. What, Philip, Jesus said to him, here am I who have been all this while in your company; hast thou not learnt to recognize me yet? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father" (14:8, 9).

Here is the foundation of the theology of sacred images. It is taken for granted that God has so created the world that a man whose gaze his heart has purified can, when he looks at it, catch a glimpse also of the magnificence of the Creator (*Rom.* 1:18-20). It is taken for granted also that God became man, so that when a man looks on the figure of Christ he sees there the fulness of the Divine Reality.

It is in the service of this mystery that religious art finds its function. Its scope includes neither the imparting of knowledge nor the formation of character, but only the preparation of the way for the Epiphany.

NOW WE MUST FACE a problem, as important as it is difficult to solve, but one which will serve to introduce us to the central significance of religious art: How has the image of Christ of which Paul and John speak come down to posterity? Certainly not directly. We have no portrait of Christ, neither in painting nor in sculpture—fortunately! be it said. The existence of such a portrait would not have been a good thing for various reasons.

What we have are reports, above all those of the Gospel, which, as Luke tells us, relate "all that Jesus set out to do and teach until the day came when he was taken up into heaven" (*Acts* 1: 1, 2). St. Paul had not seen Christ but he too, in his epistles, helps to fill out the account, providing essential depth and

force. The visions of the Apocalypse extend it into eternity.

What sort of portrait emerges? The Evangelists do not give details. They do not say: He was of such-and-such a height, His features were of this or that type, such-and-such were His gestures, such-and-such His gait. Instead they report the words He spoke, the things He did, the fate He suffered.

Have we then a biography, a narrative picture formed from His external activities and His interior life? Not even that description is accurate. It was not the writers' purpose to give us an exact biography and we who long to know everything about Jesus are conscious of much that is missing. Furthermore, the Gospels provide none of the psychological data that we look for in a biography—the individual characteristics, the mental processes, the motives and their stratification. The writer does not set out to analyze or to explain. In this Jesus of Nazareth of Whom he speaks there is something which surpasses all natural psychology, but it was precisely that something which attracted his pen. The narrative is, in fact, kerygma, proclamation, and what it proclaims is the Incarnation of the eternal son of God and his redemptive love which completely defies our understanding.

A picture emerges from this but it is a very special type of picture, one that is at all times oriented inwards; inwards not only in the direction of the soul and spirit, but also reaching down into the incomprehensible. It is here that we meet a consciousness, a purpose, and attitudes of mind which are more than human, which leave behind even the powers of a genius.

The Gospel narratives suggest something other than a contemporary's recorded impressions of a teacher called Jesus who put forward such-and-such a doctrine and underwent such-and-such a

fate. They are indeed composed from memories of a genuine experience, but it was an experience which differs from that purely natural experience which enables a writer to evoke the memory of a man whom he has known intimately. It was an experience of a fact which ranks in importance with the Incarnation itself, the fact that the Holy Spirit entered time and inaugurated Christian history, both of action and thought. The Gospel-portrait is the product of something more than the evocative faculties of Levi the Publican, of his acute powers of observation, his retentive ear for dialogue. It is the work of Matthew the Apostle in whom on the day of Pentecost there came to pass what Jesus had foretold in his farewell discourse: "It will be for him, the truth-giving Spirit, when he comes to guide you into all truth . . . he will utter the message that has been given to him; and he will make plain to you what is to come" (*John* 16: 13-14).

We have no document which speaks of Jesus purely from the view-point of history. If we did have it, it would, naturally, be valuable as is everything which adds to our knowledge of Our Lord, whatever its provenance. Truth to tell, however, it would be irrelevant, as irrelevant as would be a photograph if, to concede a fantastic hypothesis, one had come down to us. The portrait of Jesus Christ comes to us based on faithful, accurate reminiscence, a reminiscence fathered by the Holy Spirit. Naturally, this does not mean that it bears the stamp of a purely subjective experience. On the contrary, it is the only one which attains the Son of God in reality, being itself constituted the eye capable of seeing the Lord and the mind capable of understanding His message.

But to say all that is not to say enough. The reminiscence is not a reminiscence

peculiar to Matthew, a believer who also happens to be an Apostle. It is rather the reminiscence of an Apostle as such, invested with the role of laying bare the portrait of the Lord. He was not a private individual but a bishop of the Church. It was in virtue of the authority which he possessed in the Church that he evoked his memories and proclaimed them.

If therefore we would give a complete answer to the question posed—whence comes to us the portrait of Christ?—it is that it comes to us through the memory of the Church. Apart from this, there is no remembrance of Christ which gives us His true image. The Gospels do not stand apart from this memory, they are part of it, a supremely important part. "I would not believe in the Gospel if the Church had not bound me," says St. Augustine. An independent reminiscence of Christ does not in fact exist for the reason that there is no other source of it. Nor can it exist even in germ, since every account of Him written outside the Church must necessarily distort His portrait.

For the rest, such an image, since it comes down to us through living history and is renewed from one epoch to another, is not something rigid. It is true that its core, the Incarnation of the eternal Son and the subsequent work of the Redemption, cannot be other than one eternal Truth. The image is a living thing, however, and thus its character changes. Already in the Evangelists' portrait of Christ there appear differences of nuance and color. Anyone who is conversant with their different approaches will easily distinguish between an element from the portrait by Mark and an element from that by Matthew or that by John, and yet it is all the time the same Christ.

The differences become more pronounced when we leave the ambit of

Sacred Scripture and notice how the portrait is fashioned subsequently out of the memory of the Church: the Pantocrator of the mosaics, the Omnipotent God of the Roman miniatures, the Man of Sorrows and once more the overwhelming Lord of Spirits of Gothic art, the Monarch of Baroque, and so on. As long as the artist is a believer, he will always give expression through his picture to the same divine-human reality. It will however, carry the impress of the time of its origin, of men's conception of the Redeemer, of the bondage from which in Him they find redemption according as the Holy Spirit gives them to experience.

The same must be said of the representations of the characters in the sacred history: the Mother of Jesus, that figure which is so close to the Lord, the meditative Joseph, who watched over the youth of Jesus, the Apostles themselves.

The case of the saints is analogous. In them is fulfilled the mystery of which St. Paul speaks in his *Epistle to the Romans*, where he says that the believer is "moulded into the image of the Son, who is thus to become the eldest-born among many brethren" (8:29). And again in the *Second Epistle to the Corinthians*: "It is given to us all alike to catch the glory of the Lord as in a mirror, with faces unveiled; and we become transfigured in the same likeness, borrowing glory from glory" (3:18). Thus it is with every believer. In each of them the image of Christ has been formed out of their personal characteristics, out of what they experienced and what they did, but in general the image is indistinct and difficult to recognize. The saints, of course, are men in whom the image of Christ shines out with clarity and force. We must, however, once more point out that the portrait of sanctity is not transmitted to us through natural memory, but is conceived and trans-

mitted by the Church. Only the Church is able to recognize the saint. To be convinced of this it is sufficient to recall how men speak of sanctity outside the Church. It is the Church alone which "names" a man "saint," thus setting the portrait of sanctity decisively in evidence to the eye of the believer.

THE FUNCTION of the Christian art is to assist that process. The believing artist gives expression to the contents of the Church's memory.

His responsibility is great, first and foremost on account of the honor due to God. One can take from the honor due to God not only by false or temerarious thinking, but also by false or slovenly pictures. God is the artist *par excellence*. He is not served by work that is but half-done. He is the Holy One Whom no image can serve which is not the product of a genuine sentiment. The artist's responsibility also extends to the effect which the work of art produces, since the image reaches the very fibre and roots of man's inward life more surely than does mere instruction. It tends to become a model and then, having been assimilated, to be absorbed into the very life of its beholder.

These and other considerations—though we cannot here fully pursue the matter, pose the problem of the religious artist.

His function is very different from that of the profane artist. It is most accurately described as service. He is under commission to interpret the contents of the Church's memory. Consequently he has nothing of his own to say, no subjective message, but only what is in the mind of the Church, the Church herself but fulfilling on her part the mission given her by Christ. Hence the possibility of conflict with his personal impulses, all the more so in a society which to a large extent is no longer

penetrated by a genuine Christian tradition and in which all-pervasive Gnosis interprets the contents of the Faith in most arbitrary fashion. It is possible for him to find himself in a predicament similar to that of the scientist who discovers that his own opinion conflicts with the Church's teaching.

He will be in a position properly to perform his allotted function only when he is fully conversant with the content of the Gospel. One can apply to all subsequent artists what was said of those who had to build the Tent of the Covenant. We read in the book of *Exodus*: "And now Moses said to the sons of Israel, Here is the name of the man the Lord has singled out to help me. Beseleel, son of Uri, of the tribe of Juda. The Lord has filled this man with his divine spirit, making him wise, adroit, and skilful in every kind of craftsmanship" (35:30,31). Of everyone who is moved to the service of religious art by a genuine inner compulsion, one can say that he has been "called by name." Nor is it perhaps absurd to suggest that amongst the graces bestowed by the Spirit of Christ and described in the twelfth chapter of the *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, there is the power to fill the role of the Christian artist. It is indeed explicitly stated that in that great gathering-together which is called the Church there are many kinds of "services and activities" for which men are fitted by the working of the same Spirit Who "manifests His power everywhere in all of us."

But the Christian artist has at the same time not only the right but also the duty to preserve his autonomy. The shape of the sacred image in the memory of the Church is constantly being renewed; it contains not only an unchanging element but also an element which is subject to historical development. The most fleeting glance at the

past will discover what differences there are between one epoch and another and, in the same epoch, between one artistic personality and another. It follows that it is the task of every artist to form the sacred image in obedience to his inner creative impulse and to refuse to allow himself to be side-tracked by the pressure of prevailing conceptions.

But, and this is a matter not always given sufficient thought, neither can he evade the obligation to adapt his creative endeavor to the dignity of the object to be represented. The spontaneous reverence which the sacred image evokes in a believer constrains the artist never to refuse the task, often very difficult, of drawing out of his inmost self the appropriate image and of giving it existence through his work. The enormous quantity of mediocre productions—to say nothing of those that are worthless—is proof of the magnitude of the artist's responsibility.

ONE COULD SAY a great deal on this subject since in a sense the problem facing the Christian artist as artist is co-extensive with the problem facing him as Christian. It may be useful, however, now that we have come to the end of our discussion, to recapitulate what we said at the beginning.

We there spoke of the Old Testament prohibition of images of the divine. A law which was so rigorously imposed and so conscientiously obeyed has a specialized import since its enforcement was limited to a particular epoch; properly understood, however, it is valid for every epoch, including our own. Our situation is indeed very different from that of a small nation committed to the acceptance of Revelation, whose lot it was to live surrounded by a vigorous pagan culture. Pressure from this pagan culture was strong, all the stronger for the fact that the religion of the Old Testament

did not trace its origins to the religious attitudes of this people, but was Revelation in the proper sense of the word, and as such, in conflict with the religious impulses of all peoples, including the people of Israel. This people did not in fact spontaneously believe in the God announced to them by Moses and the prophets. They had strong impulses toward pantheism, as witness the almost desperate fight carried out by the prophets against infiltrations of paganism. Could one therefore conclude that the prohibition of images had a *raison d'être* in those times but is without relevance in our own? Is it true that the danger of idolatry has disappeared for us?

It is sufficient to recall to mind certain tendencies present in our civilization in order to destroy any such confidence.

One sees, for example, in all sorts of places a recurrence of interest in myth, in such wise that in various ways it has become the fashion. At first sight this is matter for congratulation, since myth is closely connected with the great moments of human existence. But there is here the danger of divinizing nature and of becoming subject to it. Thus we would have new idols. Have we not seen just this happen in more recent times with Race, Blood and Country, their symbols presented to the people as sacred signs, and an individual venerated as the bestower of happiness? It would be fatal to forget these facts. Depth-psychology and psychotherapy, whose influence is constantly on the increase, sometimes speak of instinct as though it were a divine power. The manner in which the images of the unconscious, the archetypes, are presented often calls to mind—I use the word advisedly—idols; so that then the origin of religion is seen as man's attitude toward the archetypes. In some forms of contemporary art it is difficult to see anything else save idols.

It emerges from these and other considerations that a tendency toward idolatry is not the prerogative of any one epoch but has its roots in human nature itself as it has been effected by original sin. This should prompt one to pose the question whether an image produced under the impulse of true inspiration could not become an idol for someone who approaches it with a false religious outlook.

The object of all that has been said was to show what is the function of religious art. It must announce, it must prepare the way for the sacred image which speaks to the believer out of the memory of the Church. Inversely, it must indicate to the eyes and heart of the believer the way to Christ Himself, the Way to the Father. One can therefore say that authentic religious art is essentially a way. The way by which God is announced and presented to man; the way through which man's devotion and love goes to God. It is in danger whenever it is in danger of ceasing to be a way, whenever movement ceases, coming to a standstill in the work itself. One can then say perhaps that it becomes an idol.

An idol, not in the sense of becoming something fixed, but in the sense of causing the ceasing of movement, the corruption of an attitude. This is a development which should interest any serious religious educator. It was such a development which provoked the protest against religious imagery. At first the protest was justified, but it then became disproportionate and unrealistic. A great deal remains still to be said.

It is thus that the question arises whether the Old Testament warning against images is not still of importance to us as a warning against all inner corruption through which an authentic work of religious art can become an idol.

Another problem arises out of this,

whether the emptiness indicated by the Old Testament prohibition has not its importance for the religious life. We have seen how contemporary architecture has gone back to the conception of unencumbered surfaces and empty space. A person accustomed to numerous forms and images would not hesitate to label this uninspired and cold. But it could also be true that the needs of our times, forced as we are to economize, conspire with a new realization of what emptiness conveys to one who senses the presence of God.

Every Christian educator knows how difficult it is to speak of the invisible God. To prepare oneself requires recourse to an intimate, recollected vigil in which the mind can perceive His presence. One needs a fixity of concentration which is not distracted by occa-

sional images, a tranquil perseverance which knows how to penetrate to the roots of things. The psalms speak of the "face" of God which the believer seeks and which the Lord wishes to reveal to him. This intimate process of seeking, attaining, entering into communion with Him, this being able to feel seen, called and loved by Him, all this seems to succeed better in an unencumbered space than where there are images to distract one. From this point of view the Old Testament warning seems still to be of the greatest importance.

Thus we have come full cycle. What was commanded at the beginning of sacred history has still significance for our times.

Translated by

FR. AUSTIN FLANNERY, O.P

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SPIRIT IN THE SERVICE OF THE WORLD AND THE WORLD IN THE SERVICE OF SPIRIT

LOUIS LAVELLE

Louis Lavelle, Professor at the Collège de France, died in 1951. His death was noted widely in the philosophic journals and circles of Europe, and subsequently *LES ÉTUDES PHILOSOPHIQUES*, *RECHERCHES ET DÉBATS*, and *GIORNALE DI METAFISICA* each dedicated an issue to him. He is known not only for his twenty books and numerous articles, but also as co-director with René Le Senne of Aubier's collection "Philosophie de l'Esprit," which is dedicated to the reunion of philosophy and life.

Lavelle was both a Platonist, stressing heavily the doctrine of participation, and something of an existentialist, holding before Sartre that existence precedes essence. His most important work is contained in a series entitled "La Dialectique de l'Éternel Présent," in which he develops a metaphysics of spirit. Spirit is act which creates itself at every instant; it is consciousness giving meaning to things. In *DE L'ÊTRE*, the first volume of this series, Lavelle presents his analysis of being, and of our participation in the totality of being. The same theme in a more popular and somewhat simplified form is repeated in *LA PRÉSENCE TOTALE*, which eloquently expresses his confidence in life and thought. *DE L'ACTE*, *DU TEMPS ET DE L'ÉTERNITÉ* and *DE L'ÂME HUMAINE* continue the work begun in *DE L'ÊTRE*. A fifth volume of the series, *DE LA SAGESSE*, was planned but never completed.

For Lavelle the discovery of self was the same as the experience of participating in being, and this was inextricably tied up with time: I am always present to myself, the past is present to me in memory, the future in anticipation.

Total Being is one with Pure Act, and in discovering myself I find a limited activity which can be explained only by its participation in this superior activity. Space and time form the interval between God and man, between pure and finite act. Love is the spiritual union of myself with others, all participating in an absolute intimacy.

In his monumental work *TRAITÉ DES VALEURS* Lavelle reviews the history of axiology and presents a theory of value which relates act and the given. His other works, including *LA CONSCIENCE DE SOI*, *LE MAL ET LA SOUFFRANCE*, and *LE MOI ET SON DESTIN*, deal largely with man's role vis-a-vis the world.

Lavelle contributed a paper to *PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES* (Buffalo, 1950), entitled "The Three Stages of Metaphysics." Pantheon published his meditative essay, *THE SECRET OF HOLINESS*, and Prof. Caponigri includes one of his essays in the distinguished new anthology, *MODERN CATHOLIC THINKERS* (Harper). The present article comes from *DE L'INTIMITÉ SPIRITUELLE* (Aubier), a collection of his articles written from 1936 to 1951 which presents the major themes of his thought. (This volume forms an excellent introduction to Lavelle and also serves as a summary of his work.) A careful reader will find many of these themes—spirit, the I, communion, time, love, solitude, participation, the world, essence and existence—presented in the following article. It is one of the last he wrote before his death and originally appeared in *CITTÀ DI VITA*, Jan.-Feb., 1951, Florence.

The Apparent Evidence of Materialism

PLATO SPEAKS disparagingly of those men who, believing only in what they see and touch, reject as fanciful those immaterial entities which he calls ideas and which are for him the truly real entities. The situation is no different today than it was in Plato's day. The common consciousness is always subject to the influence of the material universe with which our body is inextricably bound up; for our body is continually and insistently present to us. Our body is for us and for others the witness of our existence, and without it our existence would vanish as if it lacked support. Our body is the seat of pleasure and pain. In it are located the sense organs, and through their intermediary our body explores what surrounds it and enters into communication with everything that is. When our body dies, the world seems to collapse for us; though in fact it goes on its way without us. And should all consciousness disappear, the world would still continue to revolve in infinite space and time as a blind, indifferent mass, set in motion by an interior movement of which no one would ever know anything.

This is the image of the universe materialists create for themselves. They continually marshal the testimony of experience in their behalf. The only concrete reality for them is that discovered by the senses. Science teaches us daily to know this reality better and to use it better. What we call consciousness is only a sort of reflection of it which we attempt to perfect so that our actions may become ever more adroit and more powerful. Consciousness would err, however, in attributing to itself an existence which it does not possess; for when it is detached from its relation with things, it is only a will-o'-the-wisp

of the imagination. The success of materialism is hence easy to understand, since the objects which are here before our eyes are the only ones which can be shown to all, the only ones which continually constrain us, and the only ones which both our senses and science teach us about. We can continue neither to exist nor to grow except through the increasingly intimate relations we maintain with the material world.

Materialism Unfaithful to Its Doctrine

THE TRIUMPH of materialism, however, can never be anything but an apparent triumph, since the very evidence of which it avails itself is illusory. No materialist is faithful to his doctrine and none succeeds in putting it into practice. For this immense machine, the world, which constitutes his only reality and which he is always trying to reform, makes sense in his eyes only insofar as it can act on human consciousness to enlighten it, to strengthen it, and to bring it happiness. Thus in consciousness the materialist finds the only thing which counts in the world and which has infinitely more value than the world itself. The world is only a means and an instrument for consciousness. Accordingly we should not be surprised to see the materialist often holding an ideal which goes singularly beyond all the satisfaction which the world can bring him, and agreeing to sacrifice himself in order to hasten his ideal's realization, though he will not be on hand to enjoy it himself.

There are certain constant demands of human nature which always reappear and which no one successfully evades, even though he spends his time trying. It is impossible for any man to think that the material world could be enough for him. For whether he is content to submit to it, or whether he seeks

to impose his law on it, the interests of his consciousness are involved and it is with respect to this that he judges the truth of each of his cognitions, and the value of each of his acts. Consciousness, therefore, must be placed above the world of which it sets itself up as judge. And if consciousness cannot do without the world, the fate of the world interests it only to the extent that it is inseparable from its own fate and contributes to its formation. Therefore, despite all his denials man recognizes himself as a spiritual being. This affirmation is implied in each of his undertakings—in the very knowledge he can acquire of the material universe, and in the very act by which he seeks to use it to better his lot on earth.

It is undoubtedly easy to understand how a materialist could let himself be fascinated by all the objects he encounters—objects which are obstacles for him at first, and which in the end he makes his servants. But herein lies the proof that he himself is not an object among others. First of all, as Pascal nicely puts it, "*He knows that he is, while the universe knows nothing about it.*" This consciousness which he has of himself constitutes his true reality. He is nothing except through the pure power which he has to say I. This I is therefore not a thing. It is invisible and intangible not only because it is too subtle and too tenuous for our senses to apprehend, but also because *it is always that which looks and not that which is looked at, that which touches and not that which is touched, that which knows and not that which is known.* Because it is the subject which knows all things it cannot itself be a thing. The very difficulty we experience in knowing the I comes precisely from the impossibility of transforming it into a thing. It is the source of light by which the world finds itself illuminated; but it cannot be a part of

what it illuminates. And as a man cannot find it in the world which it discovers for us, he ends up denying its existence and forgetting that without it this world would be as nothing for us. Thus the spirit seems to disappear in the very consciousness which it begets, as God in the eyes of atheists disappears in the very work of his creation. From this we see that our own existence, like the very existence of God, is intimate and secret—intimacy and secrecy being the essential characteristics of a spiritual existence. But how could it be otherwise if it is obvious that a true being can only be in itself and for itself, and that from the outside one can apprehend only its manifestation or its phenomenon?

Freedom or Spirit in Act

IT IS INSUFFICIENT, however, to say that the I is that which looks and not what is looked at, that which knows and not what is known. It is distinguished from things in a far more profound way. For the essential characteristic of things is to be inert, that is, to be what they are without having the ability either to modify their state or to produce it. They are subject to the principle of causality. This means that all the modifications they undergo and their very existence depend on certain other things which precede them and which determine their appearance and characteristics in the world. Thus all the events which make up the world are linked among themselves by an unbreakable chain which we call determinism. Each event has its cause outside of itself and not in itself. But the I is not subject to this causality. It possesses a spiritual character because in a certain way it is *causa sui*, i.e., it is a freedom. The two words spirit and freedom have the same meaning. One can conceive neither of a spirit which would

be restrained by some cause exterior to it—it would then be reduced to the state of a thing—nor of a freedom which acts other than in the light of the spirit—it would then be a blind spontaneity. The characteristic of a spirit is to act, not in virtue of causes to which it is obliged to submit, but in virtue of reasons which it continually creates by its sole exercise. Thus the spirit is not located in the world, and it does not submit to its law, which is the law of bodies. If a spirit is itself inseparable from a body, it is because its limitation obliges it to be incarnated in such a way that the world of bodies can become the matter of its action, the seat of its effort, the means of its acquisitions, and the witnessing of its victory.

But it is not enough merely to define spirit by the freedom which places it above the world. Spirit remains in the world and there continually undergoes a test which alone stirs it from its rest. The characteristic of spirit is always to be in act. But its act consists in willing that value reign in the world, in substituting the will to good for mechanical causality. *Spirit itself could be defined as the causality of the good.* Good in its turn must be understood to be an end such (1) that our spirit could confirm and approve it (existence, as it were, has no meaning for us except on condition that we always seek to produce it), and (2) that it could effect a union between all spirits, none of which can succeed in being truly spirit except by its union with all the others. This is undoubtedly the definition of love. And so one sees that the characteristic of the life of the spirit consists not in seeking to know or to dominate matter, but in creating a communion between consciousnesses, in awakening them continually to themselves, and in raising them to an ever clearer and purer existence. The world

does not exist only, as is often believed, to serve the bodies to which spirits are bound, but also to serve the spirits themselves as a witness, a language, and the vehicle of their mutual relations. Thus the characteristic of spirit is to compel souls to go beyond the solitude in which each of them finds itself at first enclosed and to recognize that *each one can receive only through giving itself* and that they cannot be united except in the common source from which each derives the particular existence it has been given. This is undoubtedly the deepest sense of that *love which is charity*. In this love I have access to the spiritual life only by imitating the work of God, that is, only by *continually doing for another what God does for me*.

A Common Source From Which All Spirits Come

WE SEE THEN that the very essence of spirit is not to remain enclosed in the boundaries of individual consciousness, but rather to go constantly beyond these boundaries. It is this power itself. It is, however, a passing-beyond-boundaries which always tends inward and never outward. Instead of spending itself on the world which is already formed and which we would do well to describe and accept, our spirit uncovers in our own depths the presence of an infinite power which continually gives us being. And although we could not succeed without its help, the being it gives us is in the form of a possibility whose actualization depends on us. This is the meaning of a divine call which we alone can answer, and which no one else could fulfill in our place. It is always related to our situation in the world, to the actual resources which we have been given, to the opportunities which we meet in our way, and to the tasks proposed to us at each instant. Herein lies the individual's

value in the world, and this call makes each being unique and irreplaceable. Each is unique and irreplaceable much less because of his physical or mental originality than because of what he is called to do; and this justifies his nature and gives him a meaning and a value. *The spiritual life is nature not denied but transfigured.* One can succeed in it only by that completely interior union with an omnipresent activity which continually completes him. From this union there proceed simultaneously the light which illuminates him and the strength which sustains him. Without it he is incapable of anything; yet it asks of him only an assent which he is always able to refuse. If a man refuses this assent he finds himself reduced to himself; in each of his undertakings he feels his isolation, his impotence and his misery. Likewise, the world which unfurls before him resists and rebuffs him, constrains and wounds him; and when the I succeeds in submitting this world to its designs, it still obtains only a ridiculous and perishable satisfaction. On the contrary, if a man assents to this interior grace which is always offered to him (but which he does not always accept), then everything changes for him. He no longer knows isolation. On the contrary, in solitude he achieves that perfect and absolute union which is the union with God. He constantly feels an activity within himself which uplifts him, which seems to support him, and which he has only to let act. The world before him is no longer an obstacle which stops him, for he does not find his true end in it. All the failures which he can know, all the sufferings and all the evils which befall him receive a meaning through the spiritual use he can make of them. From this we learn that the world finds its explanation and its end beyond itself. It is within us and in the abdication

of our own will in favor of this action of the pure spirit, which is that of God in us, that we find the real meaning of the exterior and manifest world. It allows all particular beings to distinguish themselves and to unite in the consciousness of their common origin and of their reciprocal duties.

Thus we see that the world furnishes the different consciousnesses the conditions both for their limitation and for their mutual communication. But this could come about only to the degree to which each of them, ascending to his own source, finds it to be the same source which springs forth for all. Only the spiritual life, therefore, can justify the advent of the world and can allow us to understand the use which must be made of it. For the life of the spirit, far from denying the world, calls it forth to permit the actualization of our capabilities and consequently to ground the appearance of all these personal beings whose destiny is to make themselves be by using their freedom. Their freedom, moreover, is one which encounters other freedoms with which it is jointly responsible. Together they are called both to find in the world the means of expressing themselves, that is, of realizing themselves, and to find beyond the world the source of light and of love without which they would be unable to rid themselves of their separation, of their darkness, and of their impotence. From this we understand that one must take an interest in the world, for it is the witness and also the image of human activity. And we understand also why when man looks within himself as in a mirror, he draws back with horror. This horror itself is a sign that the world is incapable of satisfying him. He compares the world to the very purity of the source from which he continually draws, while knowing that he continually deviates from its course. For

the world up to a certain point is the work of man. *Man is but a power-to-be.* He uses only the powers which he has received, but he is free to use them as he will. The secret of the world lies for him in his use of these powers. But man often thinks that he cannot ground his independence except by the exercise of his own will. Impulse and caprice then make him a slave of his limitation. In the highest point of consciousness man's most personal call takes its place in a universal order which it helps maintain; at this miraculous point, moreover, his most perfect activity consists in being completely docile towards an activity which comes from above, and is God's very own, individually present and assented to in the depths of himself.

Time as the Road of Eternity

TO CONCLUDE we must now show how time is the road of eternity for the spirit. To believe that there is nothing besides the world or that the world is sufficient unto itself is the same as considering our I as restricted to a temporal existence, forced to run out its course between the two limits of birth and of death. But is it true that before entering the world the I was not yet anything, and that after it has left the world it is no longer anything? This view seems a little too facile. It is difficult to deny that before being incarnated the I was a possibility which had not yet found the conditions which would allow it to be actualized, and that after having finished its course in the world it subsists as an existence which we experience at every instant. For at every instant what we believed we possessed in the world leaves us, and only the memory of it remains. Thus all the events which we have lived through receive a spiritual form in our memory at the moment when they ap-

pear to fall into nothingness. This is a fate from which they cannot escape. Where memory is failing and does not give us any real recollection, they still subsist in it as possible recollections. They have passed into the world as fugitive shadows. They are now in us as a permanent power which the least movement of attention suffices to awaken. They no longer appear to the world but to the I. Henceforth they form its substance. We should not complain, as people often do, that they lack reality, as if they formed a void in our consciousness where only the lack of what we have lost is accentuated. Those who think this know only those goods which they can see and touch. They ignore the fact that true possession can be exercised only by the spirit and not at all by the body, and that only in solitary meditation can material goods themselves acquire a meaning which makes them ours. Only then do they receive the light which until that time they lacked. For everything which exists must inevitably pass through the world before receiving a spiritual form in consciousness which immortalizes it. We realize that memory, insofar as it restores the material image of the event to us, binds us to the earth. This explains the regret which almost always accompanies it. But the event itself was only the vehicle of its meaning. Its meaning has become imperishable, cleaves to us, and henceforth forms the essence of our being. And so in the language of the moderns we see how the end of our existence allows us to acquire an essence which belongs to us because it is the product of our freedom. The perishable at each instant undergoes a change which garners it into eternity. And all this happens as if we had the power of *choosing our eternal essence in the eternity of the possible.* Our life is carried out in the world, but its fulfillment

carries it beyond the world. Time is its instrument, but it emerges at each instant into the intemporal. It seems therefore that there are only two attitudes possible for consciousness. Either it thinks that the world is the only reality, that consequently our own reality is the reality of our body, and that the

spirit is concerned merely with serving its interests; or it sees that the true reality is that of the spirit itself, that is, of a completely interior activity which needs the world to test all its powers, but which can gain true possession of itself only when the world has passed on.

Translated by RICHARD T. DE GEORGE

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BIBLICAL METAPHYSICS

CLAUDE TRESMONTANT

IS THERE a biblical metaphysics? The expression is unconventional. Is the term "metaphysics" really fitting here? This article intends to demonstrate that biblical thought possesses a structure which can only be called metaphysical because no other term would be appropriate; that a metaphysical structure of Biblical theology exists, not extrinsically or accidentally, but, as analysis will reveal, of intrinsic necessity. Biblical theology would not be possible, nor the biblical message of revelation exist, if it were not metaphysically structured. The very existence of this theology, of this revelation, implies a certain metaphysical structure as a prerequisite.

We have been accustomed in the West to designate as "metaphysics" a certain type of reflection whose model has been historically given us in the books of Aristotle devoted to the "first philosophy" which the author has placed "beside" or "after" the books devoted to the "physics." These also contain some

analyses concerning "first philosophy." Because of the typical model given by Aristotle, some extremists even hesitate to speak of metaphysics in reference to the thought of Plato, claiming that only the problematic of the Aristotelean "first philosophy" merits being called properly metaphysical. In fact, we generally agree to extend the term "metaphysics" to types of inquiry and reflection which are not precisely Aristotelean. Thus we speak of the metaphysics of Plato, Plotinus, Leibnitz, Hegel, and Bergson, and within the last century, of Indian metaphysics. It is this same analogical extension of the term metaphysics which we claim for biblical thought.

The metaphysics of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Leibnitz, and others, however, have at least this much in common: they are presented and proposed as ends in themselves, in an explicit, conceptual, technical, and scholastic manner—that is to say, proper to the teaching of being in the schools of philosophy. They therefore constitute a reflection.

It is not the same with "biblical metaphysics" since Sacred Scripture is exposed neither separately, as an end in itself, nor in an explicit or conceptual manner. There are, it is true, certain metaphysical themes in the Bible posed explicitly (though gradually), such as the idea of creation, or the Priestly Code. More often, though, this biblical metaphysics must be disengaged by analysis, bringing it from its natural mode of existence to the level of conceptual formulation, as in a traditional "treatise" of western philosophy.

Biblical metaphysics, in its natural state, is embodied in a "milieu," in a context, which is not that of the meta-

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The present article (appearing first in ESPRIT, March 1957) is a valuable summary of the analysis made in the last-mentioned work, where he has the space to support his argument with a detailed discussion of biblical texts.

physical treatise; it is contained in the totality of the tradition of the historical, prophetic, and sapiential books of the Bible. To present this metaphysics in the traditional fashion, it is necessary to extract it from the very life of a people, expressed in a language eminently concrete and remarkably poor in abstract terms. In its natural state, biblical metaphysics is not, to use the language of the chemists, *isolated*, as is our western metaphysics. It is embodied, very often implicitly, but nevertheless really, under a form easily perceptible to the senses, in the bread and wine of the real, in history, in the tradition of a People who bear a Word. The logos is tissue in an incarnate reality. In the Bible we do not find a treatise of metaphysics devoted to being, time, eternity, the one and the many, causality and finality, becoming, the sensible, corporeal existence, freedom, thought and action. . . . Nevertheless, analysis discovers in the Bible a coherent and systematic metaphysics, all along its development, and perfectly conscious of itself, dealing with just those subjects which constitute a metaphysics in the larger sense.

Let us not be deceived by our intellectual habits, and confuse the implicit and the unconscious. Biblical metaphysics is most often implicit, implied in a message not precisely directed toward the technical teaching of metaphysics; yet it is conscious of itself and reflective. Its development through many centuries into a historical tradition, while still remaining homogeneous and rejecting foreign elements incompatible with its own structure, proves this.

However, it is true that it is not presented as an end in itself. It is part of an ensemble whose proper end is theological. The authors of biblical history, as well as the prophets, attempt to communicate a theological teaching concern-

ing the God of Israel and the relation of His People with God. But the question is whether this theological teaching can be proposed without simultaneously admitting and implying, by its very existence, a certain metaphysical structure. In other words, can this theological teaching exist without being metaphysically structured? This hypothesis, as will be seen, is absurd.

The metaphysical structure of biblical thought is thus communicated *at the same time* as the theological teaching, *within* this teaching. Biblical metaphysics is contained in the very teaching of the historians, prophets, and wise men of Israel; but it has this special characteristic: it is communicable, through the perceptible aspects of a concrete teaching, either historical, prophetic, or sapiential, to men who are not of the "lettered," but to servants, peasants, and craftsmen. This is what gives biblical metaphysics its universal value. It is communicable to every man coming into this world. It plays a special role in each "culture."

The task for the philosopher—and especially the Christian philosopher—is to reassume the work of disengaging biblical metaphysics from its natural mode of existence, in order to present it under the explicit and conceptual form to which we are accustomed, and to which we have legitimately held since the schools of Greek philosophy. Although interest in it is purely one of technique, this technical interest is very significant. It is not necessary to be a mathematician or physician or astronomer to live in a universe which indisputably has a mathematical, physical, and astronomical structure. The mathematician must assume the task of disengaging, for those interested, the physico-mathematical structure of the universe and of matter. But the Real also has a metaphysical structure. It is the duty of the philoso-

pher to analyze the metaphysical structure of concrete reality.

The universe of thought, however, has a metaphysical structure which differs according to cultures and civilizations. It is not necessary to be a metaphysician to live, to think, and to express oneself in a universe of thought whose metaphysical structure is well-determined. To the historian of metaphysics comes the task of disengaging these structures and explaining to us the unperceived essential in which we live, move, and are. Thus, the Hebrew nomads living in the land of Canaan did not need to be initiated into a philosophical school to live, think, and act in a universe of thought whose structure was original in comparison with that of their Canaanite, Egyptian, or Mesopotamian neighbors. The teaching of the prophets of Israel constitutes for the Hebrew people a vision of the world and a universe of thought whose structure can only be called metaphysical because there is no other word to call a doctrine of being, of time, of the sensible, etc. . . .

The fact that there is no separate treatment of biblical metaphysics in Scripture, and that it is intimately dependent on a theology of which it constitutes the infra-structure, does not disqualify it in the eyes of the philosopher. We will see that the same situation exists with every metaphysics: every metaphysics is organically united to a certain conception of the Absolute, and depends on this conception. Moreover, this organic relation between biblical metaphysics and biblical theology is not one of servitude, which would be incompatible with the dignity and autonomy of the properly metaphysical order. This relation, however, simply expresses a logical and unavoidable requirement for homogeneity and coherence: *not every metaphysics is compatible with every theol-*

ogy. On the other hand, we will see in the second part of this article that *not every metaphysics, and thus not every theology, is compatible with any conception of the Real, with any cosmology, with any anthropology whatsoever.*

Although the orders of metaphysics and theology are distinct, they are not separate. Mutual implications and reciprocal demands make up a network of really vital inter-relations without which neither one nor the other would know how to conceive itself.

Thus, a metaphysics which teaches the ontological sufficiency of the world considered as uncreated, eternal, imperishable (Aristotle), implies a certain conception of the Absolute. It is the world itself which is the Absolute, the Divine. *Natura sive Deus.* Such a metaphysics is evidently incompatible with a metaphysics of biblical structure which considers the world as profane, non-divine, and created by a God who is "other" than the sensible world. Biblical theology proceeds to reveal itself to us as implying or excluding certain metaphysical theses.

This ensemble of implications and exclusions constitutes the metaphysical substructure of biblical theology. Christian philosophy is concerned with analyzing this metaphysical structure which is implied and needed for biblical theology. In fact, the fundamental structure of biblical metaphysics is the very structure of Christian philosophy, which is, by nature and by essence, identical with biblical metaphysics. Christian philosophy is biblical metaphysics, developed in a different cultural context and philosophical milieu than that of Israel. The language and technical formulation may be different, but the structure remains essentially the same because it expresses what Blondel has called "the

philosophical exigencies of Christianity."¹

The Structure of Biblical Metaphysics

WE HAVE ADOPTED the notion of creation as our point of departure for an analysis of biblical metaphysics. The idea of man, or the world, might have been chosen instead. However, we would soon return from these analyses to our initial point of view, namely, creation, revealed as the foundation and the term of each secondary analysis, and discovered as the focal point toward which all analyses of biblical thought spontaneously converge, and from which every biblical vision of the world proceeds. This is perfectly normal, for the point of departure of the real is creation. If the entire universe depends on creation by God, then it is normal that the metaphysical analysis of each individual being, as well as of the ensemble of the real, should lead us to this radical notion.

The idea of creation defines the relation existing between God and the world, between the order of theology and the order of metaphysics. It is a notion, one might say, with a double opening: on one side, on the mystery and intimacy of God; and on the other, on the world. Only the Spirit of God, the Word of God, can tell us why God created the world and what is the meaning and design of the divine Work. The mystery of the fatherhood of God involves theology. From the human standpoint, however, it is permissible to study how, in fact and history, creation begins, how it continues to work, what designs it manifests, and in what direction, humanly speaking, it seems to be directed. The human intellect, by its

own methods and apart from all revelation, is capable of recognizing by a correct analysis of what appears to it the ontological insufficiency of sensible reality, and of discerning the creative intelligence at work within the created, which it continues to develop and fabricate. Through its own proper technique, the human intellect thus joins with the teaching of the Word of God addressed to the prophets of Israel. The word of God completes the teaching given by the real; it tells us what transcends all hope, what springs from the freedom and gracious will of God.

The notion of creation, which defines a certain relation between God and the world, thus appears organically related to theology. It is neither possible nor thinkable apart from this theology, as a function of this theology. It signifies that the sensible world is not Absolute, that it is not God, but that it radically depends upon God. God can reduce it to nothingness. In relation to His work God is free. The metaphysical notion of creation is intimately linked with a theology of the living God. If this theology is disregarded or rejected, the notion of creation is also discarded as meaningless. If the notion of creation is neglected or refused, it is because the world is considered as being the absolute or a modality of the absolute. In this case, the world is judged ontologically self-sufficient, eternal and imperishable. The world cannot be considered ephemeral and self-sufficient at the same time.

It is only where the Absolute has been recognized as Someone transcendent and personal that He has ceased to be identified with all or part of the world. It is only when He has been recognized as *other* than the world that the world has been recognized as His work.

The idea of creation is absolutely original and peculiar to biblical thought. In

¹ Referring to Blondel's book, *Exigences philosophiques du Christianisme* (Presses Universitaires). Chapters 4 and 5 appeared in *Cross Currents*, vol. I, no. 3.

fact, historically, it is only within the People of God that an understanding of a creative relation between the world and God is apparent. That is entirely normal because only within his People did God allow Himself to be known. In revealing Himself, in allowing Himself to be known as He Who Is, the living God, God allows the human intellect to discover this relation between the world and the Absolute: creation. This does not mean that the human understanding, apart from Revelation, may have been or may be incapable of discovering this relation logically. On the contrary, we think that by a positive analysis of the real, the human understanding can be guided to unveil not only the richness, the intelligibility, and the meaning of the real, but also, from the existential point of view, the radical insufficiency of this real. In other words, the human intellect can discover God, the Creator, who works within the world under our very eyes. To discover the creative relation between the world and God is to discover the living God through an understanding of the works in this created world (cf. *Romans*, I, 18ff.).

To suppose that the notion of creation may have been known in a civilization or a philosophy which had no knowledge of the living God is a contradiction in terms. That does not mean, however, that some individual, not of the People of God, had not known that the entire world was created. If this were the case, he had also known the living God and thus belonged spiritually to the People of God. In certain texts reflecting ancient traditions, the Bible seems to indicate that the God of Israel was known by certain pagans, even prophets. In our times, Bergson, by a positive reflection on experimental, psychological, biological, and moral reality, arrived at this knowledge apart from all

revelation, and accepted this revelation precisely because his philosophical and rational methods had led him to the threshold of the temple.

In fact, the history of civilization and of metaphysics shows us that the knowledge of God as transcendent and creative has been fully attained in Israel and only with the People of God. Israel is defined and set apart precisely by this knowledge. If the intellect of man, by nature, had been incapable of attaining this knowledge, no revelation could have given it to him. Revelation would only have been able to impose a yoke on the intellect, the dictation of a belief which it would not have been able to assimilate or integrate—a bread that could not be eaten. It is, in fact, this conception of “dogma” formed by certain theological schools which denies the human intellect the power to attain the knowledge of God in its own way, apart from Revelation. They forget that in these conditions, it is no longer necessary or legitimate to speak of “truths” and the intellect that accepts them. What is a truth which the intellect can not integrate into its own proper order? It is necessary, in this case, to speak of a “belief” authoritatively imposing itself on a “will.”

In biblical thought, the human intellect really attains a knowledge of God, starting with creation recognized as the work of the wisdom and the intelligence of God. If this knowledge of God is realized in fact only within the People of God, it is not because the human intellect is by nature incapable of attaining this knowledge, but because God has freed his people from slavery to idols and in this way delivered the human intellect from the captivity of nothingness. It is within the People of God that the human intellect has arrived at the fullness and the integrity of its normal exercise. In other words, intellectual ef-

fort is not independent of man's total being, of his mode of existence. The understanding and knowledge of God are indissociable from holiness. It is in freeing man from pride, injustice, and evil, that God has enabled man to know Him. The human intellect undergoes the same servitude as man's freedom: the servitude of man who holds truth prisoner in injustice, who sacrifices man, his brother, to idols and to nothingness, carries with it a darkening of the intellect. That freedom, wisdom, and understanding are only to be regained simultaneously is the constant teaching of all the prophets of Israel referred to by St. Paul in the beginning of his Epistle to Romans.² The nations and pagan civilizations which sacrificed and still today sacrifice their children to idols, evidently did not and do not know the God of Israel. Israel is a people delivered from idolatry, from slavery, from evil, and from injustice; this is its definition, its nature. There is no Israel outside of the fidelity to the covenant of justice with God. Israel is the beginning, the seed of a holy humanity, of a new humanity, capable of participating in the life of God who is holy.

THE INITIAL STEP in biblical thought consists in recognizing that the world is neither God nor a modality of the divine substance. The struggle against idolatry is at the very roots of

² According to the Fourth Gospel, the human intellect can *prefer* the darkness to the light. The intellect has an option at the most secret recess of the heart. It can choose to be darkened, as Paul says: "They have held truth prisoner in injustice, they have misled themselves in the vanity of their own reasonings, and their hearts have been darkened in misunderstanding" (*Rom.*). Human understanding is dependent on a fundamental choice which defines the very being of man. Man can find reasons to justify this initial choice. This is why, in metaphysics too, there is a place for the discernment of spirits.

the teaching of the prophets of Israel. Neither man, plants, natural phenomena, nor the sun, moon, or stars are God. Nothing that we see in the world, nor the world itself is to be worshipped. All religions, all ancient mythologies, and all pagan metaphysics rest on what has been called, from the biblical point of view, the confusion between the order of the created and the uncreated, the confusion between the world and the Absolute. Aristotle considers heavenly bodies as divine substances, free from change, and uncorruptible. Like Plato, he considers the universe as a god, *theos aisthetos*, a sensible god. Fetishism consists in taking a part of the world, such as a plant, or man, as God. More generally, from the metaphysical point of view, fetishism and idolatry consist in predicating to a part or the totality of the world what rightly belongs to the Absolute: ontological sufficiency, aseity. Every pagan metaphysics rests on the principle that the world is ontologically sufficient, eternal, and indestructible. *Natura sive Deus*. The universe is *causa sui*. The metaphysics at the foundation of "dialectical materialism" is a metaphysics whose analysis is too often neglected because of the political and economic analyses associated with it. This metaphysics again takes these fundamental theses of pagan metaphysics: the sufficiency and eternity of the Universe, the eternity of change, the eternity of matter, the infinity of space and time. The Universe is thus endowed with attributes of the Absolute. It is a "divine animal."

In the eyes of this metaphysics, the divinity of the universe entails eternal becoming. In our experience, however, becoming seems orientated and, in a sense, well determined. Everything passes away; time decays everything it touches. In order to maintain the divinity of this cosmic process, it is necessary to declare

that becoming returns to its own point of departure, that it constantly begins its cycle all over again, and that time, like the serpent eating its own tail, turns in on itself. In this image of a becoming turning in on itself in order to eternally rebegin its cycle, we would have a substitution for the eternity and the sufficiency of the divine substance. This theme of becoming indefinitely rebeginning has been found in the Babylonian mythologies, in the first Greek philosophies, in Heraclitus, Plato, Stoicism, and Engels.³

³ Instead of borrowing from the religious texts of Oriental mythologies, or from Plato or Stoicism, it is illustrative to quote from one of the founders of a philosophy which wants to present itself as "scientific" these naive statements of the old myth: "The ultimate conclusion of science is the movement of matter in an eternal cycle" (Engels, *Dialectique de la Nature*, Intro., trad. Fr. Editions sociales, p. 37). "Nature moves in a constant flux and a perpetual cycle" (Ibid., p. 38). "Here again we agree with the great founders of Greek philosophy, for whom the existence of all nature . . . consists in an eternal birth and death, in a constant flux, in continual movement and change" (p. 38). "To say that matter during its entire limitless existence in time is present only once, and for a period exceedingly short when compared to eternity, to say that before and after this it remains forever within the limitation of one place—with that sole change—this is to affirm that matter is perishable and movement transitory. The indestructibility of movement must not only be conceived quantitatively but also qualitatively. A matter, whose pure mechanical change of place has within it the possibility of self-transformation under favorable conditions, by heat, electricity, chemical action, or life, but is not capable of creating these conditions apart from them, is a motionless matter; a movement which has lost the power of metamorphosis within the various forms which befall it still has *dynamis*, but no longer *energeia*, and therefore has been destroyed" (p. 43-44). The reader will note Engel's conception of "matter capable of creating," and the *a priori* which is at the root of his whole metaphysics: the radical sufficiency and thus the eternity of cosmic becoming which is auto-creative. Matter is *causa sui*, it *produces*, it creates life and conscious-

The first act of biblical metaphysics is de-mythologizing the Universe. The biblical universe is stripped of idols, of spirits which haunt the springs, the hills, the trees, and manifest themselves as totemic animals. The Egyptian kings allowed themselves to be adored as gods; in later empires and other civilizations this same divinization of man will be reproduced. Israel never worshiped its kings. Kings are not gods. It is Yhwh, the God of Israel, who is King. The sun, moon, stars, and heavenly bodies are not gods. The whole universe and all it contains is the work of the living and creating God. The biblical universe is a profane universe where the order of the divine uncreated and the order of the created are distinguished. The biblical universe is already our positive universe, where nothing visible or sensible can pretend to divinity. We do not give enough credit to the revolution which

ness. One has to admit it, because otherwise we would be thrown back toward the inadmissible hypothesis of Creation, where we would have to have recourse to a Creator: "Or we would be obliged to conclude that the first matter becoming incandescent from the solar systems . . . had been naturally produced by transformations which are *naturally inherent* in changing matter, and consequently whose conditions must be also reproduced by matters, even if it takes millions of years and happens more or less by chance but with the necessity inherent in chance" (p. 44). The eternity of becoming implies the infinity of space: "the succession of eternally repeated worlds in infinite time is the logical complement of the co-existence of innumerable worlds in infinite space—a necessary proposition" (p. 45). "Matter moves in an eternal cycle" (p. 45). "We are certain that, in all transformations, matter remains eternally the same, that none of its attributes are ever lost, and that consequently if it must one day boldly put an end to its own highest flowering, the human (thinking) mind, it must just as necessarily somewhere else at another time reproduce itself" (p. 46). The whole introduction reads in this way. The reader may appreciate the lyricism in this profession of pantheist belief.

theology and biblical thought brought about in the mentality of ancient man. The dethroning of all idolatry and mythology has paved the way for modern science. Astronomy as a science would not have been possible as long as the stars were considered as divine substances.⁴ It is not surprising that the Jews and Christians were persecuted by the pagans as "atheists." Recall the stupefaction of Pompey's soldiers upon entering the Holy of Holies in the Temple of Jerusalem and finding, instead of statues of gods as expected, *nothing*. In relation to the multitude of pagan gods, the Jews and Christians were numerically, as it were, atheists, since they had rid the world of its abundant divinities. It is not without irony that St. Paul, at Athens, congratulates the Greeks as "the most religious of all peoples."

This de-divinization of the sensible is valuable, for it permits man to reach his maturity and delivers him from the cruel cults which the Baals and Molochs of all ages demand of him in order to deliver him from his "Anguish." The psychologist will appreciate the revolution made by biblical thought which allows man, if he consents, to free himself from his primitive and infantile mentality.

If one examines the manner in which biblical thought has utilized and transformed the myths reigning in the cultural milieu of the Hebrews, one sees that the constant movement of biblical tradition has consisted in de-mythologizing the foreign elements, preserving only an imagery, a mode of popular expression. Foreign material is corrected and adjusted so that it may be integrated. This correction has a bearing on the metaphysical structure of the myths. Theologically and metaphysically, the People of God assimilate only what they can integrate into their own thought

and transform into their own substance, at the same time rejecting what is incompatible with the autonomous norms of its living organism. The rejection of "heresy" manifests this life. When it comes to a matter of metaphysics, the People of God, both under the Law of the Old Covenant and the New, will not be easily satisfied; they will choose what suits them with independence and sovereign authority.

Mythologies have a certain metaphysical structure, and some metaphysical systems are structurally identical with ancient mythologies.

Biblical thought has rejected the idea of an eternal chaos, co-eternal with God, of an uncreated abyss, of pre-existent matter from, upon, or against which the Creator would have accomplished his work. Nothing, outside of God, is uncreated. Neither uncreated matter, nor an anterior disorder which a demiurge must organize, is ever mentioned. That nothing outside the living God is uncreated means that nothing is ontologically sufficient outside of God. In other words, nothing is God except Him whose name is *I AM*. Biblical monotheism implies universal creation; inversely, the notion of creation, in its full sense, requires monotheism.

The themes of eternal matter, of uncreated and pre-existent chaos, of disorder which a god had to organize, entail, in the myths which permit them, the idea of a struggle between the organizing god with the resisting matter, with matter defending itself, with darkness unwilling to receive the light. The theomachies of the Egyptian, Sumerian, Babylonian, Canaanite, Phoenician, Persian, Indo-European, and Hellenic mythologies are like this. God, the organizer, wars with the god of the abyss and darkness; the actual world is the result of this struggle. The disorder and evil ruling there manifest the incom-

⁴ Cf. Duhem, *Le système du monde*.

plete victory of the good god over the evil god. Thus, a tendency toward disorder and chaos recalls that the ancient battle between the principle of good and evil always remains in the material world.

In certain ancient texts, the Bible fosters the memory of these mythologies. However, it has corrected and rejected what was incompatible with a theology of the unique and creative God. Everything in our physical universe is the work of God and God has blessed His work: He saw that the world was very beautiful and good. Evil does not come from physical matter but from man's freedom. Holiness, then, will not consist in fleeing this world, but in preserving it from injustice and evil.

The theme of the struggle between the god as organizer and the divinities of darkness is completed in the Myth by the idea that the good god is perfected and fulfilled only in this death struggle. The idea of a genesis of god, or a theogony, is generally associated with the theme of theomachy. It is found not only in most Semitic and Indo-European mythologies, but also in some approaches to metaphysics. The Absolute is engendered in creating the world. The Absolute creates itself by alienating itself in nature, by dispersing itself in matter, by exiling itself in the world of darkness. Consequently, the life of the Absolute is the very life of this sad world; cosmogony is theogony. The Absolute becomes conscious of itself and accedes to the fullness of its being only in the rending anguish of the history of the world, in undergoing the mediation of negation and evil. The mediation of evil is necessary for the genesis of the Absolute which will "become" truly itself only after having negated this alienation, this exile.

The gnostic mythology found among the Christian gnostics, in the Jewish

gnosis of the Kabbal, with Boehme, Schelling, and Hegel, is full of a tragic and Wagnerian charm. Its fascination has seduced many great philosophers. It is the type of anti-Christian philosophy. Biblical theology and biblical metaphysics are constituted precisely in opposition to these myths, theogonies, and theomachies. God does not create out of need, in order to enrich or fulfill Himself; He creates gratuitously. The biblical notion of creation leads us to the threshold of the mystery of the Charity of God. This world's evil and sadness are not elements necessary to the genesis and the life of God. War is not a manifestation of divine life, for the life of God is peace. Thus, the creation of the world is neither an alienation, a fall, an exile of the divine Substance, nor a projection of the One into the many.

A metaphysics which teaches the divinity of the Universe and Nature—(the Universe is god or a modification of the divine substance)—whether it be explicit, conceptual, or immanent in ancient mythologies, comes very naturally to explain the multiplicity of beings as the result of the primitive Unity's dispersion or fall. Multiple beings are particles of the divine Substance dispersed in the material world. The human soul is *pars divinae essentiae*. This dispersion of the One in the many is an evil, or an appearance, a deathly appearance which must be corrected. Truth, then, is the identity of all those beings who believe themselves different and distinct. Individuation is a dream from which one should be awakened. Knowledge consists in remembering our former home, our fatherland, in recognizing our true essence, which is divine because we have never ceased in reality to be this divine Unity. Happy in our former existence in the bosom of the indivisible Unity, our souls have descended into this world of the many and of care, fascinated by

the bodies they saw. Here below we have forgotten our true nature. For us, therefore, salvation lies in returning to the One, in freeing ourselves from the hold of the body which is a tomb, and from this matter which soils and enslaves us in bodily cares. Salvation is comprised in return to our former condition. Thus, the cycle is achieved.

The myth seems indecisive about some things. Why did souls leave the divine Unity which they did not cease to be? Had individuation of souls pre-existed already in the bosom of the One? Here myth alludes to a dissatisfaction, an anguish in the bosom of the intelligible world. Eternity is degraded in temporality; the One becomes many, and consequently there is dissatisfaction and an evil will to become "each for himself." Evil is in the bosom of the Absolute; evil plays a role in the divine life. It is an integral element. Moreover, it is necessary for his happiness, for, without this Odyssey of dispersion, without the alienation of the Absolute in the multiple world of sadness and worry, the life of God would be dull and tedious. The tragic is necessary for divine happiness. Thus, divinity is voluntarily engaged in this grim adventure for self-fulfillment, in overcoming alienation and exile (procession) by a return (conversion). The wise man, who knows his divine nature, aids the Absolute in recovering itself, and frees the particles of divine Substance imprisoned in matter and returns them to God. The life of the Absolute is conceived as a cycle in which the immediate life undergoes the mediation of exile and evil in order to find itself after undergoing this rending, more rich and perfect—*Felix culpa*, the happy fault which contributes to the fulfillment of the Absolute.

But the myth of the descent of pre-existent souls into this evil world, into bodies which hold them prisoners, en-

tails the idea of a substantial duality between the "soul" and the "body" in man. The body is the tomb of the fallen soul. Salvation consists in the purification of bodily existence. The body is evil; or, good is only an appearance. This is the illusion of the multiple, the illusion of individual existence realized by life in the body which is evil. The wise man knows the vanity of the appearance of the multiple. Corporeity, as well as multiplicity and temporality, is reabsorbed under the knower's gaze. We must flee the body in order to return to our beloved fatherland. But the body itself, as all matter, is only a mode of divine Substance. Spinoza, according to Leibnitz, believed in the transmigration of souls.

IN THE UNIVERSE of biblical metaphysics multiplicity does not appear as the result of a fall or an alienation of the divine Substance, but as the fruit of a positive and free creation of the living God. The multiplicity of beings is not produced by the dispersion of the primitive Unity into matter. God voluntarily creates each being for Himself. The many, matter, time, and space, are not negative, but positive signs. They manifest the fecundity of the Creator. Multiplicity is not an illusion which simply disappears by the raising of the woman's veil. In opposition to a metaphysics which would deny the ontological existence of multiplicity, the biblical point of view is positive and experimental.

In biblical thought, man is not *pars divinae essentiae*. He is created by God. Since they are not of the divine essence, souls do not pre-exist. They are created. Man is not a soul entombed in the body. God has created bodily man. Nor is the body other than man, or other than the soul. Man is a living soul; he is flesh; these two make only one. Knowledge is not a flight from the "body," but do-

ing the will of God who is holy. Instead of flight beyond this material world, holiness is a co-operation in the creative and redemptive work of God. Two metaphysics, two anthropologies, two ethics, and two spiritualities are here opposed. Biblical anthropology is a positive anthropology, free of the myth of pre-existence, of the fall and the transmigration of souls. For the last half-century all biological and psychological analyses have been oriented toward this positive anthropology.

In biblical metaphysics, individual existence appears as positive. Individuation is neither an illusion nor an evil. Man is created individual, for himself. He is called to become a person capable of participation in the personal life of God. Only a metaphysic of biblical structure allows us to form an ontology of the human person. There are important consequences of this in the field of ethics. Knowledge does not consist in wishing to destroy the illusion of individual existence, but in respecting above all the existence of the other who is really a subject, a person like myself, and not an illusion. In the whole history of ancient and modern civilizations, biblical metaphysics alone leads us to an ethic which has respected the human person. Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not reduce your brother to slavery. Thou shalt not exploit your neighbor. Thou shalt not sacrifice your children to idols. In its savage destructiveness our world grimly shows to what degree it is still pagan and, from the ethical viewpoint, close to the Assyro-Babylonian and Pre-Colombian civilizations.

The doctrine of the creation of the world, and all the beings which constitute and people the universe, is important also for our consideration of time. We have already noted how, in its metaphysical structure, the myth of the divinity of the Universe led to a concep-

tion of the life of the universe as a perpetual and indefinite becoming, and to the idea that becoming eternally turns in on itself in a cyclical manner. The universe with its alternate contractions and expansions, its indefinite deflations and inflations, is the image which must be adopted by a metaphysics which considers the universe as divine.

In this metaphysics, beings are uncreated, since they are particles of the divine substance. Thus they are, by nature, eternal. Souls pre-exist in the bosom of the divinity. Birth is not a true beginning of being, but only the emergence of uncreated and eternal substance, on the same level as phenomena, under appearances that are divided up in space and time. In this metaphysics, there is no *beginning* of being. In our experience, however, we hold that beings have an origin and do not pre-exist. Pantheistic metaphysics denies this immediate experience.

Here again biblical metaphysics conforms to our experience. It recognizes a real beginning of existence; birth plays a very important role in biblical thought. Birth is announced; by a free decision God creates a specific being at a specific time. Thus, some really new being appears in the world at each birth. God creates beings which in no way pre-existed and he continues to create new beings at each instant. This continual genesis of really new beings is what constitutes time: the tempo of creation in the making.

In pantheist metaphysics, which ignores or rejects creation, time plays no role, since it does not exist. If experience imposes upon us the verification of becoming, the metaphysics of myth denies the experience and declares that time is only a "mobile image of eternity," the movement of the fall of the One into the many, a fall which the "conversion" will reabsorb. Time meas-

ures a void, the distance which temporarily separates eternity from itself.

In the biblical perspective, all beings are created and *begin* to exist. Hence the world, which is only the totality of created beings, also begins to exist. Matter and the entire physical universe had a beginning in existence. The world is under a law of continual beginning, that is to say, of genesis, of creation.

Is this genesis limitless, perpetual? Is biblical time infinite? Genesis, creation, is always directed toward a point of fulfillment. The work of God, which now cries out in the pangs of birth, ardently aspires to its deliverance, its completion. Biblical time is represented by the prophets of Israel in the images of the planting, growth, and the harvest. What would be a beginning which would never attain its end, a creation which would not reach its fulfillment?

By an inexplicable paradox, pagan metaphysics, on the contrary, in which time plays no role, nevertheless teaches the eternity of becoming, conceived as a perpetual process and endless renewal. Again experience has intervened to trouble the logic of Myth. The becoming we experience is not recognized for what it means: a creation. Thus, it appears as an aimless, indefinite process, the serpent eating his own tail.

Let us note, in conclusion, that the metaphysics which considers the human soul as *pars divinae essentiae* eliminates tragedy from death. In such a perspective, death, like birth, is only an appearance; death is the return to the One, or the moment when the eternal soul passes from one body into another. Eternity is a predicate implied by the divinity of the soul. *Sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse*. Birth has lost its metaphysical seriousness, death its tragic seriousness. The "immortality" of the soul can be demonstrated apart from an analysis of the soul's essence. It can

be deduced from its divine essence. Since individuation is the evil which we must eliminate, immortality will not be personal but a return to the all-being. The immortality of the soul is the return of the soul to the Unity from which it proceeds. Death is a deliverance, a purification.

In the biblical perspective it is not the same. The human soul, not being a particle of the divine substance, is not, *of itself*, eternal. The soul is created; man is born; and if he has future, if he is called to take part in the life everlasting, in the world to come, it is by a gift of his Creator. Existence depends on God not because of a necessary emanation but because of a free and gratuitous creation. Immortality cannot be deduced from the essence of man. If man has hope, it is in God, and not in himself. This is the essential difference between "the immortality of the soul" of the philosophies, and the progressively expressed biblical doctrine of the "resurrection from the dead," *anastasis ton nekron*.

In the Bible, death is detested; it is an object of horror and despair. If hope is given us, it is because the Lord has promised His People a future in the eternal life. "Behold I am creating all things anew, I am going to create new heavens and a new earth." Man will also be recreated; in the resurrected Christ, says Paul, he is a "new creation," capable of life eternal. This aptitude for eternal life does not come about without a radical transformation, a new birth in the Spirit, because flesh and blood cannot inherit eternal life. One sees that it is not simply a question of the natural mystic's "flight" from the "body," but of a new birth in God through Christ with whom we are co-inheritors; not a return to a previous life, but a birth into a radically new and supernatural life.

Finally, there is another difference. While in the Indian and Platonist mystics immortality consists in a return to the One, in the biblical perspective, birth into eternal life does not imply any destruction of our individuality. On the contrary, our person will be brought to the fullness of its stature, in order to participate without shame in the personal life of God, in the unity of the Mystical Body.

Biblical Metaphysics and the Real

WE HAVE TRIED to outline roughly the metaphysical structure implied and embodied in the teaching of the inspired Books of Israel.⁵ We have em-

⁵ In our analysis of this metaphysical structure implied in a progressively formulated theology, we will be reproached, no doubt, for not having taken into account the *development* of this metaphysics, that is to say the taking on of a *growing* consciousness.

According to a number of critics, it seems that monotheism had only been truly affirmed in the later part of its history. One of the first confessions of explicit monotheism is found in Deuteronomy: Yahweh is God and apart from Him, there is none (*Deut.* 4. 25). According to these critics, before being monotheistic, before having recognized that there was only one God, Israel had been monolatristic, that is to say that they professed allegiance, in principle, to the *worship* of only one God without as much as denying that other nations had also their gods whom they legitimately adored and who really existed. This would have been before the progress due in a large part to the great prophets of the VIII century in which the exclusive existence of the God of Israel and the non-existence of pagan divinities had been explicitly affirmed. Thus, biblical theology and likewise the metaphysical infra-structure implied by this theology, would, then, only be established progressively.

It would be very interesting to retrace the progressive development of this theology and its metaphysical structure. However, if it is important to trace a *history* of geometry while indicating the progressive discovery of theorems, it is also legitimate to draw up a *formulated* geometry without having to account for the history of its invention. Thus, we have held to a

phasized how, in rejecting myth, it is wedded to experience, a de-mythologized metaphysics. In its essential structure biblical thought is positive, not mythological. The biblical conception of the world, of the sensible, of multiplicity, and of time, biblical anthropology, is characterized by its agreement with objectively known experience. It is essentially non-mythological. We are adopting in this regard a position contrary to that of Bultmann. To us, Bultmann seems to confuse three radically different levels: myth, imagery, and the supernatural.⁶ We do not believe we are asking for arbitrary concessions when we define all myth simply as a production of a collective imagery which appears inadequate before objective experience.⁷ Whether myth is true and experience false, or vice versa, raises the first metaphysical option. One cannot carry on a discussion with someone who refuses experience, any more than with a schizophrenic. If experience teaches us the

rough sketch of the biblical metaphysics that has reached a full self-consciousness.

Secondly, we will be rebuked for not having considered the *milieu* in which biblical thought is formed, for not having indicated its roots in Egyptian, Sumerian, Babylonian, Canaanite, and Phoenician civilizations. We have not wished to retrace the historical genesis of the themes and theses constitutive of biblical thought apart from its geographical milieu. This task remains to be undertaken; it will be necessary not only to show all that biblical thought owed to its milieu, but also how it corrected, in the name of its own principles, all those elements which it integrated into its own proper synthesis.

⁶ *New Testament and Mythology* (Scribner's).

⁷ The truth of myth is *psychological*; myth is the product of the *psyche*, and it expresses its conflicts, tendencies, and secret wishes. Myth is psycho-analyzable. It manifests a priority accorded to the *psyche's* dream-imagery against all objective experience. Since the *psyche* is itself rooted in a biological organism, myth will manifest and reflect this organic and biological life: as with biological life, myth will have the tendency to be cyclical.

origin of beings, the irreversibility of time, and they contradict us with the pre-existence of souls, the descent of souls into bodies, the transmigration of souls, and the eternal recurrence of time, we cannot carry on a *philosophical* discussion because there is no common ground between us.

Biblical writers have fashioned a world constructed of three layers, but this does not indicate myth but imagery. Ptolemaic cosmology is not mythic any more; it shows itself to be false in the light of more developed astronomical experience. This false representation *does not involve a metaphysics*. It is characteristic of myth to admit of a particular metaphysics. The world-images of the Hebrew may have been naive, but that did not make them mythical, since they did not involve biblical thought in its metaphysical structure. Whereas the myth of eternal return, for example, or that of the descent of souls, implies and allows a well-defined metaphysics.

Bultmann considers mythological the biblical idea of the intervention of God in history, and the doctrine of the Spirit's indwelling in man. Here we come upon a totally different question which is not simply a question of imagery, since all biblical theology is involved. If the world is uncreated, if as the *nabal* says, it is not from God, then Bultmann is right: the doctrines of the continual action of God in history and of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in sanctified man are mythological. They are false; they depend on the imagination. However, if it is true that the world is created by a transcendent and personal God, nothing is more normal than the recognition that this creation continues in the present and that even now God works in a creation in full transition. If truly God has made a covenant with His chosen People, if God speaks to man through

the mediation of *nabis*—men in whom the Spirit dwells—then the idea of God at work in his creation, and of the indwelling of his Spirit in men, is no longer mythological since, in as much as *it is true, it is*. Therefore, it is a question of knowing whether the supernatural is, or not. I do not think that Bultmann denies the existence of God. In this case, he cannot, without self-contradiction, call the supernatural mythological.

The "de-mythologizing" of which Bultmann speaks fits quite different categories. Certainly, the imagery of the Hebrews and the imagery of men since the beginning of our era need to be reviewed and revised in terms of our scientific knowledge of the world, but the naive imagery does not alter the theological and metaphysical essence of the biblical message. Correcting the false images substantially changes nothing in the theology or metaphysics of the prophets of Israel and the Apostles. Furthermore, the supernatural itself plays an integrating role in this message. It cannot be discarded without the message itself being essentially altered.

We have just touched on the central point, the fundamental objection which undoubtedly will be made by unbelievers: biblical metaphysics, you say, is essentially metaphysical and structurally non-mythological. Is not the idea of creation, however, the idea of a world created by a transcendent and personal God, an enormous myth which is enough to disqualify this metaphysics radically, the more so because, as you have sufficiently emphasized, this whole metaphysics proceeds in its structure from the idea of creation as its point of departure?

The idea of creation will in fact be mythological, if the world is discovered to be ontologically sufficient, uncreated, and eternal. We can choose between two

types of metaphysics proceeding from two different points of departure. On the one hand is the principle of the ontological sufficiency of an uncreated, indestructible, and eternal world. The other teaches, from the ontological point of view, the radical insufficiency of our whole universe and all it contains. Since there is no intermediary term, there are, without doubt, only two metaphysical points of view: the pagan and the biblical. The history of metaphysics, whether explicitly expressed or contained implicitly in myths and religions, shows that metaphysics always is related, with minor variations, to one or the other of these two types. (Philosophers, it is true, are often less faithful to their own principles than logic would wish them.)

The most incontestable contribution of positive science realized in modern times has been to show us, at the same time as the grandeur and infinite riches of the world, the radical insufficiency of every being explored by science to pretend to be uncreated, *causa sui*, or eternal. The stars which Aristotle considered as gods are material, for there is nothing in the universe which could be an uncreated, indestructible, or eternal substance. Some modern philosophies have endeavored to maintain the sufficiency and aseity of the world by transferring to the totality a sufficiency which no part of the world can any longer uphold. Thus their universe would be eternal and indestructible because it is *causa sui*. In our analysis and experience, however, the universe is discovered as a spatio-temporal phenomenon in which *everything is born* at a given moment. Science has certified that man has not always existed on this earth, but first appeared some hundreds of thousands of years ago. Life is no longer held to have begun on our planet; it appeared only when certain well-

determined physico-chemical conditions had been fulfilled. Complex matter itself is the fruit of an evolution, a temporal synthesis. Matter is discovered in our historical analysis as being in the state of genesis and synthesis.

What is meant when people speak of the eternity of the universe? In attempting to maintain the eternity of matter, they are driven into a corner from which there is no escape. Of what matter are they speaking? Is it the matter in the universe which we know today? Matter, as we know it, is the fruit of a long and laborious evolution and has developed to a high degree of complexity. It is no longer a question of matter "pure and simple"; the matter we envision as constituting our universe dates back millions of years. What is the elementary atom, the primitive energy? The metaphysics which tries to maintain the ontological sufficiency of the world considered as absolute will bestow on lowly "matter," claimed to be uncreated and eternal, all the powers and "virtualities" of the gods. In the text of Engels cited above, we have seen that simple matter has the power to create from its own resources everything which emerges from it, everything it is going to constitute; simple matter has the power to produce complex matter, organic matter, life and consciousness. If the stars, as with Aristotle, were once considered divine substances, now it is "primitive matter" which is treated as a divine, creative substance.

On the other hand, to maintain the eternity of the universe is to fall back on its immensity. This is merely removing the problem. If life originated on our planet at a given moment, it is similar in other solar systems. We will always return to the fact of the genesis and the synthesis of an elementary matter which progressively, in the course of history, develops increasingly more

complex molecular structures. Synthesis, however, is an operation which transcends the elements it unites: it is a creative operation.

Finally, brought to a stand, myth finds an escape outside our actual experience. To us, the universe appears to be a spatio-temporal phenomenon oriented and irreversible, in which everything is born at a given time. How, in these conditions, can they pretend that the universe itself, the totality, is eternal? Myth then answers: so it seems in our actual experience; but in *another possible experience* which is not ours, but which we can imagine, who can prove to us that the evolution of the universe does not indefinitely renew itself according to an eternal cycle of evolution and involution, expansion and contraction, rise and fall?

In a world which appears to us entirely under the law of birth and genesis, it is the adversary who must prove his thesis: the sufficiency, aseity, and eternity of the world. Until this proof has been given, the fundamental thesis of pantheist metaphysics remains essentially mythological. Moreover, since this proof escapes the order and possibilities of positive science, it *cannot* be given. No experimental science, no matter how extensive, will ever be able to affirm legitimately the eternity and infinity of the universe, or the eternity of cosmic Becoming. This thesis is *essentially* of the metaphysical order, and this metaphysics which does not rest on any *possible* experience is, *by its very essence*, mythological. Even if it were possible, which is not the case, the demonstration of the eternity of the Universe would be formally identical to an affirmation of the ontological sufficiency of the world which is equivalent to the religious thesis of the world's divinity. It is a mystic thesis which rests on an option, a mystic preference.

Nevertheless, although the idea of the eternity of the world is not *formally* identical with the idea of the ontological sufficiency of the world, although the idea of creation is not *formally* identical with the idea of beginning, it does not follow that the idea of creation can be *really* disassociated from that of beginning.⁸ These ideas are formally

⁸ The divinity of the world implies the eternity of the world. It is to save the ontological sufficiency of the world that metaphysics teaches the eternity of matter, the eternity of becoming, and the infinity of time and space.

But from a purely logical point of view, the eternity of the world does not imply its sufficiency. To say that the world is eternal is not necessarily to say that it is uncreated. One can, St. Thomas says, conceive of an eternal yet created world. The notion of creation is not formally identical with the notion of the world's beginning. It is one thing to say that the world is created, another to say that it has a beginning.

The non-eternity of the world, St. Thomas tells us (*Summa Theol.* I, 46,2), is known to us only by faith and cannot be demonstrated. The non-eternity, the "newness" of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself; it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone did not always exist.

Today we would object to St. Thomas that, actually, the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated, but that it can be *shown*. We know today, not by deduction from concepts posed as principles, but by experience, that neither man, this earth, the hardest minerals, nor the solar system has always existed.

We might note in passing that St. Thomas, in this text, speaks of man not as an individual, but as a species. Experience shows us that men are born, that they *begin* in existence. St. Thomas does not seem to take this individual experience into consideration; "there is only science of the general." What interests St. Thomas is man as a *species*, and, according to him, there is no reason that as a species it should not always have existed. The deep-seated Platonism of this attitude is very noticeable. Today we disagree with St. Thomas in that, historically, the species themselves have *begun* to exist; they are born, historically.

The newness of the world, continues St. Thomas, can no longer be demonstrated apart from the will of God, because the will of God cannot be fathomed, except as regards those things

distinct, but in the nature of things, inseparable. A world created from all eternity would be an absurd world, a sad development never attaining its fullness, a laborious childbirth never reaching delivery, and unending anguish. Furthermore, if one wished in a coherent manner to disassociate the idea of creation from that of 'beginning,' while affirming not only the world's eternity but also that of all the beings which it contains and which constitute it, it would be necessary to deny the universal experience of *birth*. One would be involved, from the theological point of view, in inescapable contradictions and absurdities.

It will be objected, no doubt, that it is possible to conceive—as certain astrophysicists and cosmologists, in fact, do today—the universe as finding itself in a state of sustained equilibrium; consequently, there is a continual genesis of matter which seems to cancel the problems of a beginning and end of the world. Thus, because of the constant appearance of new matter, the expansion of the universe, the *releasing* of cosmic energy in a constantly enlarging space, no longer involves the perspective

which God must will of necessity. This is why the beginning of the world cannot be shown us except by revelation.

To show that the world can be created and yet eternal, St. Thomas borrows from St. Augustine the traditional neo-platonic image of the footprint in the dust; if the foot is imprinted in the dust from eternity, there would be an eternal trace whose cause is the foot; in this way the world could be created from all eternity. Who cannot see, however, that this image is the worst one one can use, since it presupposes what is in question? It posits an eternal foot and eternal dust. There is then no difficulty in finding a relation of eternal causality between the foot and the print in the dust. Creation, however, precisely means not proceeding from pre-existent matter, for matter is also created. Finally, the creation of the world is not instantaneous; it is a progressive, historical, and temporal process.

of a thermic death of the universe, nor the necessity of admitting an absolute temporal beginning of the cosmic process.

Let us examine this hypothesis from the philosophical point of view. It means nothing less than a continual creation of matter. The beginning and end which it denies to the entire universe, it applies to each material corpuscle. *The beginning is infinitely multiplied.* The universe appears to us as a perpetual gushing forth of matter, always and eternally renewed. Accepting this hypothesis comes to mean, theologically, that the universe is constantly being created, not in an ancient or Cartesian sense of a *sustained* creation, but in a dynamic and active sense of a creation in constant renewal, continually under the law of creation and genesis.

We no longer have the perspective of the 13th century and St. Thomas, since it is no longer a question of a universe supposedly created or uncreated from all eternity, and (here is the essential difference) final, but of a universe in continual genesis, in constant renewal, and eternally unfinished. Moreover, in the strict sense of the terms, it is no longer a question of materially the *same* universe today as yesterday; for, however little it is recognized, besides the continual genesis of material corpuscles, there is an equal annihilation of others. Today we can only speak of the formal identity of the universe. In a very precise sense, the form of the universe alone, no longer its matter, is capable of defining its identity, just as every human organism whose cells are replaced every seven years, is not, materially, identical to itself, but identical only because of the unity of a biological and psychological individuality. It is no longer a question, as for Aristotle, of a universe eternal through an escape from origin, change, growth, and old

age, but of a universe eternal because it is eternally in genesis, perpetually renewed. Theologically one would express this thesis in saying that God is ceaselessly creating solar systems and galaxies, and in these constantly renewed worlds, perhaps some biological syntheses analogous to those known on our planet. The proposed idea of a plurality of inhabited worlds is based not only on the spatial vastness of the universe, but also on the eternity of its temporal development.

What concerns us, in our present purposes, is to note that the hypothesis of a universe in equilibrium because of ceaseless renewal does not demand the metaphysical thesis of the ontological sufficiency of the cosmic process by considering matter as uncreated and eternal. On the contrary, it gives us a vision of things in which matter, far from being eternal, is under a law of continual genesis, leaving room for the philosopher to apply the idea of creation. Matter is not divinized, is not presented as an eternal *thing*, sufficient, unchangeable; it is discovered, on the contrary, as being *born*. It remains to be known whether this unverifiable hypothesis—of a universe which is constantly gushing forth—is consistent with the Christian concept of an economy of creation in which everything tends toward a climax, when God will create 'a new heaven and a new earth.'

Let us note, finally, that the philosophical opposition between dialectical materialism and Christianity is not situated on the level of a theory of knowledge but on that of a doctrine of being. The Christian scientist and philosopher can very well collaborate with "materialist" scientists and philosophers in studying the real with objectivity and rigor, they both reject that kind of spiritualism which rests on an erroneous conception of the relations between mat-

ter, life, and consciousness—the Cartesian conception. Epistemologically, the Christian scientist and philosopher can be as "materialist" as anyone. All employ the same scientific method: beginning with the Real and, by objective experiment, analyzing and laying bare its laws. The scientific method has some unifying truths: it constitutes the only common ground for a meeting and a collaboration between the scientist and the philosopher of different obediences.

What inevitably brings the Christian and "materialist" scientist into opposition outside the laboratory, however, is their doctrine of being. For the Christian, the Real is created; for the Marxist, uncreated. From the Marxist point of view, the Christian must then be called an "idealist," even if his epistemology is materialist, since the Christian must then think that material Reality is created by a God who is Spirit. On the other hand, Aristotle, and Spinoza are, according to the Marxists, "materialists." Materialism means the divinization of the world, a pantheism (whether it be recognized explicitly as such or not). Here is where the "idealism" of a Hegel joins the "materialism" of a Marx. Spinoza is the common foundation for both.

Conclusion

In considering relations between metaphysical and cosmological assumptions, between metaphysics and the real, we have touched on questions which greatly concerned the medieval theologians as soon as Aristotelianism had spread in the West.⁹ Arabic, Jewish, and Christian theologians posed the question of the relation between biblical theology and an Aristotelian cosmology which taught the divinity and eternity of the

⁹ These questions also preoccupied the Marxist theorists in an effort to defend evidently contrary theses.

universe. Not every metaphysics, we said at the beginning of this study, is compatible with every theology. We must now add that not every cosmology is compatible with every metaphysics. From these two propositions, it follows that not every cosmology is compatible with biblical theology, if the cosmology implies or entails a certain metaphysics. It is often said that the Fathers of the Church had assimilated Greek philosophy just as the Hebrews, in leaving Egypt, had taken with them the riches of the Egyptians. This much-used homiletic theme unfortunately oversimplifies the complexity of some real problems. The Church Fathers who were philosophers had, indeed, often received with sympathy the riches of pagan philosophy, but they had immediately *revised* what was metaphysically incompatible with their own faith. They had radically rejected the essential thesis of pagan metaphysics: the doctrine of the eternity of the world and of matter, of the eternal return and cyclical time, of the pre-existence and of the descent of souls into "bodies." After this had been done, they adapted their own thought to that of the Greeks. However, we see that the fundamental structure of pagan metaphysics was radically transformed. Just as the ancient Hebrew traditions utilized Babylonian myths but, at the same time, completely transformed their metaphysical structure, so also the Fathers welcomed what was usable from Greek philosophy, what was compatible with the metaphysical structure of their own theology (i.e. the notion of participation, or that of the intelligible world), but at the same time rejected what could not be integrated. They were perfectly aware of the metaphysical requirements of Christian theology: not every metaphysics is compatible with every theology. Those who were not sufficiently conscious of these implications and in-

compatibilities, who wished to unite Christian theology with metaphysical theses incompatible with its own structure (Origen, for example) were condemned by the Church. Some reproach the Church (as the Protestants often do) for having united Greek philosophy and Christian theology; others praise her for it;¹⁰ both are mistaken. The

¹⁰ In particular, this is the error of Father Daniélou in *God and the Ways of Knowing* (Meridian), p. 196. Father Daniélou claims that we want to hold onto "biblical categories." We do not know what he means by this. In philosophy, categories are forms of judgment. On page 195, however, Father Daniélou calls "biblical categories" *b'rith* (the covenant), *emth* (truth and fidelity), *tsedeq* (justice), and *hesed* (goodness), and writes that St. Thomas has "substituted" the "categories (?) of matter and form" for the biblical "categories"! Not only are the covenant, truth, justice, etc. . . . not categories, but we cannot see where St. Thomas has substituted matter and form for truth, justice, etc.

After attributing to us what we have never said, Fr. Daniélou states some fundamental truths which no one ever dreamed of contesting. For example: "Hebrew was not part of Revelation. Revelation transcends every possible culture and should be expressed in every language of the world." True. However, it is still necessary to analyze in *what conditions* biblical revelation is going to be able to express itself in cultures and languages whose *thought structures* differ, metaphysically, from the metaphysical structure of the biblical message. It is not a question here of "categories," but a problem of metaphysical structures, and of coherence, which Father Daniélou does not seem to perceive. He rejoices that Revelation has been expressed by theologians in the categories of Greek philosophy, and wishes that an analogous work be done for India or China. But Revelation has not been expressed by theology with the "categories" of Greek philosophy—*theology* has remodeled and transformed Greek philosophy in utilizing it as an instrument. Furthermore, it is absurd to imagine that biblical theology may be able to express itself in the body of an Indian metaphysics which professes the illusion of multiplicity, the transmigration and return of souls to the indivisible Unity, etc. . . . ; it is the same with Chinese thought. Missionaries, since St. Paul, well know that the principal resistance met on the part of any given culture arises precisely from its

thought of the Church welcomed, with great discernment, foreign elements which were capable of being integrated into it. Likewise, in regard to Chinese and Indian thought, Christian theology will accept what is assimilable, but will reject what is incompatible with the requirements of its own metaphysical structure.

Cosmologies and anthropologies are incompatible with biblical theology in so far as they imply a metaphysics incompatible with biblical metaphysics. Aristotelean cosmology, for example, contains an inassimilable metaphysical thesis concerning the substance of stars and the universe (uncreated substance, unchanging, indestructible). St. Thomas rejected the Platonist anthropology and chose an anthropology more faithful to common experience, that of Aristotle, because the Platonist anthropology contained an ensemble of myths (pre-existence of souls, the descent of souls into supposedly "evil" bodies etc. . .) whose metaphysical structure was incompatible with biblical and Christian thought.

There exist, then, between theology, metaphysics, and the reality of our experience and science, relations which are not to be forced on anyone, but which also should not be neglected. "Forcing" takes place when, in the name of his own certitudes, the theologian imposes a truth on the philosopher or scientist which they have not discovered by their own methods, resting on their own rule

metaphysical structure. The passage of the biblical message into a civilization requires, on the part of the "learned," a renunciation and a "renovation of their thought."

Indeed, Hebrew does not play a role in Revelation. Nevertheless it is important to examine how Hebrew has been an instrument *pre-adapted* to the expression of the word of God. The Word of God did not choose to express Himself in just any civilization, in just any mental universe, without *preparation* on the human level, without *pre-adaptation*.

of scientific research. It also exists in the contrary situation, when the theologian refuses to accept something which appears to the scientist as a certitude. The Galileo case consisted in wanting to impose on the scientist, in the name of naively interpreted biblical texts, a philosophy of the world which experience denied. In the 19th century, certain theologians wanted to oppose the evidence for the biological evolution of animal species in the name of a childish conception of creation and a rigid philosophy.¹¹ The autonomy of the sciences must be respected.

¹¹ We must distinguish between the *scientific* concept of evolution, which expresses a certain law of the development of reality, from a metaphysics which gratuitously attributes to this historical development of the real an ontological sufficiency which amounts to a divinization. As Teilhard de Chardin has masterfully pointed out, Evolution is not creative; it represents and manifests, for our experience, creation in the process of being made.

Once this elementary distinction is made, it must be recognized that the opposition of some theologians to the discovery of an evolution of species rests on a certain number of prejudices. First of all, in the depth of their thought, there is that old Greek notion that becoming represents an evil, a fall, and that a vision of the world in the process of becoming is in opposition to a "philosophy of being." Next, hardly conscious, there is another Greek idea, that species cannot have any beginning. The birth and commencement of species can only be admitted through the constraint of revelation. (Cf. the text of St. Thomas). Finally, the biblical imagery of the creation of the world, animals, and of man, proposes a *discontinuous* creation, thought of as a fabrication: God the potter taking clay to fashion man.

It is worthwhile to point out that the "creationist" who rejects the progressive filiation of species, one from the other, *limits* the creative intervention of God to certain moments that he considers as privileged: the "beginning" of the world, the "beginning" of life, the creation of man. To read some irreducible adversaries of the discovery of evolution, the creative intervention of God would only be necessary at these passages from one order to another. The rest of the time "evolution" would func-

Concordism is a desire to make the biblical texts and scientific truths agree, even when the biblical texts do not contain any geological, paleontological, or prehistorical teaching. The picture given us of "primitive" man is evidently very recent, and by no means faithful to the image of tertiary man. Concordism also attempts to force texts; it is mentioned when positive science and the biblical text *are not in accord*. However, when archeology, for example, discovers, by some excavation, that the biblical account of a particular personage or age, contains a great deal of historical truth, it is no longer concordism, but truth. . . .

The other error, inversely, consists in neglecting the inevitable relations existing between theology, exegesis of the Book of Revelation, metaphysics, and the positive science of the real. Frustrated by the "concordist" failure, the anti-concordists have committed the inverse error. They readily teach that the books of the bible are only concerned with giving a "religious" message, not a scientific or philosophical one. The sacred writers expressed themselves as their age appeared to them, and the Hebrews were not philosophers at all. Therefore, neither science nor philosophy is found in the Bible.

We have seen what must be thought

tion all by itself. To create man a special intervention would be necessary, but for a snail or a giraffe this is not useful; "for these, secondary causes are enough." This is to accord to evolution a sufficiency it does not have.

On the contrary, if one recognizes without reserves the fact of an evolution, which would not only be biological but cosmic, this new perspective is quite naturally integrated into the Christian vision of the world, while discerning the creative intervention of God *all along* the process of cosmogenesis and biogenesis, which is completed by an anthropogenesis. Here we have a notion of creation which is not limited to a certain moment, but is *coextensive with evolution as a whole*.

of this last assertion. The theological message of the Sacred Scriptures must be understood to be metaphysically structured. To deny that a metaphysical structure is incorporated in the Bible, is either simply to miss its meaning, or represents a completely mistaken analysis. As regards science, the attitude generally held today certainly bears one great pedagogic truth: simplicity. This academic simplicity, however, masks the real complexity of the problems. In fact, because of the vital need for homogeneity and coherence, the Bible cannot promote any metaphysics, nor, similarly, any science of the real it pleases. The Bible can very well express itself in the naive imagery of its times. It can not, however, under penalty of impairing its essentially theological message, promote just any cosmology or anthropology in so far as these cosmologies and anthropologies contain a metaphysics. For example, the Bible cannot adopt Aristotelian cosmology which teaches the eternity of the cosmos and the divinity of stars as imperishable substances, without contradicting itself, since it says that God created all things and can reduce all to nothingness. Likewise, the Bible can not promote the myth of eternal return since it tells us that the Work of God tends toward a term of eternal fullness; nor can it propose an anthropology which retains the myth of the pre-existence of souls and their descent into evil bodies. This is contrary to the doctrine of creation and the excellence of the created.

Biblical writers can express themselves as their times and milieu appear to them as long as the images used do not bring in a metaphysics incompatible with its own message. When the Bible says the sun awakens and goes to sleep, it derives the image from an observation of phenomena. The appearance is not false; it is only incomplete and insufficient, to

be corrected by a more complete experience of phenomena. However, nothing there involves the metaphysical structure of biblical theology.

Consequently, it is false to say that the Bible does not contain *any* scientific teaching. In the rejection of every cosmology and anthropology incompatible with its message, such a teaching is present at least negatively, whereas it is contained there positively by its fidelity to experience, by the denial of myth, thus forming a positive vision of the world. When the Bible speaks of the beginning and the end of the world, it poses truths which truly rise from a science of the real. These are scientific truths, or else no truths at all. If science confirms them, it will not be concordism, but truth. . . .

Positive sciences exercise, in opposition to biblical exegesis, a reductive role.¹² They free biblical exegesis by showing us what the sacred text was not commanded to tell us. When experimental science showed us that the earth was round and revolved around the sun, the texts in which the Galilean judges spoke were recognized as expressions of "things as they appeared." When the age of man on the earth and the conditions of primitive man's life were known by paleontology, it appeared that the biblical genealogies of the first ten chapters of Genesis could not have any historical import and that the account of creation did not constitute a paleontological document. In correcting this perspective of biblical exegesis, neither theology nor biblical metaphysics are altered. We return to the perspective of the nature pictures

painted by the "primitives" who utilized certain conventions which we are progressively discovering. For example, the genealogies of the first ten chapters of Genesis have no bearing on individuals but on peoples, and they did not know how to go any further back.

Positive science and the science and reading of the sacred texts are thus discovered in a dialectic relation: the dialogue of positive sciences and biblical hermeneutics demands that we detect the decay of certain representations, of certain images, while the inspired text saves the Christian philosopher and scientist from interpreting their discovery of the real in the categories of a pantheist philosophy to which the human intelligence is only too spontaneously inclined. The discoveries of positive sciences concern the *how* of the history of creation taught by the Bible and Tradition. The *how* could not be known by revelation, but must be discovered by the scientific research of man. Creation, which, as the psalm says, teaches the glory of God, requires assiduous study by the Christian scientist who wishes to find in the real, whether material, biological, psychological, or spiritual, the expression and the realization of the thought of God. As the Book of Proverbs says, the world has been created in wisdom and understanding. The scientist who, in physical matter, the universe, or the biological organism, finds again that intelligibility which Einstein admired, rejoins, through the mediation of this intelligibility, the creative intelligence at work in the world even today. In this sense, the science of the real is also theology.

Translated by RONALD KOSHOSHEK

¹² A. Gelin, *Key Concepts of the Old Testament* (Sheed and Ward).

THE UNITY OF HERBERT'S "TEMPLE"

ELIZABETH STAMBLER

IN GEORGE HERBERT'S own century *The Temple* was read and praised by men of all shades of Christian piety from Baxter to Crashaw. Though the poems of *Steps to The Temple* may seem to us very little like Herbert's, Crashaw implied that his poetic impulse came from *The Temple*. Vaughan, Harvey, and, later, Wesley not only acknowledged Herbert to be their spiritual mentor and modelled their books upon *The Temple*, but also, as far as they were able, constructed their individual poems in close imitation of Herbert's. Such strong effects on men of such varying religious beliefs argue a power and a meaning in *The Temple* greater than the sum of some 100 lyric poems.

Walton's *Life* seems to have fixed a paradoxical image of Herbert and of *The Temple*: on the one hand rare and fine and on the other entirely accessible as a model of conduct, both exquisitely educated and plain, both simple and subtle. The man and the book were identified, as Gerard Manley Hopkins is for many readers inextricable from his sonnets. Modern writers on Herbert continue to speculate on a mysterious aspect of his book, a oneness both teasing and satisfying.

Eliot, more than usually gnomic, called *The Temple* 'an oeuvre to be studied entire.'¹ Recently both Louis Martz and Joseph Summers have attempted a formulation of the book's unity. Both attempts are eloquent; the Herbert leg-

end, I think, shows itself still at work in the earnestness of both scholars' efforts, in the need both obviously feel to attempt solution of a problem. Martz finds essentially that the book as a whole reduplicates the process of meditation which he finds characteristic of many of the individual poems. The three parts of the whole, 'The Sacramental Introduction,' 'The Body of Conflicts,' and 'The Plateau of Assurance,' correspond to composition of place, analysis, and colloquy.² But are not the poems throughout the book as sacramental as the initial ones? Is not the whole book a 'body of conflicts?' What becomes of the 'plateau of assurance' in 'Dotage,' in 'My comforts drop and melt away like snow' of 'The Answer,' in the pains of 'Discipline,' in the 'dreadful look' of 'Judgement,' or in the precarious exaltation of the last poem of the book, 'Love III)?

Summers, though in a briefer and less elaborate treatment than Martz', succeeds better by describing a less rigid unity. While warning against interpretation of *The Temple* as autobiography, he stresses the organic quality of the book: '... the temple as a building was a hieroglyph for the body, particularly the human body in the service of God and the divine body of Christ.'³ He takes full note of the 'violently alternating spiritual change' characteristic of the book. He says we may 'conceive of *The Temple* as the symbolic record written by a poet, of a "typical" Christian life within the Church.'⁴ He concludes,

The Temple is almost a casebook of examples showing how 'Order' gives 'all things their set forms and houres.' It reflects Herbert's belief that form was that principle by which the spir-

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itual created existence out of chaos, and Herbert assumed that that process could be rationally apprehended. Since the principle was divine and therefore universal, the understanding of the formal organization of any one object or state or action gave a clue to the understanding of the rest. The poet's duty was to perceive and to communicate God's form. In the process he would construct out of the chaos of experience and the mass of language another object which would reflect his discovery: literary form as we understand it was but a reflection of that form which was everywhere present, although often hidden to eyes that could not 'see.' It, too, in its material embodiment appealed to man's senses, and moved his affections. The rational contemplation of it should lead to an understanding of its symbolic significance.⁵

It is hard to disagree, but the remarks are too general. 'Casebook' is a cold word for *The Temple*. Summers' reader continues to ask, just what is the form? What is the 'Order?' How do the form and order of the whole differ from the form and order of the individual poems?

I do not expect here to provide any final analysis of the unity of *The Temple*; I offer only one more partial explanation, which I consider not radically in conflict with other readings but which may be used along with them in a serious reading of Herbert.

TO SUMMARIZE this explanation I am led to a discussion of ways in which *The Temple* as a whole resembles a volume of courtly love poetry—the *Vita Nuova*, Petrarch's *Rime*, *Astrophel and Stella*—as individual poems of *The Temple* resemble lyrics of the courtly love tradition. I find these resemblances in several important details and in two fairly large general themes, the theme of loss and the theme of discipline which brings the protagonist at last to a condition of purified desire.

1

THE TEMPLE, like the best of the volumes of courtly love lyrics, is unified in its protagonist. His roles of courtier, soldier, and poet resemble Dante's, Petrarch's, and Sidney's protagonists.^{5a} There can be no doubt, I think, of the consistent character of Herbert's persona: he is one throughout the volume. The three roles are woven together in too many instances, and too consistently over the whole book, to permit the reader to suppose that the speaker of nearly every one of the poems is not the same. The character of the protagonist dominates *The Temple* as the courtly lyric protagonist dominates Dante's, Petrarch's, or Sidney's volume: the whole book consists of his emotions, responses, thoughts, and actions. Herbert's God appears in *The Temple* very much as the beloved woman appears in the courtly lyrics, characterized indirectly, via the reactions of the protagonist.

In collecting his individual poems in a volume Herbert had no model from the body of religious poetry. Only in the volumes of courtly love poetry could he have found precisely the dramatic qualities of his protagonist in individual poems and his cumulative drama over a whole volume. Far from disparaging Herbert's originality, to study the formal and dramatic analogies between *The Temple* and the courtly love volumes is, I think, to see his great skill. Not only did he turn the old form to a new use, but as we trace the traditional material through *The Temple* we come with fresh insight to many essential aspects of the tradition which had become obscured and stultified in the masses of sonnet sequences turned out in the late Renaissance. Throughout Herbert criticism it is not so much his originality which has been praised as his beautiful molding and polishing of

old material; this is the view taken by Rosemond Tuve, Martz, and Summers; this is the source of the peculiar 'order' Herbert is said to exemplify. His re-ordering and revitalizing of the form of the courtly love volume is an entirely characteristic display of his talent, on the same principle as his utilization of Christian typologies or tracts of meditation.

2

I USE THE WORD 'FORM' here in an additive sense: the form of a work may be described as the sum of the work's several formal elements. (After making such a sum, of course, we may feel that the work far exceeds our addition.) One such element has been discussed above—the dramatic protagonist who dominates the work but who also serves as a mirror through which we see another (even more dominant) figure. A second formal component of both *The Temple* and the courtly love volume is the unceasing shift in the states of feeling, registering every shade of emotion from joy to despair. Summers calls this the 'symbolic record . . . of a "typical" Christian life within the Church,' and so it may be, though we can scarcely ask for documentary proof. The volumes of love poems, however, do offer in a sense documentary proof that violently alternating emotions were involved with six centuries of literary analysis on the subject of love. I am more than a little in disagreement with Martz' idea that *The Temple* concludes on a 'plateau of assurance' when I say that over the entire length of Herbert's volume we find Petrarch's emotional contrarities (merely sharpened and emphasized in Petrarch's imitation of Dante and the troubadours and handed down entire to the Petrarchan poets of the Renaissance). If there is a 'plateau of assurance' in *The Temple*, I believe it is one of only

slight degree; the last poems of the book show very little more assurance than the earlier ones.

A cursory look at the sequences of emotional states in *The Temple* shows shattering grief in 'The Sinner,' 'Good Friday,' and 'The Sepulchre' followed by joyous exaltation in 'Easter'; bitter rebellion and remorse in 'Affliction (I)' and 'Repentance' followed by assurance in 'Faith'; desiccation of the spirit in 'Grace,' self-reproach for sloth in 'Praise (I),' near-mortal pain in 'Affliction (II)' followed by trust in all-providing Providence in 'Mattens' and 'Even-song.' I think a fair reading will find this kind of alternation continuing through the last poems of the volume. After 'The Flower' (which Marts considers the turning point from the 'body of conflicts' to the 'plateau of assurance') we come immediately to 'Dotage,' of which the second stanza suggests no retrospect on pain but rather the immediate experience:

True earnest sorrows, rooted miseries,
Anguish in grain, vexations ripe and
blown,
Sure-footed griefs, solid calamities,
Plain demonstrations, evident and
cleare,
Fetching their proofs ev'n from the very
bone;

These are the sorrows here.

The two next poems, 'The Sonnet' and 'A true Hymne,' express great joy; 'The Answer' follows with:

My comforts drop and melt away
like snow

as its first line. The rest of the sonnet, at least until the couplet, is enumeration of vanished comforts. 'A Dialogue-Anthem,' next, shows the Christian triumphant over death, but 'The Water-course' and 'Self-condemnation' warn of the precariousness of salvation; the beautiful miniature poem 'Bitter-sweet' is all contrarities.

A mixture of attitudes is revealed in the poems which follow until we reach three on death. The protagonist faces his end with courage, his faith unmarred by doubt, with hope. It is *with hope*, however, and thus far from that quality which marks the end of hope, assurance. There is no blinking at the grimness of the images of death in these poems, from the 'once uncouth hideous thing' of 'Death,' through the 'noisome vapours' and 'plague and publick wo' and 'decay' where 'Man is out of order hurl'd of 'Dooms-day,' to the 'dreadful look, / Able a heart of iron to appal' of 'Judgement.'

'Heaven' is no more free of ambiguity and complexity than the first poems of *The Temple*: the dramatic speaker Echo is carefully qualified as *not being* the pagan and mythic figure 'born among the trees and leaves,' and the poem's protagonist is shown to receive an understanding of Heaven's 'Light to the minde' and 'Light, joy, and leisure.' But the form of the poem gives us pause: Echo as teacher here continues to repeat the protagonist's own words, as by definition *Echo* must do. Is Heaven no more distant from the protagonist than this? Echo speaks last; if the protagonist spoke again would he not have to maintain the *questioning* form of his speeches throughout the poem?

I shall return later to the last poem of the volume, 'Love (III),' here noting only that its beauty results from Herbert's expression, subtle and indirect, of the protagonist's overwhelming surprise. The joy is the keener because it is undeserved and unexpected. It is sudden, another of the violently alternating emotional states which have characterized the whole volume, not a development of preceding states or poems.

The volume of love lyrics has a paradoxically double form; typically it is both lyric and narrative. If they are to

remain pure lyrics, complete and self-contained each within itself, the individual poems must remain free of one another in the volume. The reader must not be able to say of the whole: this later joy cancels the emotion of the earlier poem of sorrow, or vice versa. Every poem must seem to be in the present tense, emotion conveyed directly it is experienced. Such is the formal convention of the traditional volume of love lyrics, demanded, no doubt, by the nature of the subject: love is that emotional experience most susceptible of extreme change, least susceptible of final logical analysis. Many readers have found this form inconclusive, anticlimactic, monotonous—all, in short, that militates against *form*—and when it is poorly handled I agree that it is so. I tentatively assert, however, that it was the consciously chosen form of Dante, Petrarch, and Sidney: the formal principle is that only through constant alternations, without conclusion, and with one mood presented as equal in weight and immediacy to every other mood, can the individual lyrics remain undiluted. Herbert preserves the purity of the lyric form over the whole of his volume in just this way. His poems express emotional states; in sequence those states continually contradict one another, but to none is given primacy over the others.

3

THERE IS EVIDENCE that Herbert did consider the book a whole rather than a random collection. Hutchinson's carefully weighed conclusion that we have the poems in roughly the order Herbert wished cannot be discounted.⁶ Herbert's message to Ferrar is clear: in the *volume*, considered entire, the reader would find 'a picture of the many spiritual Conflicts that have past betwixt God and my Soul...'⁷

The poet's role in *The Temple* would lead the reader to expect evidence of other poems to present itself in any given poem; the poet's role would not be convincing on the strength of a single poem, no matter how excellent. Herbert by many subtle means establishes his poet's role as the dominant one in *The Temple*; here it is appropriate to mention his very explicit and overt references to poems outside the one at issue, quite in the spirit of that troubadour convention (which became a permanent feature of the courtly love poem) of reference to 'my songs.' 'Jordan (II),' halfway through *The Temple*, looks back on a career of poetry,

When first my lines of heav'nly joyes
made mention...

'Dulnesse' also refers to poems written before this one,

Where are my lines then? my
approaches? views?
Where are my window-songs?

'Providence' speaks of 'all my other hymnes'; in 'The Priesthood' Herbert puns with 'my slender compositions.'

Usually, it is true, Herbert's handling of the subject of poetry is one which points directly to the single text under our eyes, but a few clear and obvious extensions into other work such as those above cause the reader to notice more oblique references. Reading *The Temple* backward as well as forward, as the complexity of the book demands, we may interpret lines from the early poem 'The Thanksgiving' as seeming to promise a volume.

Nay, I will reade thy book, and never
move

Till I have found therein thy love,
Thy art of love, which I'll turn back
on thee...

An Art of Love cannot be accomplished in a single lyric poem. The last line of 'Good Friday' points to a mass of work,

'And all the writings blot or burn.' The first lines of 'Praise (I)' suggest work previous to that of this particular poem,

To write a verse or two is all the praise,
That I can raise...

'Deniall' exemplifies 'broken verse' in its own form, but its first stanza evokes a long career of frustration of happiness in general and of poetic composition in particular. At least the third stanza of 'The Pearl' expresses a very deep familiarity with the art of poetry,

what love and wit
Have done these twentie hundred yeares,
and more:
I know the projects of unbridled store...

The new state of 'The Flower,' in which the protagonist can 'relish versing' presupposes earlier attempts when the relish was absent. 'A true Hymne,' wholly on the subject of poetry, implies the same kind of experience of a time when 'some-what is behinde / To make his verse...' Like 'The Pearl,' 'The Forerunners' conveys intensely long and deep work with poetry's 'sweet phrases, lovely metaphors...' and 'Lovely enchanting language.' In 'The Posie,' 'invention' and 'comparisons' of past poems are dismissed, but without them there remains enough to make up a book:

This on my ring,
This by my picture, in my book
I write...

In 'Judgement' also there is a very concrete image of *The Temple* protagonist's own 'peculiar book.'

These references, the reader will have observed, extend over the whole of *The Temple*. They are not elaborate; they are not very important. They function as lightly and delicately as the love poets' mention of 'my songs,' to remind the reader of the protagonist's abiding preoccupation with poetry and of the fact that any single poem, however enchant-

ing and engrossing, must take its place with others in the book.

4

THE TITLE OF *The Temple* is a unifying one. However we interpret it, we must regard it as symbolic. In Herbert's time, and before it, such titles for collections of lyric poems were entirely characteristic of the volumes of love poetry—*Astrophel and Stella*, *Amoretti*, *Delia*, *Idea*. All of these, like the *Vita Nuova*, confer a meaning upon the whole volume which the reader can obtain only obliquely, if at all, from any part. They extend the implication of the volume into the realm of the abstract, into vast and universal generalization. They make sharp contrast with the tone of most poems in the volumes, a tone which is intensely personal and private; they present a long span of time, in contrast with the transitory moment of the individual poems. The word *temple* evokes a structure, massive and public, built over a long period, for the use of many. The poems within *The Temple* are altogether personal, dealing as Herbert himself said, with the 'many spiritual Conflicts that have past betwixt God and my Soul. . .' Herbert should not be thought to have taken his title's abstract significance from the love poets. It is enough to see that his title functions in much the same way as the love poets' titles, and that Herbert, because of the love poets' consistent practice in naming their works, could have depended upon his audience's recognition of a symbolism involved in such a title for a collection of lyric poems. No other genre, I think, could have supplied him with this traditional convention.

5

THE NATURE of the symbolism which these typical titles promised in such large and general terms involved noth-

ing less than life itself. The *Vita Nuova* is archetypal; later volumes followed, sometimes crudely, sometimes skillfully, its significant outlines. The word *life* here needs much qualification: the volume is not autobiography; it is the life of its fictional protagonist as courtier, soldier, and poet dating from his experience of love. As Dante makes very clear, the life cannot be separated from the act of writing poems; the separate experiences of the life are not complete until they are rendered into poetry. Reinforced, no doubt, by the Platonism of the Renaissance, Dante's fiction of the interpenetration of poetry and life appeared with even greater clarity and intensity in Petrarch and his successors. For them the writing of a poem is rarely retrospection upon an experience; the experience occurs simultaneously with the writing of the poem. A volume then, made up of many such disparate experiences, conveys the whole of the protagonist's experience—his life.

Herbert vividly identified poetry with life in, among other poems, 'Man's Medley,' 'The Flower,' 'The Forerunners,' and 'Judgement.' But these might be random references. A record of a life must be a sustained thing; it can be convincing only if it conveys a span of time, a developed chronology. I have referred to the double form of the courtly love volumes, to the fact that they are simultaneously lyric and narrative. I have discussed Herbert's preservation of the integrity of the lyric form in *The Temple*; his individual poems are points in time, intense and independent of all other times. In Herbert, however, as in the love poets, beneath the surface we find a flow of time, an ordered chronology. Modern physics, I think, supplies an analogy: like light these poems require a double principle to explain them.

6

THE POEMS at the beginning of *The Temple* have death as their theme. Christ's passion is agonizingly described and commented upon in every poem until the two Easter poems. But Christ's is not the only death in these poems; the protagonist himself is very vividly characterized as enduring a condition of dead matter, inert, a stone.

In 'The Altar,' a chain of demonstrative adjectives holds the key to the meaning of the poem; "this frame . . . these stones . . . this ALTAR" reveal the poem itself to be the subject of the poem, the altar, in a way which subsumes the other two, the heart of man and the heart of the Church. Placed at the beginning of Herbert's volume, 'The Altar' makes an identification between the poet's heart and his poem as a dedicated instrument of praise.

The next poem in the *Temple* which uses the image of the stony heart is 'The Sinner.' The 'heart' of this poem is not the metaphorical expression of an altar, but the Tablets of the Law, more intimately related to a literary purpose.

And though my hard heart scarce
to thee can grone
Remember that thou once didst
write in stone.

As in 'The Altar,' the desired action of God is one we have seen the poet consummate. God is asked to write; the poet has written. 'The Sepulchre' continues this line of imagery:

And as of old the Law by heav'nly art
Was writ in stone; so thou, which
also art
The letter of the word, find'st no
fit heart

To hold thee.

The protagonist in these poems calls upon God to animate the stone; the stone is the protagonist's heart and also the page of poetry. God's life-

giving action, so these poems say, will manifest itself as *writing upon the stone*: God's 'art' in 'Nature' is again clearly literary art, the writing of a poem. The protagonist's heart, when it wakens, will be a poem.

This imagery is dense in the short poems at the beginning of *The Temple*; it is intensified in proximity to 'The Sacrifice,' on the great theme of universal death, and to 'The Thanksgiving,' 'Reprisall,' 'The Agonie,' 'Good Friday,' and 'Redemption,' all of which concentrate on the crucifixion. These and the stone-image poems are deeply interconnected, of course: among other implications we see two parallel deaths; the two are also reversibly related as cause and effect (Christ dies for man; man is stricken almost to death with horror at Christ's suffering). Nowhere in *The Temple* do we find again the sense of heaviness, of inert matter, of these early poems. The stone images do recur—no theme is lost in *The Temple*—but they reappear transformed in 'The Church-floze,' 'Mattens,' 'Love Unknown,' and 'Sion.' In these later poems the stone is an element of construction, purposive, useful, a component of the living body of the Church, or an old building-block replaced by the living heart. Through linkages with still other poems Herbert's later uses of the stone image are closely associated with the images of song, *The Temple's* symbol for most intense animation in union with God.

I have said the two deaths at the beginning of the book are parallel. In a sense they are not so: comparison is impossible, the protagonist (in 'The Thanksgiving,' for example) cannot conceive the full meaning of Christ's action. The protagonist's condition in these early poems is not one in which his stony deathliness succeeds a span of life; it is as though he had not known life at all.

The protagonist is here metaphorically at the lowest level of the Great Chain. This is the subject, the *statement* of the early poems, the description of the protagonist's physical condition. His emotions, violently registered in the poems, do not contradict the physical image; they are locked-in, chaotic, like seething lava before the eruption. They struggle, however, towards the light, towards love. Christ's speeches in 'The Sacrifice' state the problem and its solution:

I answer nothing, but with patience
prove
If stonie hearts will melt with
gentle love. . . .

Why, Caesar is their onely King,
not I:
He clave the stonie rock, when they
were drie;
But surely not their hearts,
as I will trie.

In almost an ironic insight the protagonist says in 'The Thanksgiving':

Nay, I will reade thy book, and
never move
Till I have found therein
thy love . . .

With the two Easter poems, both aubades, brilliant sunlight stirs the stony protagonist:

Rise heart; thy Lord is risen . . .
Who takes thee by the hand,
that thou likewise
With him mayst rise.

Movement in these two poems is more projected than actual; the protagonist in 'Easter-Wings' exhorts himself to ascend in feeble and tentative imitation of Christ.

'H. Baptisme (II)' emphasizes and re-emphasizes the protagonist's condition as that of childhood.

Since, Lord, to thee
A narrow way and little gate

Is all the passage, on my infancie
Thou didst lay hold, and antedate
My faith in me.

O let me still
Write thee great God, and me a childe:
Let me be soft and supple to thy will,
Small to my self, to others milde,
Behither ill.

Although by stealth
My flesh get on, yet let her sister
My soul bid nothing, but preserve
her wealth:
The growth of flesh is but a blister;
Childhood is health.

Herbert does not use many images like this initial one; it is a very graphic image of birth. In the next poem the protagonist's 'Nature' is dedicated to the 'highest art' of God.

In these first fourteen poems of *The Temple* Herbert has constructed a beautiful chain of images by which his protagonist is transformed from an inanimate object into a living being. The beauty comes, I think, from the absolute literalness of the images; the religious, philosophical, and psychological implications of the poems, of course, ramify almost indefinitely. The subject of poetry is closely involved with the image chain from stone to child; we can everywhere paraphrase the process by saying that the poem equals life. This equation is typical of the courtly love volume as are also certain features of the demonstration of change from lifelessness to life which Herbert makes in his first fourteen poems.

SEVERAL important texts for the courtly love theory of the *cor gentil* use the stone to express the precondition of love; the action of the sun, or another 'star' upon the stone gives it its 'virtu,' or frees the function of the 'virtu,' and the stone becomes a precious stone. Guinizelli's canzone 'Of the gentle Heart' for example, to which Dante defers in the *Vita Nuova*, says:

The fire of love comes to the gentle heart
 Like as its virtue to a precious stone;
 To which no star its influence can
 impart
 Till it is made a pure thing by
 the sun...

Through gentle heart Love doth a track
 divine,—
 Like knowing like; the same
 As diamond runs through iron in the
 mine.

The first section of Herbert's 'Easter,' of which the second part deals wholly with the 'Sunne,' says,

 ...thou likewise
 With him mayst rise:
 That, as his death calcined thee to dust,
 His life may make thee gold, and
 much more, just.

A courtly love volume begins, logically enough, with the lover's 'first acquaintance' with his beloved, who is the star, or indeed often the sun itself, which warms the stony heart. In the first *Temple* poems, despite the quality of parallelism of the two deaths, God and the protagonist are separated, the one isolated ('The Sacrifice' makes this very clear and poignant) in the mystery of the Passion, and the other frozen in the stone. 'H. Baptisme (I)' speaks of the 'first acquaintance' of the protagonist and God in the sacrament of baptism. The first line of the poem, incidentally, speaks of the 'dark and shadie grove' which must be avoided. Could Herbert have known of Dante's symbolic 'selva oscura,' into which light (Lucia) from Beatrice still penetrates in the *Comedy's* version of 'first acquaintance'?

I do not wish to press analogies too far. The resemblances between Herbert's images and their implications and the theory of the gentle heart are substantial; Herbert's poems are not, however, derivative. He works with such care, establishing his chains of images with such thoroughness, that it is as though he were recreating the old theory. Her-

bert gives a sustained and developed account of the book as the life. His protagonist comes to life in the first fourteen poems of *The Temple*, and does so by a process worked out very long before Herbert wrote. It is important, I think, to see that Herbert *could have* used another process: baptism, as the first sacrament, confers life, but it need not be construed as *producing a child*. Christ had very often before Herbert appeared in images of the sun, but there was no need to describe Him as finding the gold in a stone.

If we follow the sun images through *The Temple* we can see how Herbert advances the dramatic development of his protagonist over a sequence of poems. In 'Mattens' the stone image is beautifully stated:

 My God, what is a heart?
 Silver, or gold, or precious stone,
 Or starre, or rainbow, or a part
 Of all these things, or all of them in one?

The last stanza unites the sun with the work (of the song 'Mattens') as means for achieving union with God:

 Teach me thy love to know;
 That this new light, which now I see,
 May both the work and workman show:
 Then by a sunne-beam I will climbe
 to thee.

Fourteen poems further on, 'The Starre' which has come from Christ the sun is asked (st. 2) to 'Take a bad lodging in my heart' and (st. 3):

 Then with thy light refine,
 And make it shine:

The result will be the protagonist's 'flight' (st. 5) to what is here described as a very courtly Heaven. The poem concludes with an image of the protagonist's *work*, his industry as of the 'laden bee,' as does 'Sunday,' next following. In 'Christmas,' five poems later, the 'sunne' (theme of the whole second section of the poem) evokes and is intertwined with

the protagonist's song to express union with Christ. 'Vertue' and 'Life,' separated by five poems, both image *day as life*, the time for making musick' (st. 3) in 'Vertue' or 'a posie' (a poem) in 'Life.'

The shooting star of 'Artillerie' functions like the 'Bright spark' of 'The Starre.' It is likened to music in stanza 2. It calls into being the protagonist's own powers:

Then we are shooters both...
Shunne not *my* arrows, and behold
my breast.

The protagonist's 'arrows' are his arguments of this poem; the poem itself is his 'Artillerie.' In 'The Flower' God is the spring sun and also, as in 'H. Baptisme (I),' healing waters. In stanza 6 God is addressed, 'O my onely light'; this is the stanza most devoted to the subject of poetry. In 'The Sonnet' Christ is elaborately:

...the sunnes bright starre!
...a fruitfull flame...

The protagonist is concerned here not so much with joining Christ as with finding a way to express His nature; he is concerned with language:

I like our language, as our men
and coast:
Who cannot dresse it well, want wit,
not words.

Throughout these poems Christ as sun functions to release from the protagonist's heart his unique and particular virtue, his ability to write poems. In sequence the poems show a gain in strength sufficient to enable the protagonist to reach God and to express Him.

Here we may return to earlier poems in *The Temple* for insight into how that increase in strength was obtained. After the protagonist's dedication to God's 'art' in 'Nature,' several poems deal strikingly with the subject of youth. 'Sinne (I)' begins:

Lord, with what care hast thou begirt
us round!
Parents first season us: than
schoolmasters
Deliver us to laws...

The theme of youthful ambition is treated in 'Affliction (I),' with its imagery of the squire in training for knight-hood. 'Repentance' recalls the fragility of the new life created in 'H. Baptisme (II)':

... Oh! gently treat
With thy quick flow'r, thy momentarie
bloom.

'Faith' has stanzas touching education:

A peasant may beleeve as much
As a great Clerk, and reach the
highest stature.
Thus dost thou make proud
knowledge bend & crouch...

—the power of the sun as I have been discussing it, and an evocation of the 'dark and shadie grove' of 'H. Baptisme (I)':

When creatures had no reall light
Inherent in them, thou didst make
the sunne
Impute a lustre, and allow them bright;
And in this shew, what Christ
hath done.

That which before was darkned clean
With bushie groves, pricking the
lookers eie,
Vanisht away, when Faith did change
the scene:
And then appear'd a glorious skie.

After this gradual and steady maturation, a further development occurs in *The Temple's* protagonist in the two sonnets titled 'Love' and the group of poems just following. These, 'The Temple (I),' 'Jordan (I),' 'Employment (I),' and the two 'H. Scriptures' sonnets contain a body of more systematic, theoretical material on the subject of poetry than has appeared before in *The Temple*. Not, I hope, to make too homely a little drama, in these poems, after childhood, youth, and education in the

previous ones, the protagonist seriously commits himself to his vocation, first simply the vocation of poet and perhaps in the two last poems of the group to that of poet-priest.

The Temple, considered as a whole, symbolizes, in a peculiarly *literal* sense, its protagonist's life. In all respects the poems remain pure lyrics, independent of one another. Through their image linkages they supply the sense of change and development necessary to a narrative or a drama. In the first fourteen poems we do not *read about* the birth of a child; that is not at all the poems' statement. Only in the images is such a meaning carried. The images of the last poems in the book might easily, I think, be shown to bring the life to a close. With 'The Forerunners' age comes on; in 'Death' and the three poems following, the poet-protagonist thinks of the last things. In *The Temple's* final poems, as well as in its first ones, the life remains the book; experience has no form or meaning other than the poem which expresses it.

7

IN 'GOOD FRIDAY' the word *measure* is structural, occupying the first three stanzas, and it is closely related to the poetic task at hand:

O my chief good,

How shall I measure out thy blood?

How shall I count what thee befell,

And each grief tell?

The poem's six questions may be paraphrased as, How shall I write a poem on the subject of Good Friday? We see here partly an irony: I am so inadequate to the task of writing this poem that I am able only mechanically to *count*. But the questions and the subject are too serious to allow the measuring to be wholly ironic. The verb *to measure* is colored by its sense in 'The Agonie'; it means 'to know,' and the process of

measuring, like the process of knowing, is a part of the province of poetry. In 'Good Friday,' five stanzas of measuring lead to the condition of the final section, where the state of consciousness is one of 'Sinne being gone.'

'The Sinner,' also, between 'The Agonie' and 'Good Friday,' has its counting, too, of the 'treasure in my memorie,' of 'piled vanities,' of the 'many hundredth part' of the heart. Counting in 'The Sinner,' too, is contrasted with *valid* writing, that of God upon the stony heart, the page of poetry:

'Vanitie (I)' is very similar to 'The Agonie' in listing areas of secular knowledge for the sake of contrast with the knowledge of God, but here the list is elaborately courtly. The form of the first three stanzas shows an opening image of scientific examination in terms of physical action: the astronomer 'bores,' the diver 'cuts through,' the chemist 'can devest / And strip.' The physical action is a metaphor for mastery of subject; measure is a crucial part of knowledge.

This knowledge is defined in the last line of 'Vanitie': it is death:

Poore man, thou searchest round
To finde out *death*, but missest *life*
at hand.

Looking backward into the poem from this line we see its stunning irony. The conclusion of each of the first three stanzas has contained a courtly image raised to erotic intensity.

...he sees their dances
And knoweth long before,
Both their full-ey'd aspects, and secret
glances.

...he might save his life, and also hers,
Who with excessive pride
Her own destruction and his danger
wears. . . .

Admitted to their bed-chamber, before
They appear trim and drest
To ordinarie suitors at the doore.

Stretch or contract me, thy poore debter:
This is but tuning of my breast,
To make the musick better.

The final stanza offers, once again, an image of flight to achieve unity with God:

Whether I flie with angels, fall with dust,
Thy hands made both, and I am there:
Thy power and love, my love and trust
Make one place ev'rywhere.

8

LOVE, IN *The Temple*, as in the volumes of love poetry, is constantly expressed as that which asks the whole man and that which in the fulfillment will satisfy him. I think Herbert wrote in vain if we do not interpret his work as strongly linked with mysticism. The agonizing poignancy of poems on God's absence (those preceding 'Easter,' 'Home,' and 'Longing' are examples among many) is missed if we do not see that at other moments in *The Temple* God is present to the protagonist. The 'silk twist' is let down from heaven in 'The Pearl,' His footprint is seen in 'Dulnesse,' His touch is felt in 'Paradise' and 'Clasping of Hands,' He speaks in 'Dialogue' and 'The Collar.' The opening lines of 'The Search':

Whither, O whither art thou fled,
My Lord, my Love?

tend to become meaningless, as do the last lines of that poem, if we say only that Herbert is here engaging in the art of sacred parody. The title gives sensuous significance to 'The Flower':
How fresh, O Lord, how sweet and clean
Are thy returns...

Lines of 'Aaron' have much more meaning in the light of other poems in *The Temple* than as the doctrinal generalization they appear to be here:

My doctrine tun'd by Christ, (who is
not dead,
But lives in me while I do rest) . . .

We fail in our reading if we think it only a pretty metaphor when we come again and again to a passage on *song*, coming after *measure* (knowledge, discipline, the work of poetry), or struggle (the work of the soldier), or after the imagery of the stone.

In the image of song, usually associated with an image of flight, the protagonist has a sense of reaching the actual presence of God. Song is not only spiritual, ethereal transcendence in Herbert; it is effortless and graceful sensuousness, of a practical efficacy beyond reason, inexplicable.

But *The Temple* protagonist is a 'short-breathed man': his flight cannot be sustained. The image is to be read quite accurately: no flying thing flies continually. The form of *The Temple*, as I have already discussed it, is a persistent alternation of contrarities. It remains so at the end.

In the love poems, I believe, it was a Platonic discipline which overcame loss.

The lover remained constant, and continued to purify his desire. It could scarcely be urged that the desire of *The Temple* protagonist was ever impure, but again a chain of images running through the book seems to demonstrate a process of purification.

I said above that 'Love (I)' and (II) mark a turning point. Both sonnets state importantly the theme of poetry—God is addressed as 'author' of the universe; the poet-protagonist reflects throughout on his own work and looks forward to redeeming the promise of 'The Altar': '. . . then shall our brain / All her invention on thine Altar lay.' In 'Love (II)' God is fire, the fires of judgment *and* the heat of the sun which, as in the stone-image poems, brings out the best in the protagonist:

Immortal Heat, O let thy greater flame,
Attract the lesser to it: let those fires,
Which shall consume the world, first
make it tame;

protagonist's discipline of the gentle heart.

FOOTNOTES

¹ T. S. Eliot, "George Herbert," *The Spectator*, CXLVIII, 12 March, 1932, p. 361.

² Louis L. Martz, *The Poetry of Meditation*, New Haven (Yale University Press, 1954), pp. 288-320.

³ Joseph Summers, *George Herbert: His Religion and Art*, Cambridge (Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 85.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

^{5a} Justification of the words courtier and soldier for Dante's and Petrarch's protagonists in the *Vita Nuova* and *Rime*, as indeed of the concept of a poetic protagonist in those volumes, was the task of earlier chapters of this work. There I argue for the fictive character of the poems' speakers, separable from the personalities of the poets and created within the limits of the volume of poetry. To the role of courtier I attach the protagonists' experience of association with peers at the center of civic life, active in a significant culture, and intensely aware of its issues in science, religion, language, art, and politics. This *engagement* I see

as a constant in all the poets of the courtly love tradition from the troubadours to Sidney.

For the protagonist's traditional role as soldier I adduce the concrete references in Sidney and the troubadours, along with all the poets' abundant imagery of physical combat. This imagery always carefully registers the distinctions and nuances among its varied components: the amorous struggle (archetypally Mars' and Venus', perpetuated in Cupid's arrows), feudal contests, the mystical wounding (including that of Jacob). The symbolism of this role is very interesting: it expresses a view of life as a frustrating struggle but one offering human victory; it underlies the ideal Petrarchan contrarities and also supports the protagonist's career as active man; its finest example, perhaps, is Hamlet's 'Readiness is all.'

⁶ *The Works of George Herbert*, ed. F. E. Hutchinson (Oxford, 1941), pp. lxx-lxxvii.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xxxvii.

⁸ Guido Guinizelli, "Of the Gentle Heart," in *Poems and Translations*, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, London and New York, n.d., pp. 168-170. Dante mentions it in *Vita Nuova* xx and xxi.

⁹ Rosemund Tuve, *A Reading of George Herbert* (University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 144-148.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

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POPULATION AND ETHICS: PINPOINTING THE PROBLEM

CLEMENT MERTENS

The Problem Today

EVERY SECOND ONE more man is born into the world. At the prevailing rate, the population of the United States increases each year by some three million, that of India by eight, that of China by fifteen and the world as a whole by 45 million.

How will these children who ceaselessly enter the world be received? With joy, or with anxiety, or even resentment? Will their birth be a cause of rejoicing for their families or a burden which, it is often repeated, may well become intolerable? How, in countries with heavy population, often already living in destitution, will the necessary resources be found to educate this ever more numerous youth, to guarantee it later employment and a minimum of security in the face of the hazards of existence?

These questions are not new, you may answer; the generations which preceded us resolved them by work, by acceptance of the trials of life. We can

Fr. C. Mertens, S.J., is a professor on the Faculté Saint Albert de Louvain. This article, which should be considered a contribution to the discussion inaugurated in CROSS CURRENTS (Winter, 1958) by Drs. Frank Lorimer, Jean Bourgeois-Pichat and Dudley Kirk, appeared first in NOUVELLE REVUE THÉOLOGIQUE (Dec., 1959), an important theological monthly edited by the Jesuit fathers of the Collège Philosophique et Théologique S.J., St. Albert de Louvain, Louvain, Belgium (subscriptions \$5.50 a year, from Moore-Cottrell Subscription Agency, North Cohocton, N.Y.)

but do the same; resources have not yet been exhausted in the world. They appear, rather, to be infinitely more abundant than one could have thought fifty years ago, following prodigious discoveries which succeed one another at an accelerated pace.

The solution, however, is not so simple. The problem of population is not new, true; but it presents itself today in sharp relief and under such circumstances as to demand reexamination. For example, Fr. de Lestapis writes: "It is not through simple curiosity or lascivious imagination that modern man is led to expose to the light of his intelligence these obscure forces (of sex and love) which he carries within himself. He seems to be, as if in spite of himself, trapped by the very impetus toward integration which presides over the organization of his social life. The reproduction of the species and the peopling of the earth, as well as fecundity itself, may fall under an obligation of control and regulation unsuspected yesterday by the inhabitants of the globe."¹

In this light let us review a few facts.

1. Formerly (in France, even in the eighteenth century, and until more recent times in many underdeveloped countries), one-fourth of all infants lived less than a year and another fourth died before reaching the age of twenty; only half reached the age of reproduction. Today in the countries most advanced in matters of hygiene, of 1,000 infants 950 live to be 20, 916 reach the age of forty. If the rate of fecundity is

¹ In *Cahiers d'Action sociale et religieuse*, May 1, 1956, p. 2.

constant, the increase in population is accelerated not only because of the lower mortality rate, but even more because of the considerable increase in the number of persons of reproductive age. This is the situation in large measure in many countries, among which are the most heavily populated: China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Latin American republics from Mexico to Brazil. Then too, the mean annual increase of world population, .3% between 1650 and 1750, is now 1.7%, a rate which would indicate a doubling of the population in forty years.²

2. Not only is there a rapid growth in population, particularly in countries awakening to economic development, but in these same countries we find simultaneously what has been very expressively termed "the revolution of rising expectations": the revolution of growing needs. Once having known the standard of living of more advanced peoples, or the small minority of the privileged, the others wish to join them, and without delay. But economic development presupposes capital. The richest nations are not disposed to surrender any sizeable part of that which they consider to have been earned by their labor; in the other nations the growth of population increases consumption and as a consequence competes with productive investments.

3. The more advanced nations, those in Europe in particular, are, by choice or by necessity, compelled to concern themselves with the misery still prevailing in the rest of the world and with the "demographic explosion" which that misery brings about. After the turn of

the century, and particularly between the two World Wars, well informed circles called attention to the peril of demographic regression which threatened in particular France, England, the Scandinavian countries and Belgium. Though not yet very bright, the situation reveals itself today in a less somber light. It would certainly be dangerous to let down our guard in this respect,³ but the demographic problem presents itself today in a more complex fashion. It would be disastrous to examine the problem from a perspective which is proper to our country, since it presents itself in very different terms elsewhere.⁴

4. Industrial civilization, spreading progressively over the whole world, has brought with it a weakening of the family. Previously, at least in Europe, those for whom the future was insecure remained single. Families often found these unmarried children of great help. Today the proportion of unmarried adults has diminished radically; workers previously available for domestic service have been drawn into factories, offices and shops. The family is by itself in an increasingly unstable world, which often destroys its cohesion. A great

³ It is known that Wallonia is a "dying land." In spite of a slight increase in the number of births, the ageing of the population remains a cause for anxiety, and there is no doubt that the current birth rate does not correspond to conditions of healthy family life in the great majority of cases.

⁴ For those who would like to familiarize themselves with these problems we recommend the three following works: for the facts, A. Sauvy, *De Malthus à Mao-Tse-Toung*, Paris, Denoël, 1958, 302 p.; for methods, R. Philippot, *Initiation à une démographie sociale*, Louvain, Société d'Etudes morales, sociales et juridiques, 1957, 216 p.; for the point of view of ethics, S. de Lestapis, *La limitation des naissances*, Paris, Spes, 1959, 315 p. Let us also signal out the important collective work: *The Study of Population*, ed. P. M. Hauser and O. D. Duncan, University of Chicago Press, 1959, 864 p.

² For further details see A. Sauvy, *Théorie générale de la population*, 2 vol., P.U.F., 1952-1954; by the same author: *De Malthus à Mao-Tse-Toung*, Paris, Denoël, 1958. We have certain reservations on these works. See also C. Mertens, "Problèmes de la Population: coître ou vieillir," in *Revue Nouvelle*, April, 1959, pp. 402-409.

many of the objectives of economic activity—comfort, entertainment, even culture—are in competition with family values.

These facts explain why the problem of population presents itself in a more complex and urgent manner than ever before. The movement favoring birth control by contraception is more and more active; it has considerable resources at its disposal and has won over not only the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries but also some of the most heavily populated nations: Communist China (still hesitant, however, and now committed to a policy of high fertility), India and Japan, where official endorsement has been won and the government is participating with all available means; Ceylon, Formosa, Hong-Kong, Singapore and Pakistan, where it is supported by private groups. It is difficult for us to realize the speed with which this policy is being implemented. In India, a less radical country than Japan, "the second five-year plan (1956-1960) predicted an expenditure of fifty million rupees in the project of limiting the birth rate. Propaganda in favor of contraception is making progress at least in the large cities. In New Delhi bright-colored posters recommend its adoption while contraceptive devices are offered for sale on the stalls of the many peddlers who crowd the streets of Bombay." (G. Etienne, *Population*, 1957, p. 667.)

Confronted with this situation the Catholic Church maintains all the rigor of its principles. These principles have often been explained: we have no intention of outlining them here.⁵ Among

the promoters of birth control, some consider the Church a reactionary institution and now and again fight her; most by-pass her, given the fact that their organization is more highly developed in countries where the Church has little influence. Still others, sincerely animated by a spiritual and moral ideal, are seeking grounds for mutual understanding and agreement, interrogating moralists, asking them to take cognizance of the situation in which the world finds itself, to reexamine, to adjust slightly, and eventually to perfect their teaching in the light of new facts.⁶

This appeal merits attentive and sympathetic consideration by reason of the sentiments which animate it and also because of the grave problems facing humanity which require the maximum degree of collaboration. It is therefore extremely useful to highlight the areas of agreement, to dispel misunderstandings, and to exchange information and opinions. We should not like to adopt a defeatist attitude *a priori*, but it would nevertheless be dangerous to underestimate the difficulties of agreement on certain fundamental points. The position of the Catholic Church rests principally on a notion of human nature which is of philosophic character, at the same time metaphysical and ethical, difficult to grasp even for those familiar with these disciplines. The Church has always affirmed the ability of all men, even non-Christians, to arrive at the knowledge of fundamental truths of the

position of the Catholic position. We reviewed it in the *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* of Nov., 1959, pp. 997-998. We will return to it many times in the course of this article.

⁶ See for example the note of F. Lorimer, J. Bourgeois-Pichat and D. Kirk sent in April, 1956, to several moralists and published in *Social Compass*, Vol. 4 no. 5-6 (April, 1957) under the title of "An Enquiry Concerning Some Ethical Principles Relating to Human Reproduction," and reprinted in *Cross Currents*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Winter, 1958).

⁵ Among other discussions see: M. Riquet, S.J., "Christianisme et Population," in *Population*, 1949, pp. 615-630; C. Mertens, S.J., "Doctrine catholique et Problème de la Population," in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, December, 1952, pp. 1042-1061; and above all, de Lestapis, *La limitation des naissances*, Spes, 1959, 310 p. This book is the most up-to-the-minute ex-

natural order. At the same time she recognizes that our fallen state renders this knowledge difficult and that often it will be possible only with the supernatural aid of grace, which many times assumes concrete form in the teachings of the hierarchy. Hence, what could be an area of understanding, often becomes a place for dispute or incomprehension. Moreover, it cannot be denied that propaganda for contraception, or more generally for birth control, is often spread in a climate of hedonism, even of more or less thinly disguised eroticism, which the Christian cannot accept. A number of non-Catholics recognize and regret this. Partly on behalf of non-Catholics aware of this problem and also with the desire to discuss some recent experiences and doctrinal developments, we have put together the following remarks.

Experiences in Birth Control

WE NOTED EARLIER that propaganda in favor of birth control by contraception and even abortion is officially recognized in an increasing number of countries; it is no secret that it is practiced, less clamorously but very effectively, even in lands where it is prohibited.⁷ It is presented by its advocates as the solution to the serious problems which threaten the destruction of the old demographic balance. The stan-

⁷ Certain serious considerations acknowledged even by non-Catholics (see "La Limitation des Naissances" in *Population*, 1956, pp. 209-234) justify the continuance of this prohibition. But it would be right to say that Catholics must look for help more to a wider appreciation of the family ideal than to repressive policies. A sufficiently informed observer must admit that this is so. A reading of the pontifical documents and works dedicated to family problems and a study of the action of family movements should suffice to convince one that the positive aspects play an incomparably larger part there than prohibitions or, worse, appeals for repression.

dard objection offered to Catholics is that they have no positive program to offer as a counter-proposal, or that those solutions of which they approve can only bring relief in the distant future. Nevertheless, experience shows that the slowing down of the birth rate brings with it its own serious problems.

The first danger of birth control,⁸ which was recognized before the others and which is still a real problem, is the peril to the mere survival of populations. This fear was intense in Western Europe between the two World Wars. It has now subsided as a result of a new increase in the birth rate and a new decrease in the mortality rate. If the first is due principally to an increase in the "middle-sized" families, with two or three children, large families remain indispensable. The National Institute of Demographic Studies in Paris, whose competence is universally recognized, asserted in 1956: "Families of more than four children, or of more than five children if one wishes the population to grow, cannot disappear unless at the same time the number of one-child families is reduced to those cases due to physiological sterility and the number of families with two children diminished noticeably in favor of families with three children. We have no reason to foresee such an evolution."⁹ These lines were written in a country in which the demographic adjustment was manifest. Research in the United States has shown

⁸ It is known that Pius XII distinguished between control and regulation of births, the first being accomplished principally by methods condemned by the Church (contraception, sterilization, abortion), the second employing only morally licit means for equally moral ends. We will hold to this vocabulary though, like all vocabularies, it is a bit arbitrary. For reasons one could cite to justify it, see de Lestapis, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-188.

⁹ *Population*, 1956, p. 226. One would wish that moralists would make more frequent use of this excellent review.

that in families having practiced family planning systematically the number of children actually born was noticeably inferior to the number of children predicted.¹⁰ A. Sauvy was right, then, when he wrote: "Birth control, laudable in its aims, suffers from the inability to confine its activity... the struggle against an over-abundance of life runs the risk of turning into a struggle against life."¹¹ The countries in which birth control is widely practiced are saved only by families which have resisted their propaganda or who have reacted against it. And it is known that in the West these are principally Catholic families.¹²

A second danger of birth control has shown itself more and more clearly: the imbalance in age distribution and the ageing of populations. For example, in 1900 41% of the population of Belgium was under the age of 20, but in 1955 no more than 28% was in this age

group, while the percentage of persons 60 years old or over increased from 10% to 17%. We have underscored elsewhere the serious dangers of this transformation.¹³ There are those in certain quarters who ceaselessly insist on the rupture of the old birth-death equilibrium and their argument is partially valid. But they do not seem to concern themselves with the grave complications which can result in the psychology, vitality and economic organization of a people from a profound transformation of the age structure due principally, not as is often believed to a lengthening of the life-span, but to a reduction in the birth rate. "The reduction in the birth rate is the sole cause of the increased percentage of aged. The lowering of the mortality rate exercises little influence and works rather towards the rejuvenation of a population" since it saves children and young adults.¹⁴

The most ardent proponents of birth control as a means of raising the standard of living in under-developed countries cite with pleasure the example of Japan.¹⁵ We will return more than once to the case of this valiant land to which our world can offer no solution other than a mutilation which approaches genocide. We note here only that the "success" of birth-control is bound to effect in the next fifty years an increase of aged from 8% to 25%. According to qualified demographers, a proportion of 24% is the limit beyond which the very existence of a population is endangered.

¹⁰ S. de Lestapis, *op. cit.*, p. 74-75.

¹¹ *Population*, 1947, p. 221.

¹² To say, as does A. Sauvy (*Théorie générale de la Population*, II, p. 131) that "family allowances have had a stronger effect than faith" is an over-simplification. All moralists know that virtue is influenced by exterior circumstances. But A. Sauvy seems to forget that the pioneers of family allowances were principally Catholics and that in their action they were profoundly animated by their faith. This author, of whose merits we have spoken elsewhere, often falls short when he touches on moral or religious problems and his approach to these questions is obviously quite relaxed. See for example what he has to say in the same volume (p. 138) on abortion, or a passage (p. 193) which denotes an ignorance of the most often repeated principles of Catholic ethics: "Why cannot the Catholic religion arouse itself to see what has been accomplished by birth prevention introduced in India by official means? . . . Can infidels, being outside religion, commit sin? etc." The same deficiencies are to be found in the author's most recent work, *De Malthus à Mao-Tse-Toung*. One would wish that an author enjoying such esteem would inform himself more carefully as to his view of others before treating questions of whose delicacy he could not fail to be aware.

¹³ "Problèmes de population: croître ou vieillir," *Revue Nouvelle*, April, 1959. In 1900 persons of 40 years old or over constituted 28% of our population; in 1955, 44%.

¹⁴ A. Sauvy, *Population*, 1954, p. 679.

¹⁵ This is the case, for example, with *Population Bulletin*, which in its August, 1959, issue proclaims: "Japan leads the way" and "That the birth rate has been sharply lowered in the last decade permits us to think that some solutions are possible for the countries of Asia and the Far East." (pp. 88 and 94)

A third objection to birth control is that under the appearance of gentleness it leads to brutal attacks on life and the source of life. The experience of Japan must be called to mind again here. Between 1949 and 1957 the number of births was reduced from 2.7 millions to 1.6 millions, the birth rate declined from 34.3 per thousand to 17.2 per thousand. But by the admission of the governmental authorities this result is due not to contraception, in spite of all the facilities introduced in favor—medical propaganda, the widespread sale of contraceptive products, etc.—but to abortion. In 1957 the number of legal abortions passed the million mark (as against 246,000 in 1949) and it is estimated that there were as many illegal ones. The annual number of sterilizations approaches 50,000 (as against 21,000 in the first half of 1955).¹⁶ Now Japan was the Far-Eastern country best prepared for the adoption of contraceptive techniques. If one should aim at equally spectacular results in India or elsewhere it would be without doubt at the price of still more frightening consequences.

Even in the most advanced countries, moreover, we can note a disquieting parallelism between the spread of birth control and the multiplication of abortions. In Denmark and Sweden legislation legalizing abortions has been extended. In Sweden Social Security reimburses the expense of abortion from the sixth child on. The British Royal Commission on Population asserts that the proportion of abortions is nine times higher in families which habitually practice birth control than in others.¹⁷

¹⁶ A foreign demographer told us once that in virtue of their traditions abortion is less repugnant to the Japanese than to us. We confess that we lack the competence to judge, but this would change nothing of the dramatic character of the fact.

¹⁷ S. de Lestapis, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64; see also T. K. Burch, in *Social Compass*, vol. III, p. 181.

The Institute of Demographic Studies in Paris, rejecting the claim of those who sought the suppression of laws restricting birth control on the pretext that it reduced the number of abortions, wrote: "[Abortion] requires of us but one decision and not a series of small decisions, of which not one may be missing (as in contraception). It requires, consequently, less mental strain. This explains why it exists in all countries and often overtakes contraceptive practices in spite of its seriousness and dangers." A bit further on the report declares: "Contrary to the expectations of its advocates, the extension of legal abortion in Sweden has not diminished the number of criminal abortions and has perhaps even increased that number."¹⁸

Abortion is still a dangerous thing; it solves the problem only temporarily. There exists a more radical solution: sterilization. We have seen this final leap made. When the people have had impressed upon them that the limitation of their offspring without great moral strain is an absolute imperative, it should come as no shock that many no longer shrink from the most brutal means to that end. This has been frankly admitted. "The most important step is to persuade a family to adopt any method at all, even if it meets with little success, because the habit of resorting to some form of birth control becomes fixed in the behavior pattern and the family will eventually go on to more efficacious means... in Japan, recourse to abortion and in Puerto Rico to sterilization, has usually followed on the heels of a failure of contraception."¹⁹ The *Population Bulletin* of August, 1959, sees in the example of Japan proof that the birth rate of a country may be rapidly reduced. It refrains from saying at

¹⁸ *Population*, 1956, p. 217.

¹⁹ J. Mayone Stykos, quoted by S. de Lestapis, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

what price. The present practice of birth control has cut deeply into the very flesh of nations. Let us hear no more, after this evidence, of the inhumanity of the positions defended by Catholic doctrine.

A recent work has sharply underscored the grave psychological consequences of a "contraceptive civilization."²⁰ To attain to its plenitude and maturity, all love on the human level must be creative. It cannot be self-contained joy, not even if shared by both parties, without paying the penalty of inversion in the technical sense of the word. This is true with respect to friendship; it is true with respect to sexual love. It was not without reason that Father de Lestapis blamed contraception for conjugal instability, the growing indulgence in homosexuality, and the fact that sex has become fixed in an adolescent state. He recalls a phrase of Freud: "That which characterizes all perversions (imbalances) is a misunderstanding of the essential aim of sex: procreation." Sex is degraded—whether or not this is realized—into the erotic play in the service of the couple. There results a devirilization of the man and a defeminization of the woman, to which the doctrine of contraception sometimes bears witness overtly without seeming to be conscious of it. Not long ago the *Revue Nouvelle* reprinted the shocked statements of sociologists for whom birth control was a panacea: "There exists (in Puerto Rico) the widespread conviction that the fact of having children is a proof of femininity for the woman, of virility for the man.... Persuasion, scientific education can do nothing to dislodge this irrational conviction." The commentator—not a clergyman but a father of a family, added: "The Puerto Ricans are most extraordinary people.... Will that psychologist find the means of curing that 'irrational'

aberration? Shades of Rabelais and Chesterton, can you hear this without shaking with laughter at such stupidity?"²¹

It must be pointed out, finally, that propaganda which places birth control in the foreground as a means of lifting up certain peoples, or even certain families, out of their misery, turns attention away from the inescapable difficulties which require an immediate solution. Experience has shown that the effects on population can be seen only after a considerable period of time. The attempts made in India were disillusioning for their backers and we have cited above the disillusioning reflections with respect to Puerto Rico. Demanding considerable attention and sustained will power, going against convictions implanted long ago which respond to fundamental tendencies of human nature, a reduction in the number of births is accomplished only in the upper classes. Let us ignore the possible unfavorable effects that this circumstance can have on the quality of the population; personally we are not impressed with this argument. But as has been pointed out, one must educate before speaking of limiting the number of births. Even granting wide-spread acceptance, as was the case in Japan, its immediate effects will be limited to a reduction in expenditures authorized for the education of children. The population will not be halted in its growth. In the best of hypotheses, the population of Japan will grow inexorably until about 1990. It will be necessary to find food to put into these mouths, and to find jobs for an ever greater number of adults.

The same may be said of the other under-developed countries. That is the problem which we should have attacked in the first place. To a large degree the technical possibility of its solution

²⁰ S. de Lestapis, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-103.

²¹ *Revue Nouvelle*, Jan. 8, 1959, p. 50.

exists. But a change in institutions is necessary. Just recently the Director of the F. A. O. declared: "The world is incapable of consuming the nourishment which it is possible to produce today, and in still greater quantities tomorrow, if present policies continue in effect in economics and commerce."²² Some will say that the transformation required cannot but be a gradual one. To this objection it must be answered that the changes to be brought about in our economic organization are no more revolutionary than those which are demanded in the psychological and ethical domain of peoples under strong demographic pressure. One might also call attention to the fact that less than thirty years were required to establish firmly in numerous countries a system of family allowances, contrary to all the norms recognized by classical economics. Determined action, inspired by a clear knowledge of real values, by respect for family life and an increased sense of human solidarity, is a considerable force for moral revival.

Recent Developments in Ethics

IN 1951 IN AN ALLOCUTION delivered to Italian midwives, a text which has become a basic document for Catholic doctrine, Pius XII at one affirmed the obligation of fecundity resulting normally from marriage and defined its limits: "Serious motives, such as those which occur very frequently, from medical, eugenic, economic and social reasons, may dispense from this positive obligation even for a long period, even for the entire duration of a marriage." A little further on he urged his listeners to be well informed in that which concerns periodic continence and, he added, the progress which could be foreseen in that regard.²³ It is clear, there-

fore, that for the Pope new developments were possible and desirable which would permit Christians to better regulate their fecundity by methods conforming to the natural laws of sexual activity.

More recently an influential member of the hierarchy, Msgr. Suenens, Auxiliary Bishop of Malines, on the occasion of the first Catholic World Conference on Health, addressed to Catholic doctors an oft-quoted appeal: "There are certain crucial problems—I am thinking specifically of problems of conjugal morality—which the priest cannot resolve without you. We have no right to demand that men obey a law without at the same time doing all within our power to make obedience possible. . . . On the occasion of this World Congress let us vow that Catholics in search of a solution will apply themselves, because of the urgency of the situation, to solve this problem, so vital to the moral health of our homes. May the Faculties of Medicine of our Catholic Universities make an effort, in the interests of the common good, to push forward with their research. Until and even after science will have resolved the enigma, medicine will have a central role to play in helping man to acquire control of himself in the vast realm of sex."²⁴

Not speaking in a similar official capacity, but well known for his competence and chosen as delegate from the Holy See to the World Congress on Population, Father de Lestapis expresses himself in a similar fashion and with great clarity in his most recent work. While denouncing western neo-Malthusianism as a great hoax, he admits that both from the point of view of families and that of many countries a considered program with respect to

²² *Tour d'Horizon*, Sept., 1959, p. 5.

²³ "Allocution to Midwives," A.A.S., 1951, pp. 844 & 846. See *N.R. Th.*, 1952, pp. 70-80.

²⁴ *Collectanea Mechliniensia*, 1958, pp. 578-580.

fecundity is becoming more and more common. He does not hesitate to write: "After the birth of three or four children the problem of further offspring arises. No household can escape this. It is useless to conceal the problem before marriage. The Church herself considers that facing it from the very beginning is part of a moral attitude of prudence and is the result of a considered commitment to married life."²⁵ The author also would want this matter clearly faced at the time of betrothal, so that from their entrance into marriage the couple would acquire sufficient control of their impulses; he even recommends that young girls be taught by their mothers to observe their rhythm since, in the present state of our knowledge, it is on this that the regulation of births will essentially be based.

The author justly insists on the difference which exists between the regulation of births as envisioned by the Church and birth control as it is generally advocated. For the former, the point of departure for its doctrine is an esteem for life, and an absolute respect for life once it has been conceived. It is based on self-control and does not hesitate to demand sacrifices which may be heroic. It is based on respect for the partners in marriage and love for the children already born. It works in a climate of charity and asceticism which preserves it from egoism and sterility. It disposes men also to understand the difficulties of those who are less well off and encourages mutual aid, national and international, in proportion to the problems at hand. We take the liberty of reprinting here two passages from his book which seem to us to sum up his thought: "In this growth of charity (between husband and wife), fecundity and chastity are demanded of

both. Fecundity, in order to inscribe its work in history; chastity in order to go beyond history and transfigure it. In effect physical love, valuable as it is, is invited by its very nature to transcend itself in an increasingly spiritual love." A bit earlier, referring not to the behavior of the couple but to international relations, he states: "When everything will have been done to stimulate production and increases in productivity, to incite the most favorable circulation of capital and wealth, when all possibilities of emigration have been exhausted, then in a creative climate of good will and charity the frightening question of an eventual limitation of human fecundity in one area or another may be raised."²⁶

It would therefore be false to think of the Catholic hierarchy, moral philosophers and active laymen as having their eyes closed or as motionless before a problem which occupies many of our contemporaries. Pius XII, receiving in audience the members of the World Congress on Population in 1954, could legitimately tell them: "The science of population is young but it is primordial because it touches immediately on human life and can clarify some of the gravest individual and social problems. The Church does not ignore these problems; she is not indifferent to their agonizing aspects, as is borne out by many documents published recently by the Holy See."²⁷ Let us recall further that at the close of the World Congress for the Lay Apostolate in 1957 the first conclusion was: "The rapid growth of population creates vast problems of the material and ethical order."²⁸ Further, during Lent in 1959 five cardinals spoke on French television networks on the

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 284-285.

²⁷ *Doc. cathol.*, 1954, col. 1445.

²⁸ Quoted in the *Bulletin Social des Industriels*, 157, p. 87.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 211.

theme: "Each second another man: what can the Church do?"²⁹

If the Church accepts, and ever more clearly, the idea of regulating the number of births, she is nonetheless most careful to distinguish between licit and illicit methods. Her very vigilance demonstrates that her representatives are keeping abreast of the innovations ceaselessly introduced and that her judgments do not come from an ignorance of the subject.

In recent years several products have been introduced which induce temporary sterility and which, on the basis of this claim, can be classified as part of the arsenal of contraception. The use of one of these, hesperidin, has been forbidden by moralists; on the other hand, progesteron, having therapeutic effects, may be used when a medication is necessary within the limit set by the laws of ethics on double effect.³⁰ Such care in the formation of a moral judgment, distinguishing all the elements of the problem and linking the solution to well established principles, demonstrates the degree of self-deception in the claim, such as A. Sauvy seems to make,³¹ that allowing periodic continence for Catholics was an expedient to extricate the Church from a hopeless position. The

acceptance of rhythm and the rejection of hesperidin are based on fidelity to certain intangible principles, just as on the subject of divorce the Church has maintained a constancy of doctrine which has not contradicted itself over centuries, and this in spite of changes in the sociological situation.

The ever more clearly defined positions of the Church fail to satisfy certain demographers. Their difficulty, expressed with great sincerity and deference, merits our pausing to examine it: "Can there not be a more positive emphasis in Catholic teaching on ethical motives and personal responsibility in marriage and in the regulation of procreation? If this emphasis has already received full recognition in the learned councils of the Catholic Church, can it not be more effectively implemented in the ministries of parish priests, lay organizations, and educational programs in various countries?"³²

We must point out first of all that the idea of responsibility cannot be unilateral and that current Catholic doctrine is based in large measure on this very notion.

The Church opposes with all its influence the irresponsible sexuality which threatens more and more to overrun our world. We have already spoken above of the eroticism, which, it must unhappily be recognized, has already contaminated a large part of the youth of certain countries, and which threatens to keep even adults in an adolescent state. Like everything which truly elevates man, sex is labor, with its joys and its pains, its risks, and its increasing domination of the forces of ungoverned nature. If technological progress frees man from certain servitudes, it must never be to lead him to idleness or abandon, and it is precisely because they

²⁹ Text in *La Doc. cathol.*, 1959, col. 624-626 and 847-856.

³⁰ It would be useless here to go over the analysis and the principles on which these judgments are based. For such background see the article by A. Schnoeck, S.J., "Fécondation inhibée et Morale catholique," in *N.R.Th.*, 1953, pp. 690-702 and "Morale catholique et Devoir de Fécondité," *ibid.*, pp. 897-911; A. Van Kol, S.J., "Progestatieve Hormoonpreparaten," in *R. K. Artsenblad*, 1958, pp. 323-331, the essentials of which are taken up again by R. de Guchtaneere, "Les inhibiteurs de l'ovulation," in *Saint-Luc Médical*, 1959, pp. 10-22. See also the important discourse of Pius XII to the International Congress on Hematology, *A.A.S.*, 1958, pp. 732-740, and *N.R.Th.*, 1958, pp. 974-975.

³¹ *Théorie gén.*, II, p. 131.

³² F. Lorimer, J. Bourgeois-Pichat and D. Kirk, *op. cit.*, *Cross Currents*, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 38.

are leading to laxness that contraceptive practices are so insidious and so destructive.

It must be pointed out, however, that non-Catholic groups share in these pre-occupations. The authors of the note we have already cited say: "The thesis that the procreation and education of new life is, under normal conditions, an essential end of marriage . . . seems to us to carry great force as a purely empirical judgment, in contrast to a current popular conception of marriage as mere 'companionship.'" ³³ Again, to the assertion that "the collaboration of Catholics would be more easily won if others solicitous of moral values would recognize more explicitly the necessity to struggle against all forms inciting to the eroticism which has overrun our life in society and to create a social climate in which birth control by moral means can be more easily realized," one of the best known non-Catholic personalities in the field of demography answered: "I am wholly in accord with your observation and will exert every effort to enforce this principle, directly and indirectly, in all activities in which I take part." There are here certain points which would be very valuable as a basis for concerted action and one must hope that the number of such frank and courteous exchanges of views will multiply.

There is another aspect of responsibility of which the Church constantly reminds us: the obligation of those of greater wealth towards others, particularly on the international level. In 1953, on the occasion of the 26th Italian Social Week, Bishop Montini wrote, in the name of the Pope: "Your meeting proposes to examine the controversial question of population, in particular the relationship between the growth of populations and economic development, with

a view to determining the causes which disturb the equilibrium between those two elements and suggesting possible remedies. . . . Considered on a world-wide scale this problem includes the discovery of remedies for a disorder which results not so much from nature as from human volition, and the re-establishment, in areas which suffer from overpopulation, of a harmony between population and resources."³⁴ Some months before his death, Pius XII developed these thoughts in his allocution to the Congress on Large Families: "It would be more logical and useful for modern society to apply itself more resolutely and universally to mending its ways by eliminating the causes of famine in depressed or overpopulated areas. It should direct modern discoveries to peaceful ends, adopt a more open policy of collaboration and exchanges, build an economy based on wider, less nationalistic views, and above all replace egoism with charity." Further on, he became more precise: "It is certainly not a sign of discord or inertia on the part of Providence, but of great disorders among men—in particular the disorder of egoism and avarice—that the problem of the overpopulation of the earth has arisen and persists, in part a real problem, in part feared without reason as an imminent catastrophe by our society."³⁵ As has been said, we can preach responsibility to the less fortunate only in proportion as we sincerely do what we can to raise them from their misery.

But let us return to the question raised: is it not time to add to the principles of permissibility accepted by the leaders of the Church the idea of an obligation of a responsible procreation, and to spread this teaching so that it will reach the mass of the faithful? This

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³⁴ *Doc. cathol.*, 1953, col. 1554.

³⁵ *A.A.S.*, 1958, p. 93 and 94.

is asked especially in certain countries where demographic pressure is manifest and where the Church exercises strong influence, notably in South America.

In answer we again distinguish different levels. First of all we refer to the teaching in seminaries and to manuals of moral theology.

The latter contain, it is true, numerous elements relevant to our problem—the meaning of sex and of chastity, the ends of marriage, judgments on contraception, abortion, sterilization. But it must be recognized that the problem here is as a rule limited to the prevention of sins against conjugal morality or determining under what circumstances one of the spouses may refuse himself or herself to the other—generally limited to a grave danger to health. The question of responsible rational fecundity is just beginning to be recognized, thanks to the definitions furnished by Pius XII. The broader view of the social good, of the problems which the rapid growth of certain populations presents, the destruction of the old equilibrium between births and deaths, is practically ignored. Of the manuals published or reissued in the last thirty years we have found only one which speaks of Malthus;³⁶ and then only to refute him, not to seize the opportunity to examine the problem posed today. In a great seminary of one of the old Christian countries, which is undoubtedly overpopulated, it is forbidden, we are assured, to speak of the Ogino method in the course on moral theology.

This is a serious omission. It may be due to the fact that these manuals are outlined in countries where the population is stationary or even menaced with regression. But we have already said that that perspective must be left behind. The priests who are trained in our seminaries tomorrow will have to an-

swer questions on demographic evolution; some of them—I am thinking particularly of future missionaries—will go to work in countries where demographic problems are a burning issue, and these manuals will have to be used in seminaries there. On this level then, the question of birth regulation, including both the aspect of generous diffusion of life and that of eventual limitation, must be exposed with complete clarity, not only in terms of the family, but also from a national and international perspective.

The task is infinitely more delicate on the level of pastoral duties, in preaching and the instruction of the faithful, whether in a group or individually. We are not referring here to countries where the level of culture is high, where it is possible to form groups of those preparing for marriage and of young married couples. In such regions we believe this is the means of establishing a solid Christian tradition which will become widely diffused. Unfortunately, this is generally not the case in countries where there are difficulties of demographic pressure.

On the contrary, to speak of regulating births in countries where the cultural level is low involves considerable risks and difficulties. These risks are increased sharply by propaganda in favor of birth control; because to distinguish between licit and illicit methods, between valid motives and pretexts, presupposes a training which is usually lacking or a tradition which on the basis of the evidence has not yet taken form.

Risks and difficulties do not justify inertia. Following the example of the eminent authorities of whom we have spoken, it is the duty of the ecclesiastical authorities in each country to face the problem and to see that competent laymen, especially in the best universities,

³⁶ Lanza and Palazzini.

proceed with research which will permit them to cope with different given situations, according to regions or social classes, and to adopt means which will reach a solution. It seems, for example, that sociological research on the attitudes towards the problem of procreation and education, on the positive values or prejudices on which they are based, would be the preliminary step to adequate action. This would enable us to discern the elements on which we could base the teaching of responsible procreation as well as resistance to the propaganda opposing Catholic ethics. Love for children, anxiety for their future, respect for the wife considered truly as a companion and not as either servant or object of pleasure, are elements of this kind. If such sentiments are not yet sufficiently alive, we must begin to develop them. Research will have to be done also on the demands a growth in population will make on social change, the idea of property, and the redistribution of income. What position should we Catholics take in countries where the population is increasing rapidly, as in Latin America, or where the population has already noticeably outstripped resources, as in Ruanda-Urundi? Are we not caught napping by neo-Malthusian propaganda, with nothing positive to offer as a counterproposal? We deliberately restrict these questions to countries where the Church may work efficaciously, leaving aside regions such as India, Japan or Egypt, where the proportion of Catholics is negligible, where their role, while it can be an important one, is nevertheless much more difficult.

Having made these points we feel much more confident in asking proponents of birth control not to show an impatience with the Church which betrays incomprehension. We do not think it unfair to say that their moral pre-

occupations are less intense than those of the Catholic hierarchy; they base their position generally on another level, that of practical efficacy. But from a purely empirical point of view they have learned that, with respect to the limitation of births, psychological factors play an important part and that it is not enough to spread a knowledge of the techniques of contraception to swiftly obtain the anticipated results. The *Population Bulletin* of August, 1959, recognized, for example, that the methods employed in Japan might well be unacceptable in other regions—and we are also convinced that some of the leading partisans of birth control consider these methods basically inhuman. It will be necessary, therefore, in any case to proceed slowly. The *Population Bulletin* went on to say: "The different social, religious, economic and political 'climates' of the Asian nations demand that the problem be approached in different ways." These different ways remain to be discovered.³⁷ Let no one then be shocked to see the Church proceed with prudence; whole nations cannot be used as subjects of dangerous experiments; the values involved demand greater respect. For our part we can only note our agreement with the conclusion of the *Bulletin* quoted: "Social discoveries of the highest order are necessary to master this problem (of demographic pressure)." We are only afraid that we have a different idea of the "highest social order." It is well known how the Church conceives of it, especially that it includes basic reliance on Divine Providence. This reliance does not exclude intense human efforts, but it recognizes that these efforts can go only so far, that they are surpassed by an infinite wisdom, strength and—above all—love, which, while nourishing our efforts, must necessarily perfect them.

³⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 85.

Conclusion

SPECIALISTS ON POPULATION readily designate our period as one of "demographic transition." For the fundamental equilibrium between the forces which tend to increase population and those which control it, maintained (insofar as this aspect of history is known to us) for thousands of years, a new equilibrium must be substituted, based on a more conscious activity. The more technologically advanced nations have tried their hand at this, not without risking their very vitality and sacrificing too readily certain basic moral values. Some efforts have been made, principally in better informed Catholic circles, to arrive at a better solution. In countries in the process of developing, the problem remains virtually unexamined; it is presented in sharp detail and demands the attention and collaboration of all. The Church, that is to say both hierarchy and faithful, can even less than others afford to ignore this major problem of our times or shrink from the obligation of solving it. In 1954, in his allocution to the delegates of the World Congress on Population, Pius XII said in essence: "We cannot but rejoice at the light which your labors, those of all sincere demographers, bring to the knowledge of the laws and values which determine the evolution of populations. That is why we urge Catholics to take an active part in research and efforts carried out in this field."³⁸ This appeal did not go unheeded, and there have been a number of studies published during the last five years;³⁹ if we have over-

looked others we would be happy to have them called to our attention.

Much remains to be done. One must hope that the appeal of Msgr. Suenens finds a response in the best medical circles of our universities. Some other lines of research—for instance, necessary adaptations of teaching and of the apostolate, have been indicated; it would be possible to add to the list. The chairs of demography are still too rare in our institutions of higher education and the time assigned to them too restricted. This is particularly true in countries where the population problem is most acute. Sociology of the family is without doubt in a better position.

A Catholic liaison center for demo-

ation à une démographie sociale, Louvain, 1957, 216 pp. (cf. *Gregorianum*, 1958, p. 674 or *N.R.Th.*, 1957, p. 1108); H. I. Oudshorn, S.J., *De tuinders in de Wateringen en de Lier*, Assen, 1958, pp. 142 (cf. *N.R.Th.*, 1958, pp. 1131); Zimmerman, *Overpopulation*, Catholic Univ. 1957, pp. 328 (cf. *N.R.Th.*, 1958, p. 78); P. Calderon Beltrão, *Vers une politique de bien-être familiale*, Gregorian Univ., Rome, 1957, pp. 348 (cf. *N.R.Th.*, 1958, p. 322); R. Mols, S.J., *Introduction à la démographie historique des villes d'Europe du XIV^e au XVIII^e siècle*, 3 vols., Louvain, 1954-56, pp. 335, 557 and 354 (cf. *N.R.Th.*, 1958, p. 333); *L'Algérie surpeuplée*, Algiers, 1958, pp. 319 (cf. *Population*, 1959, p. 158); J. Vialatoux, *Le peuplement humain*, 2 vols., Paris, Ed. Ouvrières, 1957 and 1959, pp. 172 and 717 (cf. *N.R.Th.*, 1958, p. 332, and 1959, p. 998); S. de Lestapis, S.J., *La limitation des naissances*, Paris, Spes, 1959, pp. 315 (cf. *N.R.Th.*, 1959, p. 997); Ch. Mertens de Wilmars, *Psychopathologie de l'anticonception*, Paris, 1955; *XVII Settimana Sociale dei Cattolici d'Italia: Famiglie di oggi e mondo in trasformazione*, Rome, 1955, pp. 385 (cf. *Gregorianum*, 1957, p. 178); M. Boldrini, *Demografia*, Milan, 1956, pp. 527).

N.B. We have limited ourself to books to the exclusion of articles, and we have only mentioned those which treat of problems of population or social organization in relation to the family. On family problems in a more restricted sense, one will find a bibliography in certain of the works which we cite, notably in that of P. de Lestapis. We apologize again to authors who may have been overlooked.

³⁸ *Doc. cathol.*, 1954, col. 1446.

³⁹ F. Bastos de Avila, S.J., *L'Immigration au Brésil. Contribution à une théorie générale de l'immigration*, Rio de Janeiro, "Agir," 1956, 223 pp. (cf. *Population*, 1957, p. 173). R. Sigmund, O.P., *Fundamentum morale politicae demographicae*, Rome, Angelicum, 1956, 109 pp. (cf. *N.R.Th.*, 1957, p. 430); R. Philippot, *Initi-*

graphers, even those of other religious obediences but sharing our preoccupations, was envisioned on the occasion of the Congress of 1954. Circumstances have not permitted the embodiment of this idea. A sharing of information, a collaboration in research, a method of liaison with demographers of other convictions, would still be most useful.⁴⁰

The preceding pages have sought to pinpoint the problem. We realize that they are very imperfect and probably very incomplete. They will nevertheless have accomplished their end if they contribute something to the dialogue between men of good will of diverse opin-

⁴⁰ We have heard that this idea has been re-examined on the occasion of the recent Congress on Population in Vienna, and that Dr. E. Bodzenta, director of the Internazional Institut für kirchliche Sozialforschung, Grillparzerstrasse, 5., Wien, Oesterreich, has agreed to gather and distribute the information.

ions, if they draw the attention of Catholics to the problems of population . . . and if they earn for their author an increase of information with which to better light his lantern.⁴¹

Translated by SERGE HUGHES

⁴¹ This article had already been completed when the report of the non-Catholic churches on the problem which has concerned us here was published. ("A Report on Responsible Parenthood and the Population Problem," in *Ecumenical Review*, Oct., 1959, pp. 85-92.) Many passages of this text are on a high level of Christian thought and underscore the bonds of charity which must unite the members of each family, many families, nations. Unhappily it reaffirms the point of view of the Protestant churches on contraception. The delegate of the Orthodox Church, for his part, confirmed that his Church allows only one method of limiting births: continence, be it complete or periodic.

We call attention, finally, to the very recent study of P. de Loch, "Limitation des naissances et pression démographique," in the *Collectanea Mechliniensia*, Nov., 1959, pp. 597-609.

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Notes and Reviews

A TRIBUTE TO CAMUS: RECENT STUDIES OF HIS WORK

Philip Thody. *Albert Camus: A Study of His Work*. New York: Grove Press Inc., 1957.

John Cruickshank. *Albert Camus: And the Literature of Revolt*. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Thomas Hanna. *The Thought and Art of Albert Camus*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1958.

Germaine Brée. *Camus*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1959.

WE ARE STILL much too close to the tragic death of Albert Camus to write about him without feeling compelled to say something by way of tribute concerning this singular man who so touched his contemporaries. Yet it is difficult to imagine what one might say that has not already been said repeatedly and eloquently. Let us simply then acknowledge, with many others, that Albert Camus lived, acted and wrote in such a way as to deepen our respect for man.

The four English-language studies under consideration were all completed at what we now know to have been Camus' next to last moment, a moment at which, however, he was still able to say, "My work is not begun." The commentators thus share a common vantage point, though what they saw was not always the same; by considering them together we can see how Camus appeared at the peak of his creative life to some of his most perceptive contemporaries.

Of the four studies, that by Germaine Brée is decidedly the best, but the Thomas Hanna book is a close second. Both commentators have a keen awareness of the need to consider Camus' work as an organic whole. In addition, they

stress its experimental nature. Camus' works are intrinsically tentative, and even to some extent contradictory, but these very aspects are the source of both our dissatisfaction and our satisfaction. In reading them we never get the sense of a finished vision. It was his refusal to complete his vision artificially that leads us to a deep respect for his honesty.

Philip Thody and John Cruickshank, on the other hand, produce works whose defects stem from a too piecemeal treatment. Each has particular sections which are quite good, but the end result is one in which dissection often exceeds revelation.

The central theme of Thody's study is that Camus is trying "to express, as a modern writer, the ideals of liberal humanism." (72) According to Thody, Camus' "originality lies in the way in which he comes to the same conclusions as the liberal humanist while setting out from absolutely different premisses." (58) As a liberal humanist himself, Thody finds the political aspects of Camus' thought of particular interest. One fears, however, that Thody's own philosophical and political commitments intrude themselves and result in his downgrading of *The Rebel* and *The Plague*. One can hardly accept the following conclusion: "The fact that *The Rebel* and *The Plague* are less satisfying respectively as works of art than *The Myth of Sisyphus* and *The Outsider* (*The Stranger*) is due mainly to the fact that Camus is cramping his intensely individualistic and passionate temperament to express ideas with which he feels less purely emotional sympathy." (72)

Thody's criticism of the morality espoused in *The Plague* is quite superficial and suffers from a too literal and

restricted interpretation. It is interesting to note that moralists of both right and left are critical of Camus' alleged moralism. This suggests, perhaps, that Camus did not present a pattern of morality, but rather a world permeated by morality, a world that is unique in that it is the creation of an artist. Any attempt to correlate it with the so-called "real world," inevitably obscures the true significance of Camus.

An encounter with a work of Camus seldom results in insights which are easily articulated or transformed into concrete principles of action. Rather, and this is particularly true for the Christian, Camus seems to put forth views which go counter to some of our most basic beliefs. Yet paradoxically enough, he repeatedly succeeds in rousing in us a new awakening, an awakening which brings an enrichment of experience and an illumination and deepening of our consciousness and conscience.

"The concept of revolt," Cruickshank maintains, "provides a key to Camus' ideas themselves and to his significance for his times." (5) Thus Cruickshank centers his study of Camus around revolt and his work is neatly divided into three parts: "Revolt as an Attitude to Life;" "Revolt and Politics;" and "Revolt and Literature." Nevertheless, the separate chapters have a monographic flavor, and the book does not seem to possess an interior unity.

Since the "absurd" is the situation out of which revolt grows and to which it is a response, Cruickshank gives a detailed description of the "nature of the absurd," as seen by Camus. He quite properly calls attention to the "quest for happiness" as one of the central themes of Camus and one which appears in his earliest essays and is never surrendered. It is this unrealizable desire for happiness which intensifies the

absurdity of the world and adds to it a tragic dimension. Cruickshank's analysis of Camus' "absurd," however, particularly as expressed in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, is deficient on two counts. First, he tends to forget his own warning: Camus has clearly stated that "he is not elaborating a 'philosophie absurde' but describing the 'sensibilité absurde.'" (42) Even more than Thody, Cruickshank gives a philosophical critique of Camus that, however telling it might be on some particular points, appears ultimately to be irrelevant.

Secondly, Cruickshank treats *The Myth* in isolation from Camus' literary works. The basically negative response which he makes to both *The Myth* and *The Rebel* results from considering them as self-contained philosophical essays rather than as moments in, and aspects of, a continually developing experience. Cruickshank repeatedly loses sight of Camus' experiential center, which gives a continuity and order to his works, but which cannot be expressed adequately in logical categories. In addition to the logical deficiencies, Cruickshank and Thody have no difficulty in pointing out a number of important omissions, particularly in *The Rebel*. Nevertheless, to submit Camus' thought to a critique according to the standards of analytic philosophy is really to miss the uniqueness of both his philosophy and his rationality. Here Cruickshank and Thody are quite evidently criticizing Camus from without rather than from within.

Consider, for example, Cruickshank's contention in reference to *The Rebel* that Camus' "eloquent pleading in these final pages is an attempt to conceal the fact that he is advocating a point of view held independently of the earlier analysis. Lacking a close logical argument and convincing practical examples he tries, probably quite unconsciously, to conceal these flaws behind an increas-

ingly poetic vocabulary." (117) Concerning this kind of criticism, Germaine Brée states: "It is very easy to destroy Camus' argumentation, sentence by sentence. But what of it? Rhetoric sometimes opens the way to thought and what matters most is the movement of the essay as a whole, the point of departure, the orientation, the *form* imposed upon the material. The conclusion is not demonstrated, it demonstrates. It is implicit in the opening sentence, arrived at beforehand, and proceeds peremptorily to dispose of any denial or hesitation, incontrovertible as a musical theme." (189)

Thody has noted that Camus himself has called *The Rebel* a confidence and a confession, and this makes all the difference in our interpretation. If one bears this in mind, and does not read *The Rebel* as an attempt to give the universal essence of revolt, much of the criticism of both Thody and Cruickshank becomes irrelevant. We are dealing with a work of art which cannot be taken as a literal description of "historical facts." If one asks, has Camus given a balanced description of the history of revolution or a definitive interpretation of the thinkers whom he considers, the answer is he clearly has not. The proper question is, however, does he transform selected historical facts into a work which serves to illuminate the human situation and to enrich the experience of man in that situation? If *The Rebel* is eminently personal from the side of its creator, the response which it evokes is also eminently personal. We must remember, however, that there are subjective and subjectivistic expressions and responses, all of which are loosely described as personal. It would appear that only by distinguishing the subjective, which has a definite objective dimension, from the subjectivistic can we properly locate and evaluate Camus. Nothing could be more erroneous than

to conclude that Camus' description of a subjective experience has no relevance beyond himself. What Maurice Blondel has said concerning St. Augustine would seem applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to Camus: ". . . in passages where St. Augustine seems to be recalling only his own pathetic history, his personal conflicts with his passions or with grace, it is not simply an individual case, an emotional impulse, some urge of life or generous gesture of charity that he describes, but a work of light, a craving for truth, a teaching of universal value, a discovery of inward reality, an illuminating solution of which he is giving us the benefit." (*St. Augustine*, New York: Meridian Books, p. 325.)

Cruickshank and Thody both provide good descriptions of the famous Sartre-Camus controversy. Cruickshank concludes that the quarrel was not primarily political but rather philosophical and moral. His categorization, however, of Camus as a "static moralist" and Sartre as a "dynamic moralist" is unfortunate. This is a pitiful oversimplification not only of the ethical differences between Camus and Sartre but also of the basic ethical situation in which man finds himself.

It is Cruickshank's contention that while "morally admirable," Camus' political ideas "do not seem likely to be realized in our present world." (127) He maintains that Camus is attempting "to introduce certain basic moral standards into political activity" and for this reason what he chiefly offers is "a kind of pre-politics." (129) Cruickshank makes it quite clear that Camus has no concern for an abstract moralism but seeks the "embodiment of values in concrete realities." (130) Camus' call for sensible and practical moderation in politics, places him, according to Cruickshank, "much closer to the English political tradition than to the doctrinaire

approach so widespread in France." (131) The two best chapters in Cruickshank's study are those dealing with "The Art of the Novel." His individual analyses of the novels, in which he considers the literary technique and structure rather than the ideas, are excellent. It is interesting to note that Camus' novels suffer less when treated in isolation than do his philosophical essays.

It is the contention of Thomas Hanna that Albert Camus "is not a novelist who also writes philosophical essays; he is a philosopher who also writes novels." (145) While this position is certainly open to question, in his attempt to fulfill "the need for a thorough philosophical analysis of the total works of Camus, both literary and philosophical," Hanna has avoided the pitfall of segmentation to which both the Thody and Cruickshank works fall prey.

"One lives with a few familiar ideas," Camus tells us, and Hanna points out that the "few familiar ideas" with which Camus lived throughout his life were present in his earliest writings. He also maintains that "Camus has been greatly misunderstood and 'prejudged'" because commentators have failed to recognize the tentative nature of *The Myth of Sisyphus*. (15)

In his eagerness to stress the developmental nature of Camus' thought, however, Hanna would seem to go too far. He is quite correct in emphasizing that the "absurd experiment" in which Camus indulges is by no means definitive, but it is not so clear that Camus passes beyond the absurd exactly in the way in which Hanna describes it. The development that characterizes Camus' thought, as Hanna would surely concede, is never that of simple repudiation and rejection. Rather it is a development in which an earlier response is transcended by being seen within a fuller context.

It is helpful to distinguish, as Hanna does, the phases of Camus' thought into a "concern with the absurd" and a "concern with revolt," but this distinction becomes misleading when Hanna sharply delineates the philosophy of Camus into "two separate sections." The danger of making such a sharp distinction is manifested in Hanna's consideration of the play *Caligula*. Hanna sees it as a kind of transition essay between the period of the absurd and that of revolt. He places it after *The Stranger* and *The Myth of Sisyphus* and sees it as bringing to a close Camus' experiment with the absurd and introducing the "philosophy of revolt." The difficulty with such an interpretation is that though *Caligula* was not produced until 1945, it was written in 1938 and thus antedated the aforementioned works. (One would not seem justified in concluding that Camus significantly revised *Caligula* for its 1945 production since in his preface to the English edition of his plays, which was written in 1957, he gives the 1938 date for the writing of *Caligula* and makes no mention of any change.)

The important point is that Hanna is able, with no obvious violence to the text, to place *Caligula* at the end of the absurdist experiment when in fact it was written at the beginning. This is not to suggest that there is no growth in the thought of Camus, nor that one can indiscriminately interchange his works and the periods in which they were written. It does suggest, however, that we must be particularly conscious of the fact that Camus' earlier works contain anticipations of what is to come, and that the later works go beyond without ever completely excluding views previously affirmed.

The strongest chapters in Hanna's book, particularly in contrast with Thody and Cruickshank, are those based

primarily on *The Rebel*. The ability to consider this essay on its own terms, and with full recognition of its relation to Camus' personal experience and to the full context of his thought, enables Hanna to lead us to some of Camus' richest insights.

If, for Hanna, Camus is "primarily a philosopher," for Germaine Brée, he "is first and foremost an artist." (9) The difference between the two commentators, however, is more one of emphasis than radical disagreement. Hanna recognizes Camus' preeminence as an artist and Brée agrees that "if we think of a writer whose essential effort is directed toward elucidating his own experience through an effort of his intelligence as a 'philosopher,' then Camus most certainly is a philosopher." (8) The emphasis of Brée would seem to be the proper one, however, and it is her clear-sighted recognition of Camus' artistry that is mainly responsible for the superiority of her study over the others. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Brée has produced a work of art herself both in style and content. Like ever larger concentric circles her exposition and commentary give us a continually expanding image of Camus and take us to deeper and deeper levels of his thought.

Brée's study is divided into twenty-four short chapters each of which flows effortlessly into the other. She first orients us in terms of Camus' time, environment and personal history, taking us quickly from his birth up to 1957. She then centers her attention upon the lyrical and descriptive essays, the novels, the plays, and finally the philosophical essays. This approach results in evoking within the reader an awareness of the various dimensions of Camus' thought, but at the same time escapes fragmentation. Brée, even more than Hanna, never loses sight of that "organic whole-

ness" which is so important: "Each of the novels is illuminated far better by the others than by the outer circumstances which accompanied its elaboration; their very titles show them to have been carefully planned to form together an organic whole." Only by reading them together is one able to realize the fuller implications of each.

Brée believes that the plays of Camus are not significant for their plots; what counts is "the atmosphere which sustains the drama and in great part conveys its meaning." (148) She is aware of the difficulty that spectators have with his plays, and her comment on *Caligula*, which is also applicable to the other plays, suggests why: "To *Caligula* he gives the mission of trying out, within the freedom of the stage, an experiment so violent and yet so logical that its full implications can reach us only later, when the 'show' is at an end." (150) Camus' plays will probably never be popular as theater since "the vision they seek to express is confined too narrowly perhaps to Camus' intimate experience and may not be immediately evident to his spectators." (183)

According to Brée, the plays of Camus "move from the concrete to the abstract" and she follows this direction in her study of his work. She feels that the plays even more than the novels need to be projected against a "larger screen," and for this she turns to Camus' philosophical essays "where the inner fluctuations of Camus' own thought and experience clarify and define the full implications, tragic scope, and dramatic significance of his theatre." (184)

While distinguishing those essays of Camus which are marked by "intellectual attitudes" from those marked by "lyrical meditation," Brée correctly notes that all are "marked by personal emotion." (185) Both kinds of essays serve a definite function since, "for Camus, in-

creasingly involved in the confused turmoil of our time, the essay is an instrument of inner clarification and definition and, therefore, of liberation." (231).

Brée is also aware of a distinction between the world the artist creates and the "real world." She writes: "Rejecting in part both the purely natural and the purely human, and yet at the same time considering each as an autonomous entity, Camus cannot completely 'reconcile' the elements of his universe. . . ." Hanna believes that the opposition in Camus between man and the world is sharpest in those writings where he is conducting his "experiment with the absurd." While he feels that Camus was moving away from this position, Hanna does not maintain that Camus overcame this unsatisfactory opposition: "The authentic thought of Camus includes the possibility of a positive reconciliation of man with the world, but this is a possibility which, at this point, has not been developed by Camus, and is therefore unfounded." (133) Brée also writes of Camus as moving toward a more adequate world-view since "he seems now to be reaching towards that 'living transcendence' he mentions and which might be a key to unity." (249)

Camus' "philosophy of revolt" is, of course, predicated upon a certain opposition between man and the world. The rebel is the man who refuses to accept this absurd opposition between man's deepest desires and the impossibility of fulfilling those desires. After ruling out such responses as passive acceptance, physical suicide, and flight into an eternal or absolute (metaphysical suicide), Camus concludes that only in revolt can man achieve whatever salvation is open to him. It is the artist, for Camus, who is the supreme rebel, and artistic creation represents the highest human activity. "Art," says Hanna in describing Camus' position, "is essentially a

protest against what is and the attempt to replace this with the value which revolt demands."

Despite his emphasis upon revolt and the need for creation, Camus does, as Brée points out, "break definitely with a certain trend in French literature which he analyzes in *L'Homme Révolté* and which culminates in the surrealist revolt against all reality." (247) If art, for Camus, cannot live on a total acceptance of reality, neither can it "live on a total refusal." Brée expresses Camus' viewpoint as follows: "The real artist uses the substance of reality but 'corrects creation.' He refuses to admit the incoherence and perpetual 'becoming' of human life and therein lies his revolt and his creativity. He gives coherence to the incoherent, form therefore to what is formless, and value to what is meaningless." (246) Such a concept of art is not new, Brée tells us, for its main lines can be traced back to the seventeenth century. Nevertheless there is a world of difference between Camus and the seventeenth century classicists, for "the 'corrected creation' of the artist is still, in his eyes, one that contests and condemns reality, correcting it on ethical grounds." (247) But most important of all, "Camus does not, as is the case with the classics, 'correct creation' in the name of a truer vision of reality, esthetic and rational in nature." (247) According to Thody, what Camus looks for in the novel is "the creation of a man-made universe which will rival the world of God and, in its order and coherence, compensate for the imperfections of God's creation." (56-57)

Implicit in this entire notion of "correcting creation" is, perhaps, the basic deficiency in Camus' thought. He failed to see that the creativity of the artist, and in fact all human activity, is not a correction of creation but rather a *con-*

tinuance of creation. It is most important to stress, of course, that Camus found himself poised between two unacceptable world-views. Camus was confronted with the historical world-view, or at least what he understood as the historical world-view. On the other hand, there was the older view of a neatly ordered and rationally coherent world in which man's only task was to conform to the eternal and immutable laws of this world. Camus rejected the first position because he saw it as transforming history into an absolute to which the human being must be subordinated and in which he is ultimately absorbed and thus lost. The second, however, was just as unacceptable, for however much he might have disagreed with the thinkers of the nineteenth century, he considered their critique of the earlier world-view as definitive.

The unacceptability of these two interpretations of the world was also held by a contemporary of Camus, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and a relation between these quite different thinkers is worth pointing out, because it is not so much a difference of opposition as it is of complementarity. Camus and Teilhard were in firm agreement on the value of the human person; their basic disagreement was the relation which that person has to the real world. For Camus it was one of opposition and hostility; for Teilhard it was one of organic unity. Such a summarily stark contrast of two complex thinkers is, of course, most in-

adequate, but it may indicate why Camus felt that human salvation was achievable only by a human creation which would be a revolt against the world, while for Teilhard salvation is achieved through actions which are rooted in, continuous with, and transforming of the world.

Theoretically considered, Camus' universe suffers from a metaphysical apartness and that is why, perhaps, it can only be sustained by his own intensified experience, which in fact is rooted in the real world. Indirectly, however, Camus has shown us the impossibility of any longer viewing the world as finished. If the world is finished and at the same time fails to satisfy man's deepest needs, then, as Camus saw it, the artist must create a better world. There is a dualism here between a static, finished world and a dynamic, unfinished man which is ultimately unsatisfactory. Only if man is viewed as continuous with the world, both of which are struggling to be born, can the absurdity which Camus shockingly described, be overcome. In such a world the importance of the artist arises not from creating against the world but for it. Actually, of course, this is exactly what Camus did and his limited awareness of just what he was doing should not lead us to overlook the profound impetus which he has given to the development of human consciousness and to the world which that consciousness bears within it.

EUGENE FONTINELL

LE PHÉNOMÈNE TEILHARD

Although it is a short time since Père Teilhard de Chardin's *The Phenomenon of Man* (Harper) has been published in English, some estimate of the book's importance may be grasped by examining a few of the reactions it has caused.

In most cases we find high praise for the work; in others, indifference or hostility. But even in the complimentary reactions one finds almost an *a priori* tendency to raise objections, as if Père Teilhard had been officially declared an

eccentric genius. This is not to say that his work is devoid of problems. But they are germinal problems, ones which have challenged the creative energies of Christian thinkers for hundreds of years. By and large, many of the objections against his system are dismissable because they are based on a misunderstanding of his "phenomenological" method or the tradition underlying his thought, viz., Platonic Christianity. This does not mean that the tradition completely envelops Teilhard's thought, that there is nothing original in him, or that the tradition of Platonic Christianity answers all his problems. Generally, his uniqueness rests in the rooting his thought has in paleontology and other natural sciences. And the tradition surrounding his thought only shapes his problems in such a manner as to dismiss shallow objections. A way to reach the heart of Teilhard's thought—approach it from Teilhard's point of view and be cognizant of the depth of the problems—is set forth, almost in the form of a plea, in Fr. Russo's recent article (*America*, Apr. 30).

Michael Polanyi, in his review (*Saturday Review*, Jan. 30, p. 21) of *The Phenomenon of Man*, is understandably puzzled over the favorable reaction the book is having among people who have basically different views on the mechanism of evolution—Julian Huxley is mechanistic and Teilhard is finalistic: while the two views are not necessarily contradictory, to many they represent basic opposition. The key to the book's success, Polanyi claims, is that it is riding the wave of a whole series of works which have attacked natural science's obscurantism and the denaturation of man. To Polanyi, Teilhard's purpose is to rewrite the Book of Genesis in terms of evolution. To accomplish this end, he uses scientific knowledge as factual imagery and thus bypasses many decisive issues. "His

work is an epic poem that keeps closely to the facts" (p. 21). Its value is that it is a new and powerful pointer towards problems requiring solution. This value needs underlining. While most biologists have advanced evolutionary thinking, many social scientists have veered from this orientation. The change in the social scientists is not due to hostility to evolution but to an inability to apply the evolutionary perspective to concrete social problems. Teilhard's distinct value is that his vision, "that keeps closely to the facts," reestablishes points of contact between biological, sociological, and even astronomical sciences through his evolutionary ideal, which at the same time is profoundly personal and intrinsically oriented to the transcendent-immanent God-Man. Many problems are involved but Teilhard's vision summons forth and demands that man's knowledge of himself be unified and not splintered into schools of specialists.

E. F. O'Doherty (*Philosophical Studies*, Dec. 1959) sees the essential point of Teilhard's theory as little more than a restatement of Leibnitz' monadology. In terms of new ideas, Polanyi might well agree, but O'Doherty goes further. Accepting Teilhard's claim that he is only writing science, the critic insists that it is poor science, since sciences have consistently tried to eliminate unobservables from their explanations.

J. Edgar Bruns shows a sympathetic but troubled concern (*Catholic World*, April) that Teilhard's view, although not excluding the idea of a special intervention of God, seems to be no more than a sort of divine concomitance. Teilhard's use of the word 'spirit' does not appear to him to be in accord with the declaration of the Vatican Council that "the rational soul is essentially different from the human body."

Of course, Teilhard does not deal directly with the philosophical-theological

question of how the uniquely human soul is united to the body; besides, Fr. Bruns seems to be aware of the possibility that both concomitance and special creation may be simultaneously true, as in his reference to Gregory of Nyssa's doctrine of the human soul. (Articles by G. Klubertanz, *The Modern Schoolman*, 1941; by L. Default, *Proceedings Amer. Cath. Philo. Assoc.*, XXVI; and by N. Luyten, *New Scholasticism*, 1951, help to develop this line of thinking.)

Fr. Fehler's criticism (*Homiletic and Pastoral Review*, May) is even more extensive. He finds it objectionable to speak of the biological properties of thought, and reads the many expressions of Teilhard on the physical oneness of everything as "not far removed from the language of monism." Fr. Fehler also speaks of a "totalitarian tinge" to many assertions, and raises the objection of pantheism: "we deny the possibility of a hyperphysics that can prescind from theology and metaphysics and still make orthodox statements about God." Objection is given to defining finality as "groping chance," and there is an insistence that finality be established metaphysically, which would, of course, require writing quite a different book. Fehler even feels that in Teilhard's thought the supernatural religion of Christianity is reduced to a necessary postulate of the evolutionary process.

Cyril Vollert brings up (*The Month*, May) the problem of evil, the most common difficulty which readers seem to have with Teilhard's work. In this review we find the curious situation in which objections are raised, then answered, and then restated as if no rebuttal existed. After saying that "as a scientist, he could hardly have been expected to draw out the dogma of original sin," he continues, "But although the doctrines of sin and redemption are incompatible with his teaching, the crit-

icism of insufficiency is, again, a valid one."

Similarly, Fr. Vollert states that one of the most serious criticisms against the work is the omission of the creation of material things. But he also writes that on the plane of science, one could not prove anything about the absolute beginning of things, and reminds us of St. Thomas' observation that there is no inherent contradiction in the idea of creation from all eternity. The section ends, bewilderingly: "Teilhard, however, writes not only as a scientist, but as a Christian. And hence it remains a very valid criticism that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to square some of his hypotheses with Christian revelation." No specific hypotheses are listed.

Bernard Towers, on the other hand, gives a wholehearted yet sensitive approval to the book (*Blackfriars*, April). His emphasis, that whatever shortcomings are found in Teilhard should be criticized more by scientists than by theologians, should be adequate reason for giving special emphasis to the review of George Gaylord Simpson (*Scientific American*, April) who believes that "Teilhard was primarily a Christian mystic, and only secondarily, although importantly, a scientist. . . . He synthesizes these radically different approaches into a metaphysics suggestive of a new personal religion, although he always insisted that his 'vision' (the word, often repeated, was his) not only was compatible with, but also was the true interpretation of Roman Catholic Christianity."

Simpson finds contradictory the claim of the book's first sentence, to be written "purely and simply as a scientific treatise," and the statement of the last chapter, that the conviction that the universe has a direction is a position "strictly undemonstrable to science." Hence he feels

that the book, although presented as science, is "devoted to a thesis admittedly undemonstrable scientifically."

As an example of Teilhard's "mystical" science, Simpson cites his distinction between material and spiritual energy; although there is an acceptance of the notion of a fundamental physical energy, Teilhard makes a division of this into tangential and radial energy. Simpson also points out that Teilhard considered neo-Lamarckian factors in evolution as more important than is generally believed.

Simpson finds imprecision or contradiction in definitions, especially in the use of the term orthogenesis:

Orthogenesis was variously defined by Teilhard as the "law of controlled complication," which acts "in a predetermined direction," as "the manifest property of living matter to form a system in which terms *succeed each other* experimentally, following the constantly increasing values of centro-complexity," or as "*directed transformation*" (to whatever degree and under whatever influence 'the direction' may be manifested)."

The last definition, taken from a manuscript written by Teilhard shortly before his death, "is broad enough to include the effects of natural selection; but that was certainly not intended, because Teilhard repeatedly contrasted selection with orthogenesis and indeed usually treated them as complete opposites."

Simpson concludes that Teilhard's use of the term orthogenesis is tautological:

History is inherently unrepeatable, so that any segment of a historical sequence (such as that of organic evolution) begins with one state and ends with another. It therefore necessarily has a direction of change, and if orthogenesis is merely that direction, it explains nothing and only applies a Greek term to what is obvious without the term....

Now it is easy enough to show that, although evolution is directional as

a historical process must always be, it is multidirectional; when all directions are taken into account, it is erratic and opportunistic. Obviously, since man exists, from primordial cell to man was one of the directions, or rather a variety of them in succession, for there was no such sequence *in a straight line* and therefore literally orthogenetic. Teilhard was well aware of the consensus to that effect, but he brushed it aside and refused to grapple with it in terms of the detailed evidence.

Simpson then asks: "Which are the premises and which the conclusions?"

Teilhard's major premises are in fact religious and, except for the conclusion that evolution has indeed occurred, most of his conclusions about evolution derive from these and not from scientific premises. One cannot object to the piety or mysticism of his book, but one can object to its initial claim to be a scientific treatise and to the arrangement that puts its real premises briefly, in part obscurely, as a sort of appendage after the conclusions drawn from them.

The temptation is great to say that Teilhard's sacral commitment to Catholicism seems less concealed than Simpson's apparent sacral commitment to scientific knowledge as the only knowledge; but in our effort to understand, it is more helpful to turn to Claude Tresmontant's *Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: his Thought* (Helicon, \$3), which provides a coherent introduction, as well as a defense of *The Phenomenon of Man*, enriched by using Teilhard's other writings. Tresmontant carefully sets forth the meaning of "phenomenology"; Teilhard looks upon himself as "... neither a philosopher nor a theologian, but a student of the 'phenomenon,' a physicist in the Old Greek sense" (p. 16). Bruno de Solages' article, which is an expository defense of Teilhard's system, explains his point of view to be "... what Aristotle called physics and the scholastics cosmology," (Christianity and Evolution," CROSS CURRENTS,

Summer 1951, p. 30). That is, he is concerned with the interconnection of factual data but not simply those that can be seen. As Aristotle discusses the first unmoved mover in his *Physics*, so Teilhard discusses spirit and Christianity as cosmological phenomena.

Tresmontant would appear to put to rest several objections that have been raised against Teilhard's system. Thus the evolutionary development of consciousness towards depth and incommunicability in Teilhard's thought is fundamentally opposed to the dissolution of differences in any pantheism (pp. 55 ff). "Concordism" is similarly dismissed as "... filing a new problem in an old pigeon hole" (p. 68). It is also shown that his system does not involve polygenism (p. 104), nor does it call for a totalitarian state, which Teilhard regarded as an aberrant social form (p. 55).

Tresmontant is not oblivious of the difficulties inherent in Père Teilhard's thought, two of which are detailed. Tresmontant finds conflict between Teilhard's position on cosmic origin and the doctrine of creation, and an inadequacy in explaining evil. At the same time, however, we find that Teilhard's thought on these points has similarity with Duns Scotus, the Greek fathers, and the great Franciscan tradition. One limitation of Tresmontant's study is that

it does not detail sufficiently how thinkers in this tradition specifically treated the problems of creation and evil. Tresmontant also locates Teilhard's theological thought in the biblical, apostolic, and patristic tradition (p. 106).

Tresmontant emphasizes the Incarnational basis of Teilhard's Christian humanism (pp. 80-1). After a life-time of allowing his earthly and Christian views to develop and interact freely, Teilhard found that ultimately they enriched each other. One work is dedicated by Teilhard

... to those who distrust Jesus because they suspect Him, as they see it, of stripping the irrevocably loved face of the earth of its bloom and freshness; to those who, in order to love Jesus, compel themselves to ignore that with which their souls are overflowing; and finally, to those who, upon failing to reconcile the God of their faith and the God of their most ennobling work, grow weary and become impatient with a life split into oblique efforts. (p. 80)

Whatever later criticism may have to say, it ought to be at least clear that for Teilhard, the intellectual life was a sacramental life, a synthesis of faith and reason, which involved the entire effort of his adult life.

GEORGE PEPPER

ETHICS AND POPULATION: THE PROTESTANT CONSENSUS

In *The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility* (New York: Oxford, 1960; \$4.25), Richard M. Fagley advocates family limitation as a matter of Christian conscience in a world whose population is growing at the fastest rate history has known. The demographic data convince. Of the solutions other than family limitation, migration offers only temporary relief and, since emigrants are often a country's economical-

ly most useful citizens, has important contra-indications. Increased production and more efficient distribution of food, though certainly offering more possibilities than Fagley, who is technologically unimaginative, recognizes, do not completely solve the problem of space.

As to family limitation, Fagley concedes that rhythm will become more effective as means are discovered of con-

verting chemical changes during ovulation into some overt symptom. He sees today's greatest hope in direct contraception by means of vaginal foams which can potentially be distributed at low cost in underdeveloped areas.

Family limitation, by whatever means, must first find its place within cultural drives. India, for example, can inhibit growth if its culture comes to reject child marriage. Beyond that, leaders in underdeveloped societies must counteract attitudes that stem from the former tragic balance between birth and death:

The tendency to regard procreation as a woman's main destiny, the desire for sons to pursue filial piety, the view of the large family as a kind of old-age insurance, as well as the exploitation of child labor, all stand in some measure athwart the kind of population policy which can restore a tolerable balance and reinforce the hope of a free society.

On the other hand, all Jews and Christians would certainly agree that certain methods of limiting births now permissible culturally—wife-sharing and *coitus interruptus* in India, abortion in Japan—should be eradicated.

For the West, however, the first step is to form its conscience on the basis of its Judaeo-Christian tradition. Fagley sees the tradition as giving sanction, when it is properly understood, to contraception. Let us trace his argument.

The ethical context of the Old Testament transforms primitive fertility drives. The distinguishing feature of Old Testament thought

... is insistence on the ethical and religious preconditions for human expansion, for the fulfillment of God's promises. The requirement is stated thus: 'if you obey the voice of the Lord your God, keeping all his commandments which I command you this day, and doing what is right in the sight of the Lord your God' (*Deut.* 13:18), then, and then only, 'Blessed shall be the fruit of your

body, and the fruit of your ground, and the fruit of your beasts, the increase of your cattle, and the young of your flock' (*Deut.* 28:1-4).

But a secondary theme, which Fagley infelicitously terms the "'one flesh' concept," adds a new dimension to the Old Testament concept of marriage. *Genesis* 2:23-24 means

... a new status for woman. She is a partner, and not a brood mare or a plaything. The corollary of this principle is a new attitude toward children, as persons in their own right. ... It is perhaps symbolic that the last verse in the Old Testament, according to the Christian canon, speaks of Elijah's returning: 'And he will turn the hearts of fathers to their children and the hearts of children to their fathers, lest I come and smite the land with a curse' (*Mal.* 4:6).

The New Testament utters a *yes* and a *no* to marriage and family life. In the Gospels the Lord's subjection to his parents, his love for children, his affection for wedding feasts are part of the *yes*. When he is asked about divorce, he replies that what God has joined together, no man should put asunder (*Mk.* 10:6-9; *Matt.* 19:4-6):

Here the 'two in one flesh' concept, which played a significant but subordinate role in the Old Testament, is moved into the center of Christian doctrine on marriage. Also the theological dimension implicit in the idea now is made explicit—'what therefore God has joined together.' True marriage is a spiritual and physical union of which God Himself is the author. Here indeed is the 'great mystery' helping us to understand both the nature of God and the essence of genuine marriage.

The *no* to family life is less a rejection of marriage than a forceful statement of the priority of the Kingdom:

This is the crucial point in the *no* of Jesus toward marriage and family life. He presents the claims of the Kingdom in dramatic fashion, but his

own life indicates that he is fully appreciative of the lesser claims of home and family. It is the 'more than me,' the putting of family ahead of the will of God in regard to witness or service in society, the giving of supreme loyalty to one's own family circle, against which Jesus is giving timeless and timely warning. Jesus does not in any specific way deal with the question of parenthood. What he does provide, in his yes and no to marriage and family life, is a spiritual and moral frame of reference essential to truly sound answers.

For Fagley, who joins modern New Testament criticism in removing 1 *Timothy* from the Pauline canon, St. Paul's attitude to marriage is essentially the same. Although he denied himself the right to be accompanied by a wife, "his reference to the eminent benedicts among the saints justifies the conclusion that Paul always regarded marriage as an honorable estate."

In dealing with Patristic literature on marriage, Fagley emphasizes the necessity "to refute persistent allegations regarding sexual vice, and to distinguish true Christian conduct from the licentiousness of the heretics." He mentions Clement of Alexandria's defense of marriage and procreation against the Gnostics, and marriage against exaggerated claims for celibacy, but recalls that his pupil Origen returned to a rigorously ascetic view. Equally important to remember is the conviction, as with Tertullian and Cyprian, that "The sword of persecution which hung over their heads was a sign of the 'impending distress,' heralding the long-awaited Day of the Lord." Given these eschatological expectations and the low state of sexual morality in the pagan world, we should not expect the early Fathers to create a completely satisfactory theology of marriage.

The special demands for Christian obedience and virtue in face of the impending distress and the require-

ments for salvation tend to convert the idea of responsible parenthood into responsible non-parenthood. This is reflected in the increasing stress not only on celibacy as the higher way, but also on abstinence and freedom from the distractions of family obligations within marriage.

Sexual abstinence is the one method of family limitation that is clearly approved . . . it seems to me fair to describe the early patristic attitude as one generally opposed to the non-procreative uses of sex.

Fagley considers St. Augustine the key figure in Roman Catholic doctrine bearing on parenthood. His description of Augustine's thought on the matter: "the proper concern for Christians in relation to procreation is in providing candidates for salvation, for election to replace the fallen angels. . . . On the other hand, procreation in the fallen state involves the 'malady' deriving from sin: concupiscence, upsetting the control of the will and the reason. . . . Through the sacrament of marriage the sin of sexual union, mortal outside of wedlock, becomes venial, pardonable."

St. Thomas gives sexual desire a more positive role:

Venereal pleasure is a lesser good as compared with 'temperance' and 'continence,' but it is not evil in itself—though it may be the occasion of sin. It is when it exceeds the requirements of reason that it becomes sinful lust. Marriage has a rightful function to serve, however, as a remedy for concupiscence. By combining Paul's advice on mutual conjugal rights with Aristotelian concepts of justice, Thomas revives in a new form the old Roman concept of marriage as a contract. . . . While the Thomistic doctrine of marriage and family life seems rather cold and formal, there are humane elements in it. Marriage is for the common life and mutual aid, as well as for procreation. . . . The leaven of the 'one flesh' idea of the Scriptures seems rather weak and dormant in the Scholastic outlook, but it is by no means dead.

Fagley sees Roman Catholic thought on parenthood evolving slowly and erratically from the outline given by Aquinas. In the "mutual inward molding" passage of *Casti Connubii*—omitted for several years from English and American translations of the encyclical—he envisions a potentially more satisfactory theology of marriage.

Fagley emphasizes and details the genuine concern of the Holy Office with the problem of limiting birth throughout the nineteenth century. Though unable to see anything relevant in the conventional natural-law distinction between artificial and natural birth control methods, Fagley quite obviously shares the sentiments expressed in the statement of Pius XII: "One may even hope . . . that science will succeed in providing this licit method with a sufficiently secure basis, and the most recent information seems to confirm such a hope."

Within the Catholic church today, Fagley finds two groups: a "fertility cult" and a group concerned with responsible parenthood.

He expects no startling developments from Rome. Rather, he feels that Protestantism must develop its doctrine of responsible parenthood; then Protestants can hope for greater Roman Catholic understanding, for acknowledgment that theirs is a serious position, adopted after contemplation of Scripture, search of tradition, and prayerful scrutiny of conscience.

Protestantism under Luther and Calvin did not reject the notion of procreation as the end of marriage, the only positive purpose of sex. The later reformers, it appears, did not thoroughly examine the implications of their reforms.

The factors that dissuaded Protestant theologians from their acceptance of the traditional position were non-theo-

logical in character: Protestant lay men and women active in the birth-control movement impressed clerical leaders, most of them married, with their concern for family economic welfare, the health of women, the care and education of present children; the depression of the 1930's cast doubts on the middle-class image of a large, thrifty, industrious and responsible family seated around a groaning board as the Protestant ideal. In 1930, the Lambeth Conference reversed its stands of 1908 and 1920 against contraception. In 1931 the Committee on Marriage and Home of the U.S. Federal Council of Churches

. . . agreed that sex relations between husband and wife 'have their source in the thought and purpose of God, first for the creation of human life, but also as a manifestation of divine concern for the happiness of those who have so wholly merged their lives'. . .

a statement that provoked discussion within the Council and, with its conclusion "that the careful and restrained use of contraceptives by married people is valid and moral," gave sanction to widespread practice. Tentative approval of birth control marked Protestant pronouncements up to World War II. Since then has been added the problem of overpopulation, especially important to the younger churches of Asia, Africa and Latin America. There is general agreement in these pronouncements that both personal and social reasons justify family limitation and that, in choosing methods, there are no moral questions involved. The position enunciated by the Calvinist Commission on Civil and Religious Marriage and approved at the 1952 General Synod of the Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk states that "Once we have taken for granted that we are jointly responsible for the creation of a family and that this responsibility can also include birth control, then the

question of ways and means becomes one that married people must settle between themselves and with their physician in the most responsible way . . . it is not the means, but the motives that are determinant." In 1954, the Augustana Evangelical Lutheran Church adopted a statement that "it is the spirit in which the means are used, rather than whether they are 'natural' or 'artificial' which defines their 'rightness' or 'wrongness.' . . . An unrestrained production of children without realistic regard to God-given responsibilities involved . . . may be as sinful and as selfish an indulgence of the lusts of the flesh as is the avoidance of parenthood." And, finally, the 1958 Lambeth Report: "There are many lands today where population is increasing so fast that the survival of young and old is threatened. . . . In such countries population control has become a necessity. Abortion and infanticide are to be condemned, but methods of control, medically endorsed and morally acceptable, may help the people of these lands so to plan family life that children may be born without a likelihood of starvation." Thus, the Protestant consensus. Fagley then looks to the future, in particular the ecumenical future.

Two major questions are posed for the ecumenical leadership in regard to next steps. One is how to find a formula on the question of responsible parenthood sufficiently flexible to leave room for the different ap-

proach of Orthodox leaders without blunting too much the cutting edge of the Protestant consensus. . . . The other main issue is whether there is sufficient conviction on this subject among the churches of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the problems show their most insistent side, to make a 'courageous and forthright judgment' truly ecumenical in character.

That is the direction within Protestantism. As to Protestantism's public witness and its relation to the Roman Catholic position, he calls for a positive formulation of Evangelical principles rather than negative opposition to Rome.

Moreover and more importantly, we who share the Protestant heritage need to appreciate more fully the serious way in which the complex problems bearing on human parenthood are dealt with under the Roman discipline. The Catholic literature on parenthood and population . . . makes our Protestant output look rather amateurish . . . however inadequate we may judge the area left to conscientious personal decision, we must recognize the large amount of attention paid to the training of Catholic seminarians in the problems of marriage and family life.

The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility is a considerable achievement, not the least of its virtues being the author's equanimity in discussing a topic whose literature is often angry.

WILLIAM BIRMINGHAM

VOLTAIRE 1960

The call for a new approach to Voltairian study was sounded by a noted scholar, Ira Wade, in *The Search for a New Voltaire* (Philadelphia, 1958): "Surely the moment is ripe for someone to unite all these separate points of view into a composite picture of the

master." The appeal concludes Wade's work, which adds many small but intriguing details to our picture of Voltaire. Of particular interest are the hint of a new interpretation of the relations between Voltaire and the Protestants of Geneva and, of importance especially to

those scholars interested in the intricacies of language and style, the pattern into which all Voltaire's works may be fitted—his *petit chapitre*.

Wade worked with the Voltaire documents in the deposit of the American Philosophical Society, especially those collected by the late Professor André Delattre. The text of the work is followed by a valuable inventory of the materials concerning Voltaire available to scholars at the headquarters of the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia.

In his most recent work *Voltaire and Candide* (Princeton, 1959) published at the close of 1959 Ira Wade attempts to answer his own call. This study of Voltaire's *conte Candide* makes a notable contribution to our knowledge both of Voltaire and of the Enlightenment. Wade's technical study of the text, complete with reproductions of a new found manuscript is of interest mainly to philologists, but even a casual reader will be intrigued by the unraveling of the scholar's puzzle: dates, composition, publication.

The year 1759, when *Candide* was published, is presented as the end of a critical period which reshaped Voltaire's outlook on life. What was *Candide*?

... there is in the implications of the work itself an inner structure—a vital soul—which is its meaning. *Candide* states simply and naively that life is quality, manner, degree. It is phenomena, criticism, judgement. In all areas in which life becomes—philosophical, aesthetic, moral, social, religious—it becomes so through the saving grace of creative criticism. That is the structural meaning of *Candide*, it is the meaning of Voltaire. I suspect it is the meaning of the eighteenth century, too, particularly in its "unfinished business."

A detailed philological and logical study of the genesis of *Candide* reveals many influences which affected the pro-

duction of the work, among them Leibnitz, Pope's *Essay on Man*, the Lisbon earthquake.

In Wade's opinion Voltaire and his compatriots had to integrate the thoughts of Descartes, Pascal, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke and Newton in order to form their own distinctive philosophy. Of central importance was a solution of the problem of evil. Was the answer pessimism, the skepticism of Bayle, the optimism of Leibnitz, fatalism, pyrrhonism or something else? In *Candide* Voltaire shows his own answer to be a composite of these attitudes. "Facts had produced ideas, it is true, but ideas had not yet produced ideals, and no one knew what to do."

Wade believes that Voltaire and the whole Enlightenment are defined in *Candide*'s insistent demand that the human spirit be released. "*Candide* proclaims loudly, not that

The play is the tragedy Man
And its hero, the Conqueror Worm

but that the play is puny, insignificant, unregenerate man, and its hero an unconquerable, defiant, eternal wit."

The intense study of Ira Wade has resulted finally in a fresh, compelling picture of Voltaire. The last years of Voltaire's life must now be studied anew to see if he maintained the attitudes expressed in 1759 until the end of his life.

Peter Gay, in *Voltaire's Politics* (Princeton, 1959), recognizes the existence of the problem that prompted Professor Wade to issue his call, but sets his sights on a lesser goal, a correct understanding of Voltaire's politics. The achievement of this purpose would in itself be a worthy accomplishment if it contributed to a clarification of what Wade calls Voltaire's "inner reality."

Gay elaborately prepares the background for his portrait. In the prologue and throughout the work the eighteenth

century scene is set, in a manner reminiscent of Franklin Ford's *Robe and Sword*, but covering more ground. This background makes Gay's work more understandable than Wade's first work for readers who do not already have a specialized knowledge of Voltaire. Without it the political views of *le vieux malade* could not be effectively presented.

The result is an excellent summary of many aspects of the eighteenth century and an attempt to work this century into its place in the course of history. But the Voltaire presented is not greatly different from the old Voltaire. He is still the bourgeois-minded, practical philosopher with wide interests of the older interpretations. Voltaire is shown as one who recognized the uses of propaganda, was intolerant of those who criticized his own work, believed in much that made up the English political system, as he conceived it, and was a proponent of the *thèse royale*.

Gay perhaps does his best work in the last two areas and in his analysis of Voltaire's gradual addition of some elements of equality to his belief in and demand for liberty. In later years, at the very time when he was praising Frederick the Great and fawning over Catherine the Great, his dealings with the *natifs* of Geneva brought some idea of the necessity for equality to Voltaire. The presentation of the complexities of Voltaire's thought is a definite contribution by Gay.

Gay has emphasized that Voltaire was interested in practical politics, just as J. H. Brumfitt recently concentrated on Voltaire as an historian or rather as the precursor of the nineteenth century historian (*Voltaire, Historian*. Oxford, 1958). Using original sources thoroughly and carefully, Gay has gone far beyond such works as that by Constance Rowe, *Voltaire and the State*, but he

does not present a significantly new picture of Voltaire.

As Gay recognizes, the problem of Christianity in the eighteenth century is a key one. Especially prominent is the question of the attitude of the *philosophes* towards Christianity. To Gay, *l'enfance* of Voltaire was Christianity itself. The opinions concerning Christianity, not only of Voltaire, but of all the "men of the Enlightenment," need re-examination, if there is to be an understanding of that period.

The eighteenth century must be seen more clearly as the heir of the 15th-to-17th centuries, rather than, as is so often the case, simply as the ancestor of the 19th and 20th centuries, if the problem of Christianity is to be understood. In the forefront of study today are the "believers in the Enlightenment," the children of the *philosophes*, committed to many of the views and hopes of that time. Judging by the book under consideration here and by his comments in the volume *Carl Becker's Heavenly City Revisited* (R.O. Rockwood, ed. Ithaca, 1958) Peter Gay is a member of this large group.

In historical studies these men have done much to show the connections between the eighteenth century and subsequent history. Without this work our own time would be even less understood than it is now. But so often the view of those committed to the ideas and ideals of the Enlightenment does not go back beyond the seventeenth century, and hence cannot respond fully to Voltaire's situation, for whom Christianity was far from having been done away with. We must remember that a number of the *philosophes* had been educated by the Jesuits, and that their ideas on many subjects were formed as a reaction against the Jesuit-Jansenist battle or the struggles of the Gallican church, because of hatred for the Quiet-

ists or for the misanthropic ideas of a man like Pascal. Christianity was alive; too alive and too corrupt to suit any *philosophe*.

The 15th and especially the 16th centuries had seen a constant two-pronged attempt, intellectual and mystical, to solve the problems of Christianity. One result of this, hardly intended, was the Enlightenment. How then can the Enlightenment be understood if more attention is not paid to tracing the positive and negative influences that the development of Protestantism, the Catholic Reformation, syncretism, Jansen-

ism, Cartesianism, Pietism and Quietism had on the formation of the minds of the men of the 18th century?

If the disciples of the Enlightenment have too often seen Christianity as finished and have therefore seen it only from the outside, we can hardly claim that Christians have been objective in their treatment of the Enlightenment. There is still need for a qualified modern Christian historian, to use his knowledge of the development of Christianity to bring about a more complete interpretation of Voltaire and his century.

J. MICHAEL HAYDEN

THE POLITICAL-CULTURAL SCENE

1.

The Council of Florence. This first history of the Council (by Fr. Joseph Gill, Cambridge University Press, \$8.50) is largely based on the *Concilium Florentinum: Documenta et Scriptores*, a critical edition of texts initiated, directed and almost completed by the late Fr. G. Hofman, Professor at the Pontifical Oriental Institute. The author, an authority in the field and a collaborator of Fr. Hofman's, himself edited one of the basic texts, the *Greek Acts*. It is proper, then, that the first historical reconstruction of the Council in almost a century should come from that circle of scholars who have done most to correct the superficiality and inaccuracies that mar previous accounts of the Council.

No less an authority than Prof. Halecki has referred to the work as definitive, subject to eventual amplifications when additional documentation will be forthcoming but in no way subject to any basic revision. It is reassuring to note in addition that in spite of the complexity of the history the work is as readable as it is scholarly, permeated

with that unassuming modesty that characterizes equitable, learned historians.

The core of the history deals with the principal theological discussions on the problem of the Procession of the Holy Spirit (the addition to the Creed of the Filioque clause). The complicated problem is dealt with thoroughly and clearly, although Fr. Gill has no illusions as to the extent to which such matters can be simplified, noting in passing that "if the reader does not understand it all, he can console himself with the thought that no one does understand the mystery of the Blessed Trinity." Still, even untrained theologians should be able to appreciate the differences of approach between East and West.

Subsidiary theological differences were not dealt with as thoroughly at the Council. There was a great deal of informal preliminary discussion on the subject of Purgatory and very little discussion on the Primacy of Peter. The Greeks conceded to the Latins the subsidiary points as well as the main ones, but there was something of a package deal at the end of the discussions and

it is easy to see where the important differences of opinion will appear when and if these questions are reopened. In dealing with these and other related theological problems Fr. Gill makes particularly skillful use of the *Memoirs* of Silvester Syropoulos, whose partisan justification for recantation can be neither completely relied upon nor discounted.

By the time union was finally agreed upon it was obvious that the difficulties were increasing rather than diminishing. The Greeks were divided and when they returned home, Mark of Ephesus, who had consistently opposed union, won many to his side again. In Florence the Greeks had been won over by the vaster theological knowledge of the Latins, who were as familiar with the Greek Fathers as with their own. They were bested too in syllogistic argument, in which the Greeks were untrained. In Constantinople, however, Mark of Ephesus and Scholarius, the most vehement of those who recanted, joined the monks and people once more and made it impossible for the Emperor, who either lacked the will to implement the decree of union or feared political repercussions. In 1439 the Greeks accepted what their forefathers had felt was heresy; by 1453 the Turks had taken Constantinople and installed an anti-unionist Patriarch; thirty years later the Synod of Constantinople denounced the Council of Florence and all its teachings.

Eugenius IV appears in a good light in this history: a pope who determinedly took up the work of unity and in the face of constant opposition from the Council of Basel shouldered himself with the financial burden of the Council, dealing with the Greeks with patience and restraint, becoming exasperated but never threatening. Nor is there any evidence to point to his use of the Council of Florence as a weapon against the Conciliarists, although this was its most

enduring outcome. He appears to have been resolved to bind divided Christians again in charity and truth.

Father Gill offers no suggestions for the future in this work, but less cautious and less erudite readers will be impressed by the self-evident conclusion that doctrinal clarity in theological discussions is essential but hardly enough for implementation. Implementation depends on intangibles and matters that have nothing to do with doctrinal clarity. In plans for union, clarity and good will can go only so far.

SERGE HUGHES

2.

Political Man. In recent approaches to the study of political behavior, one witnesses increasing interdisciplinary collaboration as well as the acceptance of common concepts and methods. This new evidence of the basic unity of the social sciences affects especially political science, sociology, psychology and anthropology. The usefulness of this unified "behavioral" approach has become quite evident in the systematic study of social relationships, as applying to the analysis of political processes and institutions. S. M. Lipset attempts this approach in his *Political Man: Where, How and Why Democracy Works in the Modern World*, (New York, Doubleday, 1960, 432 pp., \$4.95).

By means of the sociology of politics (cf. for a recent bibliography Heinz Eulau et al., *Political Behavior*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1956) Lipset hopes to analyze the social conditions making for democracy. His conclusion is that "democracy is the good society itself in operation. . . . Democracy requires institutions which support conflict and disagreement as well as those which sustain legitimacy and consensus" (p. 403). Extremists and intolerant movements in modern society are found as more

likely to be based on the lower classes than on the middle and upper classes. (This has also been the "tragic" discovery of the Socialist Italian novelist Ignazio Silone). Working-class authoritarianism becomes consequently a key to "Fascism" which Lipset structures into left, right and center varieties.

Another major section of the book deals with election mechanisms as expression of democratic class struggle. The comparative treatment of electoral behavior is one of the most comprehensive ever undertaken. The data are interpreted to mean that a democratic class struggle exists and will continue, but it will be a fight without ideologies. The decline of political ideology everywhere is one of the resultants. "Political Behavior in American Society" (Part III) is traced fascinatingly. The growing affluent and bureaucratic society represents elements inherent in any equalitarian and democratic society.

Lipset's intellectual rigor makes a valuable contribution, but his book appears overrationalistic. Aristotle's hypothesis of the relationship of democracy to a class structure bulging toward the middle is accepted as fully valid today. But is it? Political activity is more than the temporary adjunct to economics. And Lipset implies so himself, when he illustrates how democracy has existed in a variety of environments.

Clarification of the value dimension of democracy can be found in the September 1959 issue of *Esprit*, concerned entirely with "La Démocratie est une idée neuve." (Cf. also Dietrich von Oppen, "Befehlen und Verhandeln," *Zeitwende*, November 1959, concerning the structure of power and ethics).

Lipset, like many of his craft, relies on one of the towering fathers of *Sozialwissenschaft*, Max Weber, who died forty years ago this June. Weber's

ability was to see in any specific situation the interrelation of economic, social, political and religious factors in all their influence. Reinhard Bendix (*Max Weber, An Intellectual Portrait*, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1960, 480 pp., \$5.75) has done a pioneering and admirable service by introducing the readers to an orderly overview of Weber's ramified thought. He emphasizes, moreover, his empirical rather than his methodological writings (pp. 9-12 carry a guide to all translations). To make Weber's though more accessible, Bendix uses the expository method. He omits what detracts from the main line of argument and puts together other material belonging to the same context. The resulting exposition displays the growth of Weber's ideas and concepts along three lines: German society and the Protestant ethic (agrarian society and economic rationality in the West); society, religion and secular ethics (a comparative study of civilizations: China, India and Ancient Judaism); and political sociology (domination, organization and legitimacy). It is an exhaustive treatment. Two examples must suffice here.

Weber approached the study of religious ideas in terms of their relevance to collective action and social processes. Confucian ethics, Christian ethics *do* have a social dimension. It is fascinating to read this "proof" that a genuine religious idea always strives beyond the individual, seeks incarnation in the environment. On the debit side of this tendency is the obvious: religious fervor and theological ideas might easily promote secular striving. Here Weber could be profitably used to explore the "apostolic" dimension of individual faith.

Weber's almost Orwellian views on bureaucracy have gained him an appreciative audience in modern welfare states. He viewed a system of bureaucratic rule as inescapable for the modern

state's functional existence, ushering in a "dictatorship of the bureaucrats," rather than of the proletariat. His speculations about the future of modern society drew heavily on insights into Chinese history. It helped him to forewarn of the totalitarian propensity and potential even of democracies. "Bureaucracy under legal domination" rather than its technical or humanistic education towards responsibility (the classic Chinese model) is, therefore, Weber's political recipe. Bendix is, however, more interested in Weber's "comparative study of bureaucracy" yielding "analytically useful categories that can aid our understanding of the totalitarian regimes that have developed since his time" (p. 456).

In contrast to the "political science" of the Weber study is the "political theory" of a recent book by Msgr. John A. Abbo (*Political Thought: Men and Ideas*, Newman, 1960, 542 pp., \$5.75), who presents a lucid exposition of the great thinkers of Western political thought. The pithy chapters are tied together by a unified Catholic interpretation of this "three thousand year intellectual journey." An Appendix offers 40 of the Catholic Principles of Politics prepared by the International Union of Social Studies (Mechlin Union, 1952).

Only a few critical comments can be offered here. The treatment of Plato seems inadequate. "The political thought of Plato always remained essentially unchanged" (29). This lack of understanding has its repercussions in later sections. Platonism, ancient and modern, remains the key to the dialectic function of "political theory" (Cf. Hessen, Shorey, Wild, E. K. Winter and others).

"Concerning the social and political issues, Christ was responsible for 'secularizing' the state. With Him religion and politics were sharply distinguished" (p. 64). This "duality" Abbo works out more clearly in the chapter on St. Au-

gustine. Abbo stresses that St. Augustine did not view the political order as inferior or a violation of natural law. He did not look upon the state merely as a consequence of sin. "He meant simply to condemn the violent, cruel, unjust domination . . . the greed and the power urge that drive men . . . to found nations and empires or to extend them by force or treachery" (p. 78).

Comments on Luther and Erasmus, for example, are welcome additions to such texts. On the other hand Nicolas Cusanus is missing; Sturzo and Maritain get only a line. The chapter on American political thought is valuable. The comprehensiveness of the work makes it an excellent general introduction.

ERNEST F. WINTER

3.

Psychology and Religion. A Paulist psychologist and a Jesuit theologian have collaborated in a pioneer effort to compose a practical treatise on "Modern Techniques and Emotional Conflicts" (*Counselling the Catholic*, by George Hagamier, C.S.P., and Robert W. Gleason, S.J., Sheed and Ward, 301 pp., \$4.50). It is intended to serve as a textbook for seminarians and as a reference work for priests and other Catholics who find themselves in the role of counselor. In spite of all the talk about a rapprochement between religion and modern psychology, the urgent need for a volume of this sort remains an undeniable fact. The co-authors of this book are to be congratulated for the sober, intelligent and highly successful manner in which they have tried to meet this need.

The book is divided into two sections, *Part I* dealing with "Psychological Perspectives on Counselling" and *Part II* with "Moral Perspectives on Counseling." Though written separately by the two authors, both parts are well inte-

grated and the style of each section is equally clear and interesting. *Appendix I* briefly surveys the symptoms and causes of the main mental illnesses. A second *Appendix* consists of a very practical list of referral facilities. A useful bibliography is also included.

The emotional stratum of man's life is the focal point of interest for the authors. Their aim throughout the book is to help foster new attitudes in the clerical reader, attitudes based on the findings of modern psychology in the realm of emotional dynamics as they affect moral and religious problems. Modern counselling techniques are concretely described in the first section, while more technical applications of moral theology to counselling situations are handled in the second section. Both sections deal from their respectively different viewpoints with the delicate and complicated topics of masturbation and homosexuality. The treatment of these subjects in both sections is superb. It is to be hoped that the authors' intention of encouraging a change in the seminary curriculum in the direction of pastoral counselling will quickly be realized.

4.

Religion, Science and Mental Health. (New York University Press, 107 pp. \$3.00). This volume includes short papers read at the first Symposium on Inter-disciplinary Responsibility for Mental Health, held under the sponsorship of the Academy of Religion and Mental Health on December 6th-8th, 1957, together with summaries of the discussions that followed the reading of the papers.

Some random sampling of opinions and remarks may serve to indicate the significance of the contents of this book. Dr. Mowrer declared that "the behavioral sciences are currently in crisis and are being influenced more by religion than the other way around." Dr. Maslow sug-

gested that we "try to understand what are the descriptive characteristics of the human beings whom we actually call our best human beings." He also remarked that "the Catholic psychologists . . . have been raising questions that other psychologists haven't discussed."

Dr. Zilboorg, with his customary forthrightness, stated that he was "suspicious of tying psychiatric problems in with religious ones, as if these two fields really have something in common." He was "skeptical about the tendency . . . to connect mental health and religious life." He went on to say that "if you are very ill mentally, you can't be a half-way decent street cleaner any more than lead a proper religious life; yet capital criminals may have a religious life of considerable depth, and neurotics can achieve sainthood." He declared that he felt "like warning (himself) to beware when emphasis is laid on the fact that religious life promotes mental health, and good mental health promotes religious life."

Dr. Wolff was "convinced that the brain may be damaged in the process of attempting to make adaptations to situations that the individual cannot meet." He declared that "direction, pressures, goals, values are relevant to the problems of disease, both at the level of the brains and at the level of the other bodily organs, at the level of the mind and that of secretion."

Dr. Hoffman envisioned "an opportunity for the scientist to be open to the possibility that the universal may reveal itself in the scientific realm, and for the religious believer to rejoice that his faith becomes more relevant in the midst of scientific investigation directed toward a more honest, mature, and free humanity."

Father Mailloux stated that "no informed theologian will accept the platitudes proffered by those who feel in-

clined to make use of religion, as they might do with occupational therapy, because it may bring comfort to the *average man* in occasional distress, and help him to pull himself together by providing the sort of teleological interpretation of his universe that will satisfy his wishful fantasies and infantile needs."

Rabbi Goldman declared that Judaism "would have no particular quarrel as such with the behavioral sciences, providing that the behavioral sciences are willing to affirm the concepts of creativity, of worth, of value, and of goals."

Most appropriately, among the subjects indicated for further study, Dr. Loomis, one of the participants, proposed an investigation "to find out whether the relation between religion and mental health lies in the subject matter itself, or in approaches to it, or in philosophizing about it."

BERNARD GILLIGAN

4.

Art and Art History. The essays in *Responsibilities of the Artist* (Scribner's \$2.95) may not add much for those acquainted with Maritain's views on art, ethics, and censorship but they do recapitulate effectively. There is an essay that deals with the general relationship between art and ethics, divergent in end and therefore in means; two essays on art for art's sake and art for the people, respectively; and a final essay that takes up Gide's malicious comment on the devil as cooperator in the work of art. Maritain does not share in the solemn anguish that besets some eminent novelists for whom the very depth of their insight into the dark motivating forces of their creations makes it virtually impossible for them to remain both Christian and artist.

The problem is developed more fully and more persuasively in Antonia

White's essay "The Novelist" in the Downside symposium *Art, Artists, and Thinkers* (\$7). Miss White has some relevant considerations on the problems of the novelist who accepts, relies on and explores layers of sub-conscious motivation and has difficulty in ceasing to act creator-wise, as is proper in his art, once the novel is completed. The symposium is on an impressive scale—sculpture, ballet, aesthetics, metaphysics—and some indication of its quality may be had by considering the contribution of E. I. Watkin, "The Medieval Tradition," a forceful reminder of the role of the neo-Platonist aesthetic of the Middle Ages; the frank appraisal of "The Mass Media" by Robert Waller; and in a very trying subject matter, "The Freedom of the Imagination" by Alan Pryce-Jones.

In a scholarly vein, the long need for an adequate history in English of Romanesque architecture has been filled by Kenneth John Conant's *Carolingian and Romanesque Architecture 800-1200*. (Pelican History of Art. \$12.50). The period is one of the more energetic of modern times but it is still astonishing to consider the rapid and wide development of this great architecture. Prof. Conant's account is thorough and detailed, for some readers a shade too technical; yet even those with scant patience for technical aspects will be fascinated by his reconstruction of Cluny, and his description of the five great churches of the pilgrimage roads. Romanesque is eminently French, but the sections on Germany, Mudejar Romanesque, the Two Sicilies, and Northern Italy give an idea of how autonomous and local an international style could become. The work has but one shortcoming—the division of the work arbitrarily assigns the study of the sculpture of the period elsewhere. This is mutilation.

Although the photographs are unusually clear considering the difficulties Romanesque interiors present, the reader may find it useful to supplement them with the fine detailed collection of photographs in *Romanesque Europe* (Macmillan \$9.00). The photographs of sculpture are uniformly high in quality.

Broadest in scope is *Christianity in Art* (Bruce, \$4.50) by Frank and Dorothy Getlein. They write unpretentiously and do not demand great technical knowledge of their readers; they try to limit their range by developing the theme of the influence on Christian art of the prevailing Church-state relationship of different periods. This inevitably leads them into overly-simplified historical generalizations, whereas the Getleins' real contribution here is to help the uninitiated begin to see the fine points of composition, the contributions of line, color and mass in some of the most famous works in the history of religious art. The book should be of value in Catholic schools in breaking down anti-Renaissance prejudice.

SERGE HUGHES

5.

"*Africa South* . . . will continue to appear, for as long as what little is left of liberty in South African law permits its publication. And when it is banned, as sooner or later it must be, we have no doubt that the ideas it cherishes will survive, fighting on in the minds of men till Africa throws off at last the terrible clutch of racialism forever." Since Ronald E. Segal, courageous young editor of *Africa South* (Subscription address: Mrs. M. Singer, 336 Summit Ave., Mt. Vernon, N.Y. Price per issue 75c; \$3 per year) wrote those words, the Union of South Africa has erupted in violence and bloodshed. Mr. Segal himself was at first put under house arrest but has managed to escape to England where he

is determined to continue publication of his excellent journal. Mr. Segal, whose brilliant editorials abound in perception and insight, is joined in the pages of *Africa South* by such distinguished figures as Myrna Blumberg, Abdullaye Diop, Alan Paton, and Julius Nyerere.

E. FONTINELL

6.

Jacopo Sadoletto by Richard M. Douglas (Harvard University Press, \$5.00). One of the most interesting and important aspects of Reformation history is the story of reform within the Catholic Church—and until quite recently it has been one of the most neglected aspects. As a result of this neglect our total picture of the great era of religious change and upheaval has suffered and our knowledge of what has long been called the "Counter-Reformation" has been partial and superficial. Happily, however, this situation is being remedied by studies like the present one which are casting a more abundant light on the process and problems of Catholic reform.

Mr. Douglas' study is the biography of one of the most notable Catholic humanists and reformers in the first half of the sixteenth century, Jacopo Sadoletto. Scholar and friend of Erasmus, papal secretary, Bishop of Carpentras, Cardinal and curial reformer, Sadoletto was involved in church affairs at the highest level from the indulgence controversy of 1517 down to the convocation of the Council of Trent in 1545. Torn by the desire for the "contemplative life" of the humanist scholar and by the demands for his service in the Roman Curia, he felt an ever-present tension in his life, and the role he played was both that of a sensitive observer of the crises of his age and that of an active participant in the work of church administration and reform.

It is Mr. Douglas' achievement that he has given us a clear account of Sadoletto's dual rôle as well as a balanced appraisal of his aims and character. And he has done this in a steady, quiet narrative manner that adequately places Sadoletto in the full context of his times. Sadoletto's relationship to other reformers in the Curia is especially interesting and well treated. His separate identity is never lost in these reform associations and the independence of his own approach and spirit is emphasized.

This excellent biography of a Catholic reformer in the Age of Reformation calls to mind Wilhelm Schenk's comparable study of Sadoletto's fellow humanist and Cardinal, Reginald Pole. The tone and theme of both books are remarkably alike and it can only be hoped that further studies of the great figures of Catholic reform—Contarini, Giberti, Caraffa—marked by the same scholarship and objectivity, will soon appear. Our knowledge of the "Counter-Reformation" will certainly be enhanced when they do.

JOHN C. OLIN

7.

The Image Industries (Sheed and Ward, \$3.50). Fr. Lynch's essay has already earned for his publisher the Thomas More Award for creative publishing for 1959. As the work of a creative theologian who is also a distinguished literary critic, the book is a prime example of the value of placing high intelligence to the task of making "a constructive analysis of films and television." Fr. Lynch is free of both snobbishness and moralism, and has a healthy respect for the latent response of the much-abused popular audience. He writes simply, and makes his terminology clear with specific examples.

Cross Currents readers will find confirmation of their suspicion that most

discussions of the popular arts by moralists locate the problem in too narrow a focus. Fr. Lynch is more concerned about the effect on the American public of continual doses of the rootless dream, distortions of reality, artificial "magnificence," and inserted manipulation than the more obvious fixations of "cheese-cake" publicity: "It is surely hard to say which is the greater menace to the final dignity and structure of human nature: the film with the occasional deliberately seductive two minutes in it which can be recognized by moralists and all men of sense, or the film of poor, almost disdainful workmanship and inferior sensibility which constitutes an insult to the very substance, shape, and intelligence of man."

Despite its apparently rambling approach to a wide range of material—including incisively humorous comments on the bland tone of the news announcer, and the content of popular songs—Fr. Lynch's essay is organized to make his case for the release of greater creativity in the national imagination from various vantage-points. His appeal is both to the practicing artist and the creative theologian: they "are united in a common antipathy to any exterior manipulation of the interior man. They can protest together against many features of our contemporary civilization."

Fr. Lynch's relative optimism is perhaps more easy for him because he is writing without reference to the present physical structure of the movie and TV industries; his positive recommendations suggest his awareness of the problem, but he has not chosen to write that particular book. His rhetoric seems to betray him only in his use of the words "socialized," at the outset of his essay, and "enemy" at the close.

The positive response to this study within the American Catholic community suggests that we are approaching the

time when organizations such as the Legion of Decency will be better understood as legitimate but minor aspects of the Catholic approach to the popular arts. Even more importantly, if his plea to practicing artists and theologians is given serious attention, it will have played an important part "in overcoming the present burden of inactivity that lies heavily upon the national spirit."

JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

8.

Catholics in America (continued). Although most readers will justifiably have had a surfeit of journalistic discussions of Catholicism and American politics in recent months, the collection of items on "Catholics in America: some facts and opinions pertinent to the 1960 campaign" that figured in the recent debate in *The New Republic* (1244 19th st., N.W., Washington 6, D.C., \$8 a year) is a public service. It is good to have on record Paul Blanshard's triumphant unmasking of this distinguished liberal weekly as presumably "soft on Catholicism" because it harbored a Catholic literary editor (who assigned a Catholic, William Clancy, to review Blanshard's latest book).

The special issue planned by *NR*'s editors (reprinted in the collection) is soberly executed by John C. Bennett, Arthur Schlesinger, and Jaroslav Pelikan. Not surprisingly, it is Dr. Pelikan, author of this year's award-winning *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism* (Abingdon), who makes the most strenuous efforts to transcend the political-journalistic level of discussion.

Professional liberals might take the largely critical response *The New Republic* received for apparently underestimating "the Catholic threat" as an invitation to some rather strenuous re-examination of outworn clichés. Catholic opinion-makers would profit from reading the reprint of the various items in the debate (available free in a subscription offer reported elsewhere), and reflecting on their responsibility in creating the image of Catholicism as a monolithic anti-democratic power. It would indeed appear that the liberal community is more fearful of "Catholic power" in 1960 than it was in 1928, and even the *NR* editors say they would feel more secure if the Supreme Court reverses the *Everson* decision, as is possible next year.

JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

1.

Holy Writ or Holy Church. The Crisis of the Protestant Reformation (Harper, \$5). Fr. Tavad's new book is a major contribution to the ecumenical dialogue, and indicates that his talents are best employed when he does not need to concern himself with popularizing the results of his scholarship. His book provides new material for an understanding of the history of that separation and opposition of Scripture and Church which

is so intimately involved with the crisis of the Reformation. We have throughout a mine of documentation, a large degree of clarity despite the intricacy of the subject, and nuanced and irenic judgment.

Fr. Tavad makes clear that for the Fathers there was no separation between Church and Scripture. Their teaching was essentially maintained until the end of the 13th century, although the Middle Ages did not always adequately distinguish between inspired Scripture in the

strict sense and the writings of the Fathers and conciliar and papal decrees. The critical spirit of the 14th and 15th century, the importance of nominalism, the tendency to separate spiritual and temporal authority, the Great Schism, the exaggerations of papal power—all are given their emphasis. There is an increasing tendency to hold Church and Scripture in separation, and Fr. Tavad's book makes clear that to pose the question as which of the two, Scripture and Church, is superior to the other, is to misunderstand the traditional position. It is in such a context that we find the excesses of some Catholics in maintaining the superiority of the Church balanced by the Protestant extreme position, in which Scripture is in no respect dependent upon the Church and in no way implies the Church.

Fr. Tavad's final chapters on 'The Anglican Search' and 'The Elizabethan Way' describe the attempt to harmonize the principle of the sufficiency of Scripture with some notion of tradition. His work places scholars of all denominations in his debt, and challenges theologians to proceed with further studies of the nature of the Church and the meaning of doctrinal development.

F. X. QUINN

2.

Abbé Pouget (Helicon, \$4). Jean Guiton has provided us with an unusual work, which brings to life a blind Vincentian priest of an earlier generation who was a spiritual guide and sage for many intellectuals, both in and out of the Church. Its power is difficult to analyze, and like the Abbé's hold over souls, profound in its effect but not wide in its dimensions. One has some notion of the appeal of the book's subject when it is said that the reader often feels that even so gifted a philosopher as Guiton is sometimes in the way. The author is

trying to compose a book which will locate the many suggestive statements of Abbé Pouget as recollected from notes taken after actual lengthy discussions. The dialogues are tremendously suggestive, and the Abbé's mind is revealed as saturated with the Gospels, and striking off various directional statements that appear as summary indications of the concerns to be taken up by a later generation of Catholic scholars.

JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

3.

The Mystery of the Church (Helicon, \$4.75). One does not expect a work by Fr. Yves Congar, the distinguished French Dominican ecclesialogist, to be anything but important, and the above title includes the translation (which, unfortunately, is guilty of a few strange lapses) of two French works, *La Pentecôte de Chartres*, and *Esquisses du Mystère de l'Église*. The first that is printed is actually far more recent, and aimed at a somewhat different and more popular audience; it should have been pointed out in the introduction that the second, although belonging in the library of all those concerned with the ecumenical movement, actually dates from 1938. The first is a meditation, aimed at the students making the annual pilgrimage to Chartres at Pentecost; the second is a work of speculative theology on the nature of the Church. Particularly noteworthy is the emphasis on the role played by the Holy Spirit as the soul of the Church.

F. X. QUINN

4.

Roman Catholicism and Religious Liberty. The articles of A. F. Carillo de Albornoz, appearing in the *Ecumenical Review* (July and Oct., 1959, and Jan., 1960) have been reprinted as a booklet by the World Council of Churches. This

is a sober and scholarly work of documentation, which should help to make clear that American Catholic acceptance of the U.S. constitution is not a pragmatic "exception" to Catholic thinking on religious freedom, but is in the spirit of the mainstream of contemporary Catholic theology. The author concludes his study with several generalizations: after comparing Catholic and ecumenical statements on religious liberty, he believes that "the *doctrinal* accord between ecumenism and this stream of Roman Catholic thought on the matter is highly satisfactory. We believe also that, once this Roman Catholic opinion ceases to be only *one of several* admitted within Catholic orthodoxy and becomes the *official attitude* of the Church itself, a *practical* agreement with the Roman Catholic Church on the real exercise of religious liberty in all countries will be possible. And we sincerely hope that time is not so far away as many fear."

Deploring the atmosphere of distrust in which the Catholic attitude to re-

ligious freedom is discussed, he continues:

Too many Protestants seem to believe that all Roman Catholics (even those who defend religious liberty) are of bad faith and voluntarily tergiversate in this matter with the machiavellian intention of misleading Protestants or that they have as unique goal, in all they say and do, political domination. As for Roman Catholics, many of them also seem to think that Protestants raise the question of religious liberty merely as a pretext to attack the Catholic Church.

Without many illusions as to the long road that must yet be traversed, study groups using this booklet may be helped, in accordance with the author's desire, "to create the necessary atmosphere for an ecumenical understanding."

When sending for the booklet, it will also be useful to enter a regular subscription to *The Ecumenical Review*, a needed reference source in this whole urgent field (World Council of Churches, 475 Riverside Drive, New York 27, N.Y., quarterly, \$3).

JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

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